



## ADVANCED GCE

## HISTORY

Historical Investigations 1799–1955

**2589**

Candidates answer on the Answer Booklet

### OCR Supplied Materials:

- 16 page Answer Booklet

### Other Materials Required:

None

**Monday 8 June 2009**

**Morning**

**Duration:** 1 hour 30 minutes



## MODIFIED LANGUAGE

### INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

- Write your name clearly in capital letters, your Centre Number and Candidate Number in the spaces provided on the Answer Booklet.
- Use black ink. Pencil may be used for graphs and diagrams only.
- Read each question carefully and make sure that you know what you have to do before starting your answer.
- Do **not** write in the bar codes.

### INFORMATION FOR CANDIDATES

- The number of marks is given in brackets [ ] at the end of each question or part question.
- The total number of marks for this paper is **90**.
- This paper contains questions on the following two Options:
  - Napoleon I (pages 2–3)
  - Stalin and the Development of the Cold War in Europe 1941–55 (pages 4–5)
- Answer on **one** Option only. In that Option, answer the Passages question, and **one** other question.
- You should write in continuous prose and are reminded of the need for clear and accurate writing, including structure of argument, grammar, punctuation and spelling.
- The time permitted allows for reading the Passages of the one Option you have studied.
- You are advised to spend equal time on the Passages question and the essay you select.
- In answering the Passages question, you are expected to use your knowledge of the topic to help you explain and evaluate the interpretations in the Passages, as well as to inform your answer.
- In answering an essay question, you are expected to refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations to help you develop your arguments.
- This document consists of **8** pages. Any blank pages are indicated.

## Napoleon I

If answering on this Option, candidates **MUST** answer **Question 1** and **ONE** other question.

- 1 Using these **four** Passages **and** your own knowledge, assess the view that the **main** reason for Napoleon's downfall was the defeat in Russia. [45]

**A** From: G. Rudé, *Revolutionary Europe 1783–1815*, published in 1964. This historian suggests that Napoleon's invasion of Spain led to his downfall.

Some say Napoleon's downfall began in Spain, others Moscow, others again at Leipzig in 1813; or even in besieged and embattled France in the Spring of 1814. Napoleon himself confessed that it was 'the Spanish ulcer' that destroyed him. There was certainly no straight and undeviating line of destruction leading from the Battle of Baylen (in Spain) and the lines of Torres Vedras (in Portugal) to Waterloo. Nevertheless, the Peninsular War, beginning in 1808, became a running sore that drained the Grand Army, gave fresh hope and opportunity to his enemies in England, Austria and Russia, and generally stimulated that 'awakening of peoples' to which his ultimate fall and failure have most commonly been attributed. 5

**B** From: F. L. Ford, *Europe 1780–1830*, published in 1989. This historian argues that Napoleon's downfall was not inevitable, and that Napoleon's refusal to accept peace terms was a key reason for his downfall.

Napoleon's chief hope of survival after 1812 lay in the chronic jealousy and suspicion among the powers attacking him. Austria, in particular, had reason to stop short of a total victory likely to benefit its old rivals, Prussia and Russia, while releasing nationalistic passions among the various groups of the Austrian Emperor's subjects. In 1813 Austria still saw advantages in maintaining Bonaparte, linked as he was by marriage. Early in November, therefore, the Austrian foreign minister made an offer of peace which guaranteed France its natural frontiers, the Rhine, Alps and Pyrenees. This would have left Belgium, the German left bank of the Rhine and Nice-Savoy under French rule. These terms Napoleon bluntly refused. On 21 December the armies of the fourth Coalition crossed the Rhine into France. Local victories in February 1814 so exhilarated Napoleon that he again brushed aside peace offers. As a result Britain was able to secure an Allied agreement that they should fight on together to a clear decision. 10 15 20

- C** From: M. Broers, *Europe under Napoleon 1799–1815*, published in 1996. This historian argues that Napoleon's defeat in Russia, though serious, was only the start of his downfall.

Of the 650,000 troops who began the invasion of Russia, only 93,000 returned. The majority of those troops lost were the best. The mainly French central force was destroyed: only 25,000 of an original force of 450,000 struggled back to Poland. Equally serious was the loss of good cavalry and artillery horses and never again would the French have an advantage in this sector. The Russian catastrophe should have been the end of Napoleonic domination, but it was only the beginning of the process and, for contemporaries, even a victory of these proportions did not signal a return of confidence. The campaign of 1812 had all but exhausted Russia both financially and militarily, and the Russians themselves were divided over whether to pursue Napoleon over their own borders. Metternich kept Austria neutral, still afraid to fight even a shattered Grand Army. He tried to arrange peace between Napoleon and Russia, which Napoleon saw as an incentive to fight on.

- D** From: G. Ellis, *The Napoleonic Empire*, published in 2003. This historian argues that in the end it was Russia that played the most important role in the defeat of Napoleon.

If the military turning point in Napoleon's fortunes was the disastrous Russian campaign of 1812, it nevertheless took all the allies to bring him down in the campaigns of 1813–14. In that victory the contribution of Russia was probably the decisive factor, helped no doubt by Prussian mobilisation early in 1813. For if Britain provided most of the financial backing of the allied coalition, thanks to her heavy subsidies, Tsar Alexander I injected the resolute will to pursue and destroy Napoleon while he was in retreat. It was this determination, almost a sense of crusade, that eventually gave the Allies their superiority over the French. In spite of Napoleon's desperate and often brilliant efforts during the campaigns of 1813–14, he was forced to abdicate on 6 April 1814.

Answer **either**

- 2** Assess the view that Napoleon was the 'heir to the French Revolution'. [45]

**or**

- 3** Assess the view that the main reason for Napoleon's military success in Europe up to 1809 was the weaknesses of his enemies. [45]

*Candidates are reminded that they must refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations in developing the argument in their essay.*

## Stalin and the Development of the Cold War in Europe 1941–55

If answering this Option, candidates **MUST** answer **Question 19** and **ONE** other question.

- 19** Using these **four** Passages **and** your own knowledge, assess the view that the collapse of the Grand Alliance at the end of the Second World War was inevitable. **[45]**

- A** From: Michael Lynch, *Stalin and Khrushchev: The USSR 1924–1964*, published in 1990. This historian argues that the only reason for the Grand Alliance was the Second World War.

The coming together of the 'Big Three', the Soviet Union, the USA and Britain, became known as the 'Grand Alliance'. However, a more accurate description might be a 'marriage of convenience'. What bound them together was their desire to defeat their common enemy. They had little else in common. There were constant disputes between the Soviet Union and its two western partners. A major irritant was the question of the Second Front. Later on, as the war drew towards its end and the defeat of Germany became highly probable, the ideological differences between the Soviet Union and the other allies began to resurface. There was fear in the Soviet Union that Britain and the USA would attempt to enlist Germany in a war against Soviet communism. On the western side, there was anxiety that the Soviet advance into Eastern Europe heralded the start of a new period of communist expansion.

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- B** From: David Williamson, *The Cold War in Europe*, published in 2002. This historian argues that differences between the allies meant their alliance was unlikely to last after the war had ended.

It can be argued that the Cold War began from the very moment the communists triumphed in the Russian Revolutions of 1917. But if we accept that there was no Cold War proper during the 1920s and 1930s, it was Hitler who created the context for the Cold War when he invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941 and then, just after Pearl Harbour, declared war on the USA. The subsequent defeat of Germany by the Soviet Union and their western allies in 1945 at last brought the two superpowers – the Soviet Union and the USA – face to face. A few days before he committed suicide, Hitler predicted that 'the laws of history and geography' would make a conflict between these powers inevitable. Some historians see this as the key explanation for the Cold War. The causes of the Cold War can be likened to placing a 'scorpion and a tarantula together in a bottle'.

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- C** From: Oliver Edwards, *The USA and the Cold War 1945–1963*, published in 2002. This historian argues that although there were differences in their post-war aims neither Roosevelt nor Stalin wanted their alliance to break down.

Roosevelt and Stalin shared some post-war objectives. Both agreed on limiting the power of Germany. Roosevelt thought that the Soviet Union might be a more important ally to the USA than Britain. Stalin genuinely wanted to remain on good terms with the USA. Yet in many respects their plans for the post-war world were radically different. Roosevelt's most cherished objective was the creation of the United Nations. Stalin's overriding concern was the security of the Soviet Union. His country had paid a high price for victory over Germany. From Stalin's point of view it was essential that the Eastern European states on the Soviet perimeter should have similar political and economic systems to the Soviet Union.

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- D** From: Mike Sewell, *The Cold War*, published in 2002. This historian argues that there were tensions between the wartime allies but that the collapse of the alliance was not inevitable.

With the onset of war in June 1941, Stalin sought an alliance with the West. It was an alliance of convenience, of desperation, not trust. Ideological mistrust remained strong. This was reinforced by Stalin's suspicion that the Anglo-American strategy was to fight Hitler to the last Russian. During the war, the Soviets discussed post-war aims with their Western allies. Deals were possible, especially with the British as is shown by the agreement on percentages of influence in the Balkans in November 1944. Differences among the allies were not always Western-Soviet antagonisms. Soviet perceptions of Anglo-American friction were encouraged by Roosevelt's actions at Tehran and Yalta on the issue of imperialism. Roosevelt remained confident that he could deal with Stalin on the basis of the mutual trust that had been built up during the war. The British and the Americans remained confident that they could do deals with Stalin.

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Answer **either**

- 20** Assess the view that the main reason for the USA's policies and actions in the period from 1945 to 1949 was that the USA wanted to protect Europe from communism. **[45]**

**or**

- 21** Assess the view that Stalin's policies in Eastern Europe were more defensive than aggressive in the period from 1944 to 1948. **[45]**

*Candidates are reminded that they must refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations in developing the argument in their essay.*

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