



*Rewarding Learning*

**ADVANCED  
General Certificate of Education  
January 2013**

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## **History**

**Assessment Unit A2 1**

**[AH211]**

**FRIDAY 18 JANUARY, MORNING**

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# **MARK SCHEME**

## Level of response mark grid

This level of response grid has been developed as a general basis for marking candidates' work, according to the following assessment objectives:

**AO1a** recall, select and deploy historical knowledge accurately and communicate knowledge and understanding of history in a clear and effective manner;

**AO1b** present historical explanations, showing understanding of appropriate concepts and arrive at substantiated judgements;

**AO2** In relation to historical context:

- interpret, evaluate and use a range of source material;
- explain and evaluate interpretations of historical events and topics studied.

The grid should be used in conjunction with the information on indicative content outlined for each assessment unit.

<b>Level</b>	<b>Assessment Objective 1a</b>	<b>Assessment Objective 1b</b>	<b>Assessment Objective 2</b>
	Answers at this level will:	Answers at this level will:	Answers at this level will:
<b>1</b>	recall, select and deploy some accurate factual knowledge and communicate limited understanding in narrative form. There will be evidence of an attempt to structure and present answers in a coherent manner.	display a basic understanding of the topic; some comments may be relevant, but general and there may be assertions and judgements which require supporting evidence.	limited recognition of the possibility of debate surrounding an event or topic.
<b>2</b>	be quite accurate, contain some detail and show understanding through a mainly narrative approach. Communication may have occasional lapses of clarity and/or coherence.	display general understanding of the topic and its associated concepts and offer explanations which are mostly relevant, although there may be limited analysis and a tendency to digress. There will be some supporting evidence for assertions and judgements.	an attempt to explain different approaches to and interpretations of the event or topic. Evaluation may be limited.
<b>3</b>	contain appropriate examples with illustrative and supportive factual evidence and show understanding and ability to engage with the issues raised by the question in a clear and coherent manner.	display good breadth of understanding of the topic and its associated concepts. Analysis is generally informed and suitably illustrated to support explanations and judgements.	there will be an ability to present and evaluate different arguments for and against particular interpretations of an event or topic.
<b>4</b>	be accurate and well-informed and show ability to engage fully with the demands of the question. Knowledge and understanding will be expressed with clarity and precision.	display breadth and depth of understanding of the topic and its associated concepts. Explanations will be well-informed with arguments and judgements well-substantiated, illustrated and informed by factual evidence.	there will be appropriate explanation, insightful interpretation and well-argued evaluation of particular interpretations of an event or topic.

## Synoptic Assessment

Examiners should assess the candidate's ability to draw together knowledge and skills in order to demonstrate overall historical understanding. Candidates' answers should demonstrate breadth of historical knowledge and understanding by ranging comprehensively across the period of study as a whole. They should make links and comparisons which are properly developed and analysed and thus indicate understanding of the process of historical change. The knowledge and understanding of the subject should come from more than one perspective – political or cultural or economic – and there should be understanding demonstrated of the connections or inter-relationship between these perspectives.

### Generic Levels of Response for Synoptic Assessment

**The generic levels of response should be used in conjunction with the information on the indicative content outlined for each answer.**

#### **Level 1 ([0]–[5]) AO2(b), ([0]–[7]) AO1(b)**

Answers at this level may recall some accurate knowledge and display understanding of mainly one part of the period and one perspective. The answer will be characterised throughout by limited accuracy and a lack of clarity. Answers may provide a descriptive narrative of events. There will be few links and comparisons made between different parts of the period. Answers will be mainly a series of unsubstantiated assertions with little analysis **AO1(b)**. There may be perhaps an awareness of contemporary **or** later interpretations, but the answer may focus only on one interpretation **AO2(b)**. Answers at this level will be characterised throughout by unclear meaning due to illegibility, inaccurate spelling, punctuation and grammar; there will be an inappropriate style of writing; and defects in organisation and lack of a specialist vocabulary.

#### **Level 2 ([6]–[10]) AO2(b), ([8]–[15]) AO1(b)**

Answers at this level may recall and deploy knowledge which draws from examples across the period. The answer will have frequent lapses in accuracy and at times lack clarity. The answer will provide some explanation though at times will lapse into narrative. Links and comparisons will be made but these will not be fully developed or analysed. Answers will contain some unsubstantiated assertions, but also arguments which are appropriately developed and substantiated **AO1(b)**. There will be an awareness of contemporary **or** later interpretations about the subject, but this will be limited and in need of further development **AO2(b)**. Answers at this level will have frequent lapses in meaning, inaccurate spelling, punctuation and grammar; at times the style of writing will be inappropriate; there will be occasional defects in organisation and little specialist vocabulary.

#### **Level 3 ([11]–[15]) AO2(b), ([16]–[22]) AO1(b)**

Answers at this level will recall and deploy knowledge accurately, drawing from all parts of the period with clarity and focus. Answers provide focused explanations and make links and comparisons which are developed and analysed, indicating an understanding of the process of historical change. Arguments are developed, substantiated, illustrated and reach a judgement **AO1(b)**. There is a satisfactory evaluation of either contemporary **or** later interpretations of the subject **or** a partial evaluation of **both AO2(b)**. Answers at this level will be characterised by clarity of meaning due to legibility, accurate spelling, punctuation and grammar; the style of writing is appropriate; there is good organisation and some specialist vocabulary.

**Level 4 ([16]–[20]) AO2(b), ([23]–[30]) AO1(b)**

Answers at this level will demonstrate accurate recall of knowledge from across the period studied with clarity and precision. Answers will provide detailed and focused insightful explanations drawing on actions, events, issues or perspectives across the period, and there is an excellent understanding of the connections or interrelationships between these. A judgement is reached using arguments that are fully developed, illustrated and substantiated **AO1(b)**. There is a well-informed and insightful evaluation of contemporary **and** later interpretations **AO2(b)**. Answers at this level will be consistently characterised throughout by clarity of meaning due to legibility, accurate spelling, punctuation and grammar; the style of writing is most appropriate; there is very good organisation and appropriate use of specialist vocabulary.

## Option 1: Anglo-Spanish Relations 1509–1609

AVAILABLE  
MARKS

Answer **one** question.

- 1 “The strong Catholic beliefs of Spanish monarchs had the greatest impact on Anglo-Spanish relations in the period 1509–1609.” How far would you accept this verdict?”

This question requires an assessment of the impact that the Catholic beliefs of Spanish monarchs had on Anglo-Spanish relations throughout the century. Responses might consider the impact that the religious beliefs of others had on Anglo-Spanish relations. Answers should consider if all the Spanish monarchs of the period had strong beliefs and if these were the main influence on Anglo-Spanish relations.

Top level responses will reflect on how far the religious beliefs of Spanish monarchs differed from their English counterparts and if these differences had the greatest impact on Anglo-Spanish relations. Answers should also consider other factors which had a major influence on relations such as: economic clashes in the Americas, political or dynastic conflict and clashes of personality between rulers.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

**Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:**

**(a) Religion**

Answers should consider whether Spanish monarchs had strong Catholic beliefs. The granting of the title “Their most Catholic Majesties” to Ferdinand and Isabella by the Pope and their campaign against the Moors established this idea. As the title was passed down to Charles I (V) and Philip II and III, it could be suggested that strong Catholicism continued in Spain. Candidates might use J Doussingague’s attitude to Charles V’s war against the Turks as being driven by religious belief. Responses should support this by showing how Charles I opposed the birth of Protestantism and was particularly harsh against Protestants in his Dutch possessions. Philip II’s support for the Inquisition, actions against the Moriscos and Turks, harsh treatment of Dutch Calvinists and conflict with Protestant England all suggest that he followed these strong Catholic beliefs. Candidates could use the “Black legend” and historians like P Geyl to support this view. Philip III showed his Catholic beliefs by expelling the Moriscos from Spain.

Responses should consider how far this strong Catholicism affected Anglo-Spanish relations. As Henry VIII was a strong supporter of Roman Catholicism until the 1530s, religion cannot be considered to have had a major impact on Anglo-Spanish relations before the break from Rome in 1533. The decline in the strong relationship between England and Spain in the 1530s could be explained by the split from

Rome or by Charles' annoyance at the mistreatment of his aunt and the Habsburg family name. Candidates might use Cromwell or Cranmer's attitudes of the 1530s and 1540s to demonstrate the growing reforming interests in England. The alliance of the 1540s with both Henry VIII and his openly Protestant son, Edward VI, suggests that the Catholic beliefs of Spanish monarchs were not the greatest influence on Anglo-Spanish relations. Philip II's support for Elizabeth I in the early 1560s lends support to this argument, yet the growing conflict of the 1570s and 1580s and the sending of the Armada support the proposition. Philip III's continuation of the conflict against Elizabeth and the signing of the Treaty of London with the Protestant James I suggests a non-religious motivation.

Answers should also consider the religious motivations of English monarchs. Henry VIII had little time for Protestantism but his clashes with the Papacy left England with its own style of Catholicism, quite different to Spain's Roman Catholicism. Edward VI favoured a radical brand of Protestantism, yet good relations were maintained between England and Spain. The restoration of Roman Catholicism under Mary I could have damaged Anglo-Spanish relations. Mary's marriage to Philip Habsburg linked Spain to the persecution of English Protestants and developed a strong xenophobic feeling in England. Cardinal Pole's comments on the failure of the persecution of Protestants could support this case. The mild Protestant church settlement of Elizabeth's reign suggested an open-minded approach to religion but support for Protestant rebels in Scotland, France and the Netherlands gave Elizabeth the image of a Protestant crusader.

**(b) Economic Factors**

Good economic links between England and Spain had been established by the Treaty of Medina del Campo and this developed with the wool trade and Spain's rule of the Netherlands. Good economic links continued throughout the reign of Charles I (V) despite religious conflict over England's break with Rome. Signs of growing English competition were evident in the late-1550s and this might relate to growing Protestantism in England. Spain's economy had many weaknesses such as poor agriculture, lack of industry, parasitic nobility and investment directed towards government bonds. In addition, it was overwhelmed by the almost constant state of war that Spain found itself in. It was these weaknesses that made Spain more sensitive to challenge rather than the appearance of Protestant belief. A growing conflict with the English in the New World led to disruption in the flow of bullion into Spain and further damaged Spain's fragile financial position. This challenge to the jewel in the crown of the Spanish empire had a major impact on Anglo-Spanish relations and was heightened by the growing differences on religion.

England wanted to expand trade by establishing new markets and sources of raw materials and find new homes for a surplus population. W Cecil's comments supporting these ideas could be used as a



contemporary view of this issue. England was not content to let Spain have the New World more or less to itself. Spain had been granted control of the New World by the Pope and England did not recognise his authority. Many Englishmen saw themselves as a chosen people and this can be used to show how religion influenced economic affairs. Contemporaries like Drake and Hawkins despised the Spanish and openly campaigned against them both verbally and physically. England was also concerned for the security of its traditional markets in the Netherlands. Antwerp was the European base for the merchant adventurers who controlled the vital woollen trade. The inability of Philip II to govern this province led to rebellion which damaged English trade. English intervention in Dutch affairs was for economic reasons but, as the rebellion was also Protestant, the causes of intervention become blurred. Candidates might use RB Wernham's views on English involvement in the Dutch revolt to support this idea.

**(c) Political/Dynastic Factors**

The changing dynastic links between the two countries could be said to have had the greatest impact on Anglo-Spanish relations. The divorce issue of the 1530s could be seen as a slight on the Habsburg family name and Elizabeth's rejection of Philip II as damaging to his ego. Philip meddled in English politics in order to topple Elizabeth, supporting Mary Stuart, the Revolt of the Northern Earls, as well as the Ridolfi and Babington Plots. Candidates might use the ideas of R Trevor Davies when he compares Philip II's foreign policy to Germany's *Weltpolitik* of 1914. During the course of the century, the role of France in shaping Anglo-Spanish relations changed. Philip II's comment of "better a heretic on the English throne than a French woman" supports the importance of France in Anglo-Spanish relations. In the first half of the century France was a common enemy that united the two countries but, when it was consumed by the Wars of Religion, each side interfered in France to further its own interests and this increased tension. For example, Elizabeth interfered in France with the intention of inducing it to intervene in the Netherlands against Spain. Money was given to the Duke of Anjou and troops were sent to the aid of Henry of Navarre for this purpose. Whoever controlled the Netherlands was of interest to England because it was the natural invasion route from the continent. The ports of the Netherlands were only a day's sailing away from England. For such interests of national security, England preferred the Netherlands to be largely self-governing. Spain's increasing military presence from the 1560s posed a threat to national security. Elizabeth's support for the Dutch rebels in the Treaty of Nonsuch (1585) was a trigger for the war between Spain and England. The treaty committed England to sending a force of 6000 under the Earl of Leicester. Candidates could use the contemporary comments of Robert Dudley as evidence of the pro-war camp at the English court. English privateering raids from Hawkins and Drake in the New World were an attack on Philip's authority and prestige, revealing the vulnerability of his overseas empire and forcing him into costly projects for their defence. Candidates might use the discussion



between historians like J Neale and D Loades to decide if Elizabeth had a foreign policy or was reactive or proactive. Much of the conflict of the 1570s to the early 1600s could be attributed to the clash of personalities between Elizabeth I and Philip II. Both monarchs wished to avoid war yet their own arrogance and misunderstanding of their opposite number increased the likelihood of conflict. When Philip signed the Treaty of Joinville, Elizabeth suspected a Catholic crusade against her and this encouraged her to support the Dutch. Philip identified these actions as those of a crusading Protestant. In both cases each monarch was trying to protect its own internal realms from the spread of French Protestantism or possible Spanish invasion. Philip III's continuation of war until Elizabeth's death and speedy conclusion of peace with James I, in 1604, supports the argument that personality had a more important impact on Anglo-Spanish relations than the strong Catholicism of Spanish monarchs.

Candidates should conclude that relations were influenced by this range of factors and reach their own conclusion. The strong religious beliefs of Spanish monarchs were a vital element but it may be argued that it did or did not have the "greatest impact" on Anglo-Spanish relations. Arguments must reflect the period and may put different emphasis at different parts of the century and with different monarchs.

*Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately*

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- 2 "England's foreign policy towards Spain in the period 1509–1609 was defensive, while Spain's foreign policy towards England was aggressive." To what extent would you agree with this statement?

This question requires an assessment of the aims of both England and Spain in their foreign policy. Answers should focus on whether England's policy was defensive and Spain's aggressive and whether these policies remained constant throughout the entire period. Responses should consider the impact different monarchs had on Anglo-Spanish relations and how their aims and personalities influenced relations. Responses could consider England's growing international standing throughout the period and consider how this changes Anglo-Spanish relations from the 1570s onwards.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

**Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:**

**(a) Henry VIII and Ferdinand, 1509–1516**

Answers will consider how Anglo-Spanish relations had been mutually supportive in the Treaty of Medina del Campo of 1489. The newly

united Kingdoms of Aragon and Castile sought support and the Tudor dynasty of England saw mutual benefits in an alliance. The marriage of Henry VIII to Catherine of Aragon confirmed strong Anglo-Spanish relations which led to an alliance between the nations against France. The war of 1512 with France shows both England and Spain working together against the French with no sign of a defensive or aggressive element to their relationship. The historian Woodward's views of Ferdinand's foreign policy could be used in this discussion. Anglo-Spanish relations in this period were manipulated by the wily and experienced Ferdinand who used Henry VIII's desire to be King of France as a means to exert influence on the young monarch. Ferdinand's successes in Navarre were gained at Henry's expense but the policy of each nation could not be described as aggressive or defensive. Machiavelli's description of Ferdinand as a "preacher of peace and goodwill and an enemy of both" gives a contemporary opinion which supports this argument.

**(b) Henry VIII and Charles I (V), 1516–1547**

When Charles Habsburg succeeded his grandfather, Ferdinand, as King of Spain in 1516 relations between England and Spain began to change. Spain's growing wealth, gained from its New World possessions, made it one of Europe's leading nations and, when Charles became Holy Roman Emperor in 1519, he was the most powerful man in Europe. Candidates could use M Rady's comments to give a historical perspective on the nature of Charles V's kingship. Answers could use this position to suggest that England's foreign policy became defensive against the two main powers in Europe, France and Spain. However, the Habsburg-Valois dynastic war created a valuable middle ground that England and Thomas Wolsey took advantage of. Responses might consider England's international position as shown in the Treaty of London (1518), the Field of the Cloth of Gold (1521), the Treaty of Windsor (1522) and the Treaty of More (1525) and League of Cognac (1526). Wolsey's attempts to develop England's international position by switching support between France and Spain suggest that its policy was not defensive but rather about advancement. Henry VIII's desire to be King of France always made him more likely to be aggressive towards France and the Treaty of Cognac shows that, even in opposition to Spain, England declined to come into open conflict with it. Candidates could use comments by Wolsey to support a number of the differing aims of Henry VIII's foreign policy. Relations between England and Spain had their ups and downs in the 1520s but there few signs of Spanish aggression.

The divorce issue of the 1530s could be used to show how a defensive English and aggressive Spanish policy developed. Charles I (V) felt that his family was being slighted with Henry VIII's attempt to divorce Charles I (V)'s aunt, Catherine of Aragon. Responses might suggest an aggressive policy from the Emperor towards England. Henry VIII's policy in the 1530s was inward looking and his heavy expenditure on coastal defences could suggest a defensive mindset, especially after his excommunication. The 1540s saw Anglo-Spanish relations restored with a renewed alliance

against the French. Henry VIII was once again motivated by a desire to be King of France and this does not fit with a defensive foreign policy, although it does protect England from Spanish aggression. Charles I (V) may have been aggressive towards Henry VIII but his desire to defeat France seems to have overridden his opposition to England.

**(c) Edward VI, Mary, Charles I (V) and Philip II, 1547–1558**

English actions in this period seem to fit with a defensive foreign policy towards Spain. Protector Somerset and Northumberland maintained good relations with Spain in order to stabilise their own rule in this period. With the creation of a Protestant religious settlement in England, opposition from Spain could have been harmful. Charles I (V)'s policy could not be viewed as aggressive towards England, despite the religious changes happening there. Once more Charles I (V)'s need for allies against France limited his aggression towards England.

Mary I's marriage to Philip Habsburg could be seen as a defensive move by England. Parliament's concerns forced the placing of restrictions on Philip yet both England and Spain concluded the alliance despite these problems. Candidates might use Wyatt's rebellion of 1554 as a demonstration of hostility towards Catholic Spain. This suggests a defensive motive from England but not an aggressive policy from Spain. Mary's attempts to avoid supporting her husband, Philip II of Spain, in his war with the French in 1558 suggest a defensive policy from England but not one focused on Spain. Candidates might use A Pollard's comments on Mary's foreign policy to consider this point. Responses could see Philip II's use of England in this conflict as manipulative but not aggressive towards England.

**(d) Elizabeth I and Philip II, 1558–1598**

Responses could suggest that England's foreign policy in the 1560s was defensive as Elizabeth attempted to hold on to her throne. Philip II's marriage proposal to, and protection of Elizabeth from excommunication, could be used to show a supportive Spanish policy rather than an aggressive one.

Answers might use events from the 1570s onwards to show Spanish aggression towards England. Spanish support for the Rebellion of the Northern Earls, the Ridolphi plot, Munster rebellion, Throckmorton plot and Babington plot all suggest Spanish aggression. The declaration of war by Spain in 1585 and the sending of the Armada in 1588 further support this case. Candidates might compare the attitudes of H Kamen to G Parker to show the historical debate about the motives of Spain's foreign policy on this issue.

Responses might suggest that Elizabeth's foreign policy was aggressive and not defensive. Her involvement in Scotland (1560) and France (1562) suggest a religiously motivated foreign policy which was bound to lead to conflict with His Most Catholic Majesty, Philip II of Spain. Candidates might use Walsingham's contemporary comments as evidence of the open hostility of many of the nobility of England to

Spain. This could be contrasted with W Cecil's pursuit of peace. Historical debate between W Camden and C Haigh could be used to highlight this area of discussion. Elizabeth's support for and eventual treaty with Dutch rebels was certain to lead to conflict with Spain and responses might see this as not being a defensive foreign policy. Answers could suggest that Elizabeth used restraint in her support for the Dutch and in her dealings with Spain, despite the contrary opinion of her advisors, and this shows a defensive mindset to her policy.

**(e) Elizabeth I, James I and Philip III, 1598–1609**

Elizabeth's refusal to look for peace with Spain after Philip II's death could be used to argue against a defensive policy. With Elizabeth's death in 1603, the two new monarchs, Philip III and James I, were able to sign the Treaty of London (1604). This treaty's recognition of a strong English position could be seen as a defensive move by the Spanish and a reward for English aggression. Candidates might use the views of R Cecil as a means of demonstrating England's views on peace with Spain. Answers might suggest that it was a defensive move by James I to allow him to establish his reign in England. The historical debate on James I between historians like W Roughead and G Donaldson could be used by candidates to demonstrate the difficult position in which James I found himself.

*Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately*

[50]

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**Option 1**

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## Option 2: Crown and Parliament in England 1603–1702

AVAILABLE  
MARKS

Answer **one** question.

- 1 “In England the period 1603–1702 should be seen as a victory for Parliament over the Crown.” How far would you agree with this verdict?

This question requires an assessment of the extent to which the events of the seventeenth century can be interpreted as a victory for Parliament over the Crown.

Top level responses will reflect on the extent to which Parliament ended the century in a position of supremacy, focusing on the key moments which changed the relationship between Crown and Parliament, such as the Constitutional Revolution, the execution of Charles I, the Glorious Revolution and the Nine Years’ War in Europe.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

**Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:**

**(a) The power and influence of Parliament in 1603**

In early Stuart England Parliament’s role involved obtaining the consent of the Kingdom’s representatives and maintaining contact between the monarch and his subjects. It was responsible for providing the King with advice and supply, and passing bills. The Crown could appoint officials, advisors and bishops; make foreign policy and control the armed forces; summon, prorogue and dissolve Parliament; obstruct legislation; dispense individuals from or suspend law; issue proclamations and vary customs duties. As Parliament was an irregularly occurring event rather than an annual institution and was entirely dependent on the monarch for its existence, it had limited status and influence in early Stuart England. It was further weakened by the predominance of factions rather than political parties with shared ideals and stated aims. Parliament’s main strength was in its power to help the monarch change the law and its control of the country’s, and consequently the monarch’s, purse strings.

**(b) The reign of James I**

While the reign of James I (1603–1625) saw some significant clashes between King and Parliament, notably over monopolies and foreign policy, there was little significant change to their relationship. Contemporary opinion of leading figures such as Cranfield may be utilised to explain the tensions between Crown and Parliament. Good candidates may note that the Monopoly Act placed a limitation on the monarch and Parliament’s impeachment of Cranfield marked a significant challenge to the King’s power to choose his own ministers. However, the reign of James I should not be interpreted as a victory for Parliament over the King. Candidates may employ an observation from a historian such as Durston on the impact of the reign of James I.

**(c) The “Constitutional Revolution”, 1640–1642**

During this period a number of successful attempts were made to impose limits on royal power and secure an increased and more permanent role for Parliament. The Triennial Act and the Act Against Own Dissolution were designed to prevent the monarch employing personal rule in the future and increase the co-dependency of their relationship. This “revolution” saw the abolition of the Crown’s prerogative financial devices, increasing the need for monarchy to rely upon finance from Parliament. The abolition of the prerogative courts restricted the Crown’s independence in the legal system.

However, there were limits to what was actually achieved by Parliament; for example, it failed to secure the right to choose the King’s ministers and Charles I refused to allow them to lessen his control of the Anglican Church. The King also retained his right to collect customs duties and to become financially independent if his revenues increased due to an expansion of trade. The control of the armed forces also remained a royal prerogative. Despite these limitations there is no doubt that the period 1640–1642 saw Parliament achieve a number of notable victories over the Crown, although it is debatable if it merits the term “revolution”. Contemporary opinion from Milton may be employed, while the views of historians such as Hirst could be used to explain the impact of this period.

**(d) The Execution of Charles I, 1649**

Parliament’s victory in two civil wars and the execution of Charles I could arguably be seen as the ultimate victory of Parliament in this period, as England became a republic with an exiled monarch. Good candidates will note that the execution of the King was not supported by all of Parliament, noting the significance of Pride’s Purge or even how the country had been divided during the Civil War. Parliament may have secured a military and political victory over the King but found it difficult to find a workable political settlement without the monarchy. The contemporary opinion of individuals such as Ludlow and the views of leading historians such as Aylmer may be included. While the execution certainly created a radical change in the government of England, the restoration of Charles II in 1660 suggests that the change was only temporary.

**(e) The Restoration Settlement and the Reign of Charles II, 1660–1685**

The Restoration Settlement confirmed all the reforms passed by Parliament up to the end of the 1641 session and ensured that the impact of the Constitutional Revolution would be long-lasting. The prerogative taxation and courts of Charles I’s reign remained illegal and the King could no longer collect taxes without Parliament’s consent. The King’s permanent revenue was set at a level, £1.2 million, which was designed to ensure the need for Parliament to meet and vote additional supply. The Clarendon Code and the later Test Acts would reassert the supremacy of Parliament over the church, although the monarch regained his position as Head of the Church. Despite these



significant changes to his relationship with his Parliament, the position and prerogative power Charles II inherited in 1660 remained almost the same as that which his father had received in 1625. The victory Parliament had secured on the civil war battlefields and in the King's execution had not resulted in any long-term change. Indeed, Charles II's Cavalier Parliament further strengthened his position by making it treason to imprison or restrain the King, censoring the press and passing a weakened Triennial Act. Contemporary opinion of leading figures such as Pepys may be included to explain the political impact of these changes. By the end of his reign Charles II was financially independent of Parliament due to the customs boom from the trade revolution and the subsidies he received from France. By the time of his death Charles II was able to leave his brother a remarkably stable and financially secure position. Comments from historians such as Bliss may be included to explain the changing position of Parliament.

**(f) The Glorious Revolution and the Revolution Settlement, 1688–1689**

The relationship between James II and his Tory dominated Parliament had initially been good but was ruined by his retaining of a standing army after the Monmouth Rebellion and particularly his promotion of Catholic officers. His desire to secure political and religious equality for Catholics and his attempt to pack Parliament with supporters of reforming the penal laws resulted in a complete breakdown in his relationship with the gentry and ultimately his removal in the Glorious Revolution. Contemporary opinion from the Marquis of Halifax could be employed to illustrate the tension of this period. It could be argued that Parliament achieved a significant victory by forcing James II to abandon his throne and replacing him with the Protestant monarchy it desired. While these clashes did not radically alter the prerogative power of the Crown, they did pave the way for a new style of monarchy under the joint leadership of William and Mary. Good answers will examine the changing prerogative power of the monarchy as a result of the new Coronation Oath, the Bill of Rights, the Mutiny Act, the Toleration Act and the revised financial arrangements. For example, in the Bill of Rights of 1689 Parliament insisted that the monarch had to be Protestant. It is notable that most of these changes were designed to fix the abuses of James II's reign rather than change the prerogative power of the monarchy. The real changes in the relationship between Crown and Parliament were to occur during the reign of William III but not at its outset. Candidates may employ an observation from a historian such as Fellows on the importance of the Glorious Revolution.

**(g) Changes to the Role and Status of Parliament during the Reign of William III**

At the end of the century, Parliament asserted itself more decisively in the realm of finance, achieving royal dependence and accountability through the Commission of Accounts and Civil List. The Act of Settlement achieved the independence of the judiciary, determined the religion of the monarch and the succession to the throne, and a new Triennial Act established the duration of a Parliament as three years.



To fund his European conflict William was willing to allow Parliament a say in how the subsidies it granted were spent. This new style of government gave parliament a permanency that allowed it to become more efficient and effective in its operation. Contemporary opinion of leading figures such as Sacheverell may be employed. By 1700 the Crown was coming under pressure to appoint ministers who could command a majority in the House of Commons, although even at this late stage there was no legal obligation to do so, and Parliament still had no authority over the appointment of the monarch's ministers. Parliament also clarified its role in foreign affairs. It was upset when it was not shown the Partition Treaties of 1698 and 1699 and The Act of Settlement of 1701 dictated that the Crown could not go to war in defence of its foreign dominions without parliamentary support. In 1701 William thought it best to ask Parliament's approval for his treaty of Grand Alliance.

Candidates may employ the post-revisionist school of thought to enhance their argument. By the end of the seventeenth century the relationship between Parliament and the Crown had changed considerably. Parliament now met almost annually and had become a permanent and integral part of central government. The Commons had supplanted the Lords as the true seat of power and political parties were now accepted. Parliament had also expanded its range of powers, being able to determine the King's income through the Civil List and having established its right to levy all taxation. The Crown had lost a degree of financial independence even if his supply from Parliament had in fact increased. Parliament had also been able to determine the succession and religion of the monarch. Even foreign policy was now part of Parliament's sphere of influence. Despite this significant expansion in its power and influence, the century should not be seen as a straightforward victory of Parliament over the Crown. The monarchy remained at the forefront of the government and, with its increased financial muscle, had, in some ways, become more powerful.

*Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately* [50]

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- 2 "The Constitutional Revolution of 1640–1642 represented the most important turning point in the powers and prerogatives of the monarchy in England in the period 1603–1702." To what extent would you accept this statement?

This question requires an assessment of the impact of the Constitutional "Revolution" of 1640–1642 on the powers and position of the monarchy. A comparative analysis should be made with other pivotal events in the period, including the execution of Charles I, the Restoration Settlement, the Glorious Revolution and the impact of the European war during the reign of William and Mary.

Top level responses will reflect on the ways in which the Constitutional Revolution changed the prerogative power of the monarchy. The question as to whether these changes were actually revolutionary may be explored. The response should discuss the extent to which monarchy recovered its powers after this period, perhaps identifying other events in the period which were more significant in changing the power of the monarchy.

It would be legitimate to argue that no single event in the period saw a significant long-term change in the power and position of the monarchy but that the change in its role and status was gradual. Alternatively, it may be noted that the “Whig myth” of a gradual, inexorable rise of Parliament has been discredited by revisionist and post-revisionist historians who have argued that the seventeenth century should not be seen as a simple victory of Parliament over the monarchy. Candidates might argue that, while the role and status of the King changed considerably in this period, it is arguable that the monarchy’s loss of prerogative power was minimal.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

**Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:**

**(a) The Powers and Prerogatives of the Crown in the Reign of James I (1603–1625)**

In 1603 the Crown could appoint officials, advisors and bishops; make foreign policy and control the armed forces; summon, prorogue and dissolve Parliament; obstruct legislation; dispense individuals from or suspend law; issue proclamations and vary customs duties. Parliament primarily existed to provide the King with advice and supply, and pass laws.

While James I occasionally clashed with his Parliaments, notably over monopolies and foreign policy, there was little change to the powers and prerogatives of the monarch during his reign. However, it could be argued that the relationship between Crown and Parliament had become strained and some of their later clashes had their origins in this period.

**(b) The Constitutional Revolution, 1640–1642**

The Constitutional Revolution of 1640–1642 brought the abolition of prerogative courts, protecting the nobility from the King’s abuse of the judicial system. By removing the King’s financial devices and insisting that no taxation could be levied without MPs’ consent, Parliament had restricted the King’s financial independence. The “revolution” also placed limits on the monarch’s power to summon and dissolve Parliament through the Triennial Act and the Act Against Own Dissolution.

However, the King was by no means politically weak after the events of the Long Parliament. The monarch retained the ability to become financially independent of Parliament through an expansion in trade revenue. Parliament could not find agreement to limit the Crown's powers over the Church, the armed forces and the appointment of ministers. As a result, many of its more radical proposals, which could have seen the monarchy irreparably damaged, were not passed. Contemporary comment from leading figures such as Holles and the views of historians like Quintrell could be used to explain the impact of the Glorious Revolution.

**(c) The Execution of Charles I, 1649**

Arguably, the execution of the King had more of a long-term impact on the relationship between Monarchy and Parliament than the events of 1640–1642. The defeat of Charles I in two civil wars and his eventual execution at the hands of the army represented the ultimate triumph for Parliament. England entered a period without a ruling monarch, although finding a workable settlement to replace the King proved impossible. The restoration of Charles II in 1660 suggests that the execution had not been of long-term significance. However, it is legitimate to argue that the relationship had been altered for ever. The spectre of the Civil War and a potential for a repeat conflict loomed over the rest of the century. Contemporary opinion from Scot may be employed, while historians such as Schama could be used to explain the extent to which the execution was a turning point in Stuart Britain.

**(d) The Restoration Settlement, 1660–c1665**

Although the Restoration Settlement confirmed all the reforms passed by Parliament up to the end of the 1641 session, in reality it represented a triumph for the King. Given that his father had been executed at the hands of Parliament and that he had been invited back on its terms, the settlement represented a remarkable achievement for Charles II.

The prerogative taxation and courts remained illegal and the King was unable to collect taxes without Parliament's consent. The monarch's permanent revenue was fixed at a level, £1.2 million, designed to ensure the need for Parliament to meet regularly to grant additional supply. The Clarendon Code and the later Test Acts helped to reassert parliamentary influence, even control, over the Church. These restrictions on the King's independence from his Parliament certainly suggest that the powers of pre-1641 had not been recovered.

However, it is arguable that the Restoration Settlement actually saw a strengthening of the position of the monarch. Charles II still retained the most significant prerogative powers and his loyal, Cavalier Parliament strengthened his position by making it treason to restrain the King. It also passed a watered down version of the 1641 Triennial Act and took steps to censor the press to restrict open criticism of the monarchy. Indeed, the position of the monarchy was so strong that Charles II was

able to end his reign with a short period of personal rule, as a trade explosion and his links with France enabled him to survive financially without the need for Parliament. While Charles may have been unable to undo the changes made by the Constitutional Revolution, he was able to leave his brother James a stronger and more stable throne than he himself had inherited. Contemporary opinion of leading figures such as Morley may be employed, while the views of historians like Thirsk could be used to explain the significance of the Restoration Settlement.

**(e) The Glorious Revolution and the Revolution Settlement, 1688–1689**

The “Revolution Settlement” of 1689 clarified the powers of the King concerning dispensing and suspending power and declared against standing armies in peacetime. The Crown still had control over foreign policy and the armed forces, the appointment of ministers, the power to veto legislation and supremacy over the Church. However, it had become dependent on Parliament for finance, revenues were set low and temporarily and this imposed practical limitations on theoretical powers. The principles in the Bill of Rights meant that the monarch had to work with Parliament. Therefore the Glorious Revolution represented a significant change to the power and position of the monarchy and was arguably of more significance in weakening it than the events of 1640–1642. The contemporary opinion of William of Orange could be employed to illustrate the Crown’s perspective on the Glorious Revolution. The views of historians like Miller could also be used to explain the extent to which the event transformed the relationship between monarchy and Parliament. The introduction of a joint monarchy had undermined the concept of the divine right of kings, although it was the monarchy that had created this partnership, rather than it being imposed by Parliament. It may be argued that the Glorious Revolution did not transform the powers and prerogatives of the monarchy and that it was most significant for setting the foundations for the changes that were to come in the following decade.

**(f) Changes to the Power and Position of the Monarchy in the Reign of William III**

The most substantial and long-lasting changes to the power of the monarchy came in the final decade of the seventeenth century and were a direct consequence of the King’s foreign policy. The Triennial Act of 1694 limited the royal power of dissolution, making Parliament an almost permanent part of Government rather than an occasional event. The Commission of Accounts, Civil List and Bank of England all contributed to a greater financial dependency of the monarchy on Parliament. The Act of Settlement, 1701, ensured that Parliament secured a Protestant succession and reflected the extent of its influence upon this new style of monarchy. The reign of William and Mary saw the establishment of a working relationship between Crown and Parliament. Candidates may employ the contemporary opinion of leading figures such as Sunderland and the views of historians like Holmes.

Candidates may note that the Crown and its Parliament had always enjoyed a partnership in Government, even if it had not always been an amicable one. James I had depended on Parliamentary subsidy in order to execute his foreign policy and, although the mechanisms of Government had changed during the course of the century, the importance of an effective working relationship had not. Furthermore, the seventeenth century had not resulted in a dramatic change in the power and position of monarchy, as the Crown still retained the right to choose ministers and judges, determine foreign policy and call, dissolve and prorogue Parliament. Arguably, the improved financial position of the monarchy at the end of the century meant that, in this respect at least, the Crown had emerged, from a century of turmoil, stronger.

*Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately*

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**Option 2**

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### Option 3: Liberalism and Nationalism in Europe 1815–1914

AVAILABLE  
MARKS

Answer **one** question.

- 1 “Its success or failure depended solely on Europe’s rulers.” How far would you accept this assessment of the fortunes of liberalism in Europe in the period 1815–1914?

This question requires an assessment of the role played by monarchs, prime ministers and others who might be described as “rulers” in supporting or repressing liberalism. Thus, Charles X’s anti-liberal stance may be mentioned and compared with Louis Philippe’s cautious liberalism. The question also expects candidates to consider other factors affecting liberalism’s fortunes, such as the expansion of the middle classes, the later growth of radicalism and the calibre of liberal activists.

Top level responses will reflect on the changing attitude of rulers towards liberalism, such as Napoleon III’s initial opposition and later adoption of liberal reforms, or Frederick William IV, who granted a constitution, only to dilute it within a few years. At the top level there will be more consideration of other factors influencing the fortunes of liberalism and a judgement made as to the relative importance of the different factors.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

**Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:**

- (a) The period before 1848 is generally characterised as one of failure for liberals. There are a number of examples of rulers acting illiberally, most notoriously Charles X of France, who blatantly sought to defy the spirit of the Charter of 1814, and Metternich, whose influence extended beyond the Habsburg territories to include both Italy and Germany. Within the Austrian Empire Metternich’s system of spies and censorship made progress difficult for liberals, while in Germany Austria held the whip hand in the German Confederation and was easily able to persuade frightened rulers to accept the Carlsbad Decrees and the Six Acts, both anti-liberal measures. Acting as a leader for those restored rulers who equated liberalism with the excesses of the French Revolution, Metternich persuaded them to approve expeditions against liberal influence, sending Austrian troops to Italy in 1820 and 1831, and permitting a French invasion of Spain in support of the deposed Ferdinand VII in 1823. Candidates may cite a quotation from Metternich to explain his implacable opposition to liberalism.
- (b) There are, however, a few examples of rulers offering liberal concessions even before 1848. The German free trading area of the *Zollverein* had its beginnings in the actions of Frederick William III’s Prussia, while at the Restoration Louis XVIII “granted” the French



people a Charter, only moderately liberal but a constitution nonetheless, and in Baden, Bavaria and Württemberg the largely ignored requirement that all German Confederation states should have a constitution was observed by their rulers. Louis Philippe was another ruler who helped liberalism before adopting a less conciliatory approach. He took over the French throne in 1830 as a self-professed liberal, offering a new, more liberal French constitution, but, as his reign progressed, he resisted liberal pressure to further extend the franchise, an issue that played a part in his overthrow in 1848.

- (c) There are, however, other factors to be considered. Liberalism stalled in the early period, not only because of the strength of the opposition, but because of its own inherent weakness. Largely bourgeois in an era when that class was not yet large enough to intimidate government, it was more a vehicle for students and intellectuals, by definition a small minority. In time the commercial middle class would dominate the movement, its financial clout something rulers would respect. But before 1848 liberalism's leadership was arguably too timid to succeed, as well as hopelessly naïve, as when the liberals in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies accepted the word of the treacherous Ferdinand and allowed him to leave his country to seek, as it turned out, Austrian assistance to overthrow the recently granted constitution. Poor leadership was also seen in 1848, when a combination of economic turmoil and general discontent played into the liberals' hands and allowed them to influence or even seize power from the old rulers. These rulers were better strategists, and the failure of 1848 was therefore partially due to their actions, but the weakness of the liberals played its part as well. In Germany they failed to acquire proper military strength and proved indecisive when it came to drawing up a constitution, while in France and Austria the middle class liberals were so terrified of radicalism that they lost their chance and allowed the former regimes to regroup and regain lost power. Analysis of the liberals' failings from historians such as Jones might be used to illustrate this.
- (d) Between 1850 and 1870 conservative rulers still, in many cases, dominated the agenda. Frederick William IV of Prussia, having comprehensively defeated the liberals in 1848, now offered his own version of a constitution, but by 1852, in introducing a three class voting system, effectively thwarted the liberals, who were opposed throughout the 1850s by Manteuffel. Italy, with the single exception of Piedmont, had reverted to authoritarianism, the rulers still calling the anti-liberal shots. Austria, in the same decade, saw a return to authoritarian rule under the Bach system. But, despite these initial setbacks for liberalism in the years immediately after 1848, the tide was about to turn, thanks to a combination of pressure from below (a growing middle class and therefore more liberal pressure) and astute rulers who had learnt the lesson of 1848 and made concessions in the interests of survival. Individual freedoms were cautiously increased, and moves made towards representative government. The liberals had set up a Republic with universal suffrage in France, but when the electorate overwhelmingly voted for a Bonaparte as President, he



turned out to be far from liberal during the 1850s, suppressing what he believed to be dangerous opposition. Yet, as his reign progressed, Napoleon began to take France down a more liberal road, but his “liberal Empire” ended with his defeat in 1870. Candidates may refer to historians’ views on whether Napoleon’s later liberal tendencies were sincere.

In Piedmont, the Prime Minister, Cavour, set out to show how a liberal state might work, winning many supporters across Italy, enough to ensure that as the country was united it would be due to Piedmont’s liberalism. Liberals in Prussia came up against a firm opponent in William’s Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck. They had overcome electoral disadvantages to hold enough seats to block military reforms, but Bismarck simply overrode their objections and illegally collected taxes, to the fury of liberals.

- (e) After 1870 liberalism made further gains, particularly in the field of civil rights, but this was tempered by the persistence of authoritarian governments. The German liberals made their peace with Bismarck, giving him a government, although the Chancellor showed where real power lay when he abandoned them in 1879. Candidates may include a quotation from Bismarck revealing his attitudes towards liberals. France offered an example of the new toughness of liberal rulers, personified by Thiers, and they successfully fought off attacks on the liberal Third Republic from the Paris Commune in 1871, a Royalist resurgence later in the decade, followed by a bid for power by the neo-Bonapartist Boulanger, and a series of syndicalist strikes in the period just before 1914. The Panama Scandal must be seen, however, as a failure on the part of the liberal rulers of France, and the long struggle to pardon Dreyfus was hardly evidence of success. Italy became a poor advertisement for liberalism in power, as corruption and cynical political deals became the norm. In Austria the Emperor, by the turn of the century, had reverted to near-authoritarianism, while in the German Empire, although the lower house was elected by universal suffrage, its actual powers were strictly limited: both these cases are examples of the old rulers reasserting their own powers, while offering some concessions to liberal sentiment.
- (f) Economic liberalism enjoyed a brief free trading heyday in the third quarter of the century, due less to initiatives from rulers than to effective commercial lobbying, as was its decline, sparked by an economic depression and counter-lobbying by German agrarian interests. The steady rise of socialism, hostile to bourgeois liberalism, was the result of universal suffrage and increasing organisation by the working classes, while the welfare state-style reforms in the late 1880s were a failed attempt by the German ruling class to destroy socialism by stealing its policies. Candidates may include comments from historians as to the depth of Bismarck’s commitment to free trade.

*Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately*

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- 2 To what extent would you agree that 1848 represented the major turning point in the fortunes of nationalism in Europe in the period 1815–1914?

This question requires an assessment of the periods before and after 1848, the former generally seen as a barren time, the latter as more fruitful. Some consideration may be given to the events of 1848, particularly the lessons drawn from it and its significance as a “shop window” for the nationalist cause.

Top level responses will reflect not only on the failures but on the successes of the pre-1848 period, possibly arguing that 1830 was an important turning point. They will also note the way in which nationalism grew from an elite preoccupation to a widely supported movement, often under government stimulus.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

**Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:**

- (a) Between 1815 and 1848 nationalism struggled to make headway in the face of determined efforts by the Powers to maintain their empires. The Vienna Treaty redivided Italy and Germany into many small states, with the Habsburg Empire gaining direct control or significant influence over both countries. Poland was repartitioned, and Belgium placed under the control of Holland. Perceiving nationalism as a threat not only to the Habsburg dominions but to the peace of Europe, Metternich persuaded the Eastern Powers in particular to sanction intervention wherever revolution appeared a threat. Austrian troops were sent into Italy after risings in various Italian states in 1820 and 1831, while he persuaded the German Confederation to enact laws curbing academic freedoms after the Wartburg and Hambach festivals. The “provocations” were as much liberal as national, but in this era nationalism and liberalism tended to overlap. At the same time, Metternich employed an extensive army of spies to act against nationalists within the multi-national Habsburg territories. During the 1830s Mazzini’s Young Italy, trying to break free from the earlier failures of the Italian secret societies, attempted, without success, to organise a series of risings aimed at expelling the Austrians and creating a united and democratic Italy.

But the pre-1848 era was not without some nationalist successes. In 1830 Belgium broke free from the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Greek independence from Turkey was recognised by the Great Powers, and a Polish Rising against the Russian occupier failed. Yet, taken together with the other two successes of that year, this showed that nationalists in various countries were prepared to take up arms without outside help, at least in the first instance, to achieve their freedom. Also by this stage the *Zollverein* was showing Germans what could be achieved by

dismantling trade barriers between the various states, with an obvious political implication highlighted by nationalists. The stress put by some revisionist historians on 1830 as an important year for nationalist progress might be discussed.

- (b) The events of 1848 need not be described in any great detail, but the reasons for failure and lessons learnt need analysis. In the sense that this was a huge upheaval, even greater than 1830, with revolutions in almost every European state, 1848 will probably be seen as a key turning point. Yet the sum total of nationalist success after the dust settled was zero. In Italy the defeat of a gallant Piedmont proved that a small country acting alone could not hope to take on a great empire and win. Italians, some thought, were too influenced by local loyalties and could not hope to succeed without outside help. In Germany, too, it was clear that the nationalists could not succeed in uniting their country without stronger, more decisive leadership than the liberals of Frankfurt provided, and without the military might needed to take on the Austrians, who sought to keep Germany disunited. The dead hand of Austria and the animosity of the other Great Powers towards nationalist aspirations seemed the key factor holding back nationalism. Candidates may provide examples of historians' views on the legacy of 1848.
- (c) At first sight the period after 1850, particularly the 1860s, appears a time of dizzying success. Although the Habsburgs seemed to have restored the status quo, this was a superficial view, and the slow decline of the Empire across the whole period had been, however briefly, highlighted in 1848. The first national group to take advantage of this was the Italians. But this was a very different form of nationalism, compared with the comic opera revolutionaries of the earlier period. Rather than an uprising springing from the Italian masses, this was, it may be argued, a campaign of Piedmontese expansionism aimed at unifying the northern half of Italy under the house of Savoy. Cavour, the Prime Minister, showed how nationalism had moved into a new phase after 1848 by enlisting foreign help in the shape of Napoleon III's France. Mass involvement was still present in the form of the National Society, which kept the impetus of the movement going when a cautious Napoleon withdrew from the 1859 war against Austria, but the cession of Nice and Savoy to France as France's reward for a job only half done showed the realism which was succeeding the old idealism in nationalism. The completion of Italian unification by Garibaldi's swashbuckling southern campaign showed, however, that the new nationalism did not have it all its own way, as Cavour was obliged unwillingly to absorb the southern half of Italy into his new kingdom. Candidates may refer to Cavour's personal views on the unification of the whole of Italy.

The unification of Germany exhibits some similarities. Again a single state set out to extend its control, this time Prussia, and again war was crucial, as Austrian decline (and its isolation) was disastrously exposed in the 1866 war which saw the establishment of the North German Confederation. Bismarck's clever diplomacy was in stark contrast to the

earlier bumbling efforts of the liberal nationalists, as he outmanoeuvred Napoleon III throughout the late 1860s, their dealings culminating in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, after which the new German Empire was declared. Historians' views on whether the Second Reich was not a triumph for genuine nationalism could be offered. The old style nationalists, at least in their liberal guise, were originally hostile to Bismarck, whose support of von Roon's army reforms was seen as a tool for political repression, but after the 1866 war they accepted the nationalist bonus that came from Prussian ambition, another sign of how the pre-1848 nationalism had moved on. The other great triumph of this decade was the achievement of self-government for Hungary. During the 1848 Revolutions the long campaign waged by Magyars for greater freedom briefly resulted in an independent Hungary, and, although this was eventually crushed, the Austrian defeat of 1866 left it in no position to withstand a further campaign, and the *Ausgleich*, offering home rule to Hungary, was the result. Another victory for nationalists had come in 1859 with the union of Moldavia and Wallachia, which meant that Rumania broke free from Turkish rule.

- (d) After this flurry of nationalist success the pace slackened, although there were a number of further nation state creations. By 1885 Bulgaria had achieved practical independence from the Ottoman Empire in the wake of the Russo-Turkish War of 1878, although Transylvania remained under Habsburg rule until after the First World War. In 1905 Norway gained its freedom from Sweden, while, as a result of the Balkan Wars, Albania achieved independence from the Turks in 1912. Better answers may note that victories over the Ottomans were, in the declining days of their Empire, facile, and that although there was undoubted nationalist activity, the participation or the consent of the Great Powers was always a necessity, unlike the idealistic but unsuccessful nationalist efforts of 1848. It may also be noted that none of these new nation states were of the first rank. Nationalists arguably came up against a brick wall as the period came to a close, with the Irish, Poles, Czechs and citizens of the Balkan states thwarted in their desire for self-government, regardless of the merit of their claims.
- (e) The best answers will note not only a quantitative but also a qualitative change in nationalism after 1848. Not only did nationalist leaders become more pragmatic, but nationalism itself, from being a movement primarily of opposition, was in some instances utilised by governments, and what might be termed state-sponsored nationalism appeared. This happened in Germany, with propaganda relating to the Fatherland used to help weld together a country which had perhaps been less the product of nationalism than of Prussian conquest. Nationalism was often seen by governments as a useful diversion for the working classes, who might otherwise be tempted by socialism, and was particularly evident in those countries which were, in the late 19th century, building overseas empires. Russia sought to impose its culture on and therefore increase its political control over the non-Russian parts of its Empire through a policy of "Russification". From being a mainly liberal idea before 1848, nationalism became

more conservative, a mainstay of, rather than a challenge to, the state, and in some cases it adopted a more jingoistic tone, with elements of xenophobia and racialism (cf Dreyfus in France, and the anti-semitic Mayor of Vienna, Karl Lueger). Examples of this change in emphasis may be taken from the writings of Social Darwinists.

*Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately*

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**Option 3**

AVAILABLE  
MARKS

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## Option 4: Unionism and Nationalism in Ireland 1800–1900

AVAILABLE  
MARKS

Answer **one** question.

- 1 “Irish nationalists enjoyed success up to 1850 but experienced only failure between 1850 and 1900.” To what extent would you accept this verdict on constitutional, revolutionary and cultural nationalism in Ireland in the period 1800–1900?

This question invites an assessment of the factors which explain the varying fortunes which nationalists experienced in this period. Top level responses will examine constitutional, revolutionary and cultural nationalism. Regarding the former, it can be argued that complete success was never achieved either before or after 1850, but that certain periods of time were more rewarding than others. While those involved in revolutionary nationalism shared the common disappointment of failing to break the Union with Britain, they still enjoyed success through their association with other forms of nationalism and by bestowing a legacy for others to follow. In addition, cultural nationalism enjoyed some success after 1890.

The structure of the answer is immaterial; whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

**Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:**

- (a) In the period up to 1850, constitutional nationalists experienced a mixture of successes and failures, and answers can reflect on where the balance lay.**

O’Connell achieved Catholic emancipation because of a well-managed campaign, featuring mass support, financed by a “penny rent”, the use of mass rallies and rhetoric. Literature was produced, and the profile of the campaign was enhanced by his carefully chosen participation in high-profile elections. The support of the Catholic Church was noteworthy. O’Connell’s victory in the Clare by-election of 1828 came at a time when the Tory Government was at its most divided and vulnerable. In these circumstances his tactic of rhetoric made the administration more likely to make concessions. However, one disappointment attached to the Emancipation Act of 1829 came with the raising of the 40s freehold vote to a £10 franchise, which reduced the potency of O’Connell’s subsequent campaigns. Candidates may refer to a comment from O’Connell about his campaign to achieve emancipation, or the opinion of the historians such as Kee about the significance of the campaign.

In the 1830s, O’Connell’s liaison with the Whigs, known as the Lichfield House Compact, witnessed a mixture of outcomes. Answers can comment on the merits and limitations of reforms such as tithe, local government and poor law, in which every gain seemed to be countered by a disappointment. For example, the arrangements for collecting tithe were altered, but the principle behind the tithe remained



unchanged. The impartial administration of Thomas Drummond at Dublin Castle was perhaps the most noteworthy achievement, yet it was of short duration. Candidates may point to an assessment by historians such as Boyce on the relative merits of the Compact, or employ a verdict on his relations with the Whigs from O'Connell.

O'Connell's campaign to secure the repeal of the Union ended in total failure in the 1840s. His campaign was thwarted by the firm response of the Prime Minister, Robert Peel, who put his experience of Ireland and knowledge of O'Connell to good effect. O'Connell undermined his prospects by duplicating his tactics from the 1820s in obtaining emancipation, making him predictable and easier to counter. He quarrelled with the Young Ireland movement, lacked the support of the Catholic middle class, lost most of his 40s freehold support, and faced a firm conservative government and a united parliament. A comment from Peel explaining why he upheld the Union so vigorously could be mentioned. A verdict from a historian such as Rees on the reasons for the failure of the repeal campaign could be given.

**(b) Revolutionary nationalists experienced nothing but failure in the period 1800–1850.**

Emmet's revolt in 1803 failed because of its lack of popular support, inadequate planning and the robust response of government. His attempt to overthrow British rule was so ill-conceived as to border on the farcical. His force of 100 men failed to capture Dublin Castle. Similar risings in Ulster and Wicklow failed to materialise. The Young Ireland revolt of 1848 failed miserably. William Smith O'Brien's forces were crushed with contemptuous ease by the Irish constabulary at Ballingary, County Tipperary in July 1848. However, answers may reflect that revolutionary nationalists left a legacy for future generations, so in this sense they did not experience total failure. Emmet's speech at his trial – "Let no man write my epitaph; for as no man knows motives dare now vindicate them, let not prejudice nor ignorance asperse them" – inspired future revolutionaries.

Young Ireland provided literature, role models and a vision of history for later generations. They were influential not just as failed revolutionaries but also as propagandists. John Mitchel's *Jail Journal* emerged as one of the classics of modern Irish nationalism. Those Young Ireland rebels who survived the failed rising of 1848 fled to the continent, and provided a personal link with the Fenian rebels of 1867. Gavin Duffy, founder of the Young Ireland paper, *The Nation*, lived until 1903, bequeathing a legacy to inspire members of the Sinn Féin movement. Contemporary comment from Thomas Davis or *The Nation* newspaper could illustrate the ideals of the Young Ireland movement.

**(c) While failure was a feature of Irish nationalism in the period 1850–1900, there was also some measure of success.**

Parnell brought about land reform in the 1881 Land Act and the Arrears Act of 1882. His "New Departure" mobilised the masses in a coalition



with the Land League, assisted by former members of the Fenian movement. Moreover, he succeeded in placing the issue of Home Rule at the forefront of Westminster politics, by creating a modern day political party, whose members were the first in Europe to receive a salary and to be bound in a disciplined way by a pledge of unity. Under Parnell, the Irish Parliamentary Party was a force to be reckoned with by both Liberals and Conservatives, and it was through his legacy that the experience in the democratic process at Westminster was to create the circumstances for another attempt at Home Rule in the next century. However, Parnell was fortunate to encounter in Gladstone a political leader who placed his own welfare and that of the Liberal Party above the morality of seeking self-government for Ireland. A contemporary comment from Gladstone could indicate how Parnell managed to place Irish affairs at the forefront of British politics.

Parnell failed in his ultimate objective of achieving Home Rule partly because he alienated his support base – such as the Catholic Church – over his divorce scandal, while Gladstone, under nonconformist pressure in Britain, was forced to disown him. Additionally, Parnell was a victim of the political realities at Westminster. Home Rule split the Liberal Party, while the Conservative-dominated House of Lords had the power of veto over any Home Rule bill. Reference to historians such as Boyce or Lyons could be employed to assess Parnell's downfall.

**(d) Revolutionary nationalists such as the Fenians failed in their objective of achieving independence from Britain, ending the Union and establishing a parliament in Dublin.**

The Fenian Rising of 1867 was a weak, uncoordinated and, at times, haphazard affair, easily suppressed by an efficient combination of military and police forces, the suspension of habeas corpus and the arrest of scores of Fenians. The flow of intelligence about Fenian activity from government spies undermined any prospect of success. Any gaps in government knowledge were helpfully plugged by General Massey, a Fenian who was arrested in early March 1867 and who graduated from being the most senior conspirator in Ireland to the role of chief witness for the crown in the prosecution of his former associates. Widespread support was discouraged by the decisive leadership of Cardinal Cullen, who led the Catholic Church in an energetic campaign to dissuade Catholics from giving any credence to what he saw as sinister, oath-bound revolutionary society. Candidates could utilise contemporary comments from leading Catholic clergymen such as Cullen to indicate the degree of clerical opposition to the Fenians. Moreover, historians such as Boyce and Kee point to the various failings of the Fenians themselves which undermined their aspirations in 1867.

- (e) However, the Fenians left a legacy for future generations, so in this sense they were not a total failure.**

As with the Easter rising of 1916, the execution of three Fenians in 1867 created a consensus of support for Fenianism which had been hitherto lacking. The title of “Martyr” hinted at a shift in the relationship between popular Catholicism and the Fenian movement. Clerical sympathy for the Fenians, though by no means an approval of Fenian aims or strategy, encouraged many of those who had hitherto kept the IRB at arm’s length. Isaac Butt led the Amnesty Association in 1869 to campaign for the release of Fenian prisoners. In 1870 he directed his energies toward Home Rule, and eventually Fenians supported Parnell in the New Departure. The failed revolt of 1867 contributed to Gladstone’s determination to deal with Irish problems. He said that the Fenian activities had awakened British public opinion to the broader condition of Irish politics. Descendants of the Fenians, such as T. J. Clarke, planned the Easter Rising of 1916.

- (f) The activities of cultural nationalists after 1850 suggests that success outweighs failure.**

The GAA, founded by Cusack and Croke in 1884, witnessed immediate success, which has continued up to the present day. Within five years of its foundation, the GAA had achieved a membership of over 50 000. The object of the Association was to replace what were perceived as “foreign” games by more “traditional” Gaelic sports and thereby contribute to increasing an awareness of a national consciousness. Candidates could refer to contemporary comment from the GAA’s founders regarding their expectations. In 1892 WB Yeats, along with Douglas Hyde, founded the National Literary Society. In the same year Hyde gave a famous lecture under the title of “The Necessity to De-Anglicise Ireland”, and shortly afterwards established the Gaelic League to fulfil his ambitions. By 1900, the Gaelic League had 200 branches, and was on course to enlist nearly 900 000 members in the early years of the new century. However, while the cultural gospel undoubtedly spread, Hyde’s aspiration to embrace the Unionist tradition was received unsympathetically at a time when the question of home rule appeared to threaten their very existence in Ireland. The eventual infiltration of cultural nationalism by physical force groups such as the IRB thwarted Hyde’s hopes for a non-political movement. Contemporary comment from Yeats or Hyde could illustrate the thinking behind these cultural movements. Reference to historians such as Kee would be valid in debating the degree of success which cultural nationalism enjoyed.

*Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately*

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- 2 “While they shared a commitment to the Union, they had little in common.” How far would you agree with this assessment of the motives and methods of the supporters of the Union in the north and south of Ireland in the period 1800–1900?

This question requires candidates to examine the response of the supporters of the Union in the north and south of Ireland towards the Union. They should address the extent of unity of motivation, methods and organisation displayed by the supporters of the Union, and indicate where comparisons and contrasts lay.

Good answers may comment that, while the reasons for defending the Union were similar, there were significant contrasts. However, especially in the period after 1886, there were clear differences in the way in which the threat of Home Rule was confronted, which reflected the social structure, geographical distribution and self-perception of Unionists in the north and south of Ireland.

The structure of the question is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

**Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:**

- (a) In the early part of the period the Union was defended by the common means of constitutional methods, though the supporters of the Union were not necessarily co-ordinated in their response.**

Daniel O’Connell’s campaigns for Catholic emancipation, reforms for Catholics under the Lichfield House Compact and his attempt to secure the repeal of the Union prompted unionists to respond.

Brunswick Clubs were formed in 1827–1828 and operated broadly as a popular anti-emancipationist organisation with strong ties to Toryism. The Cork Brunswick Constitutional Club established an electoral organisation to ensure the election of Protestant candidates in the 1830 by-election in Cork city. The Irish Protestant Conservative Society was formed in 1831, and was superseded by the Irish Metropolitan Conservative Society in 1836, which co-ordinated elections for supporters of the Union. This electoral machinery was developed by the formation of the Central Conservative Society in 1853. O’Connell’s planned triumphant visit to Belfast in 1841 was rebutted by northern liberal Protestants, barracked by Orangemen and derided by the northern unionist leader, Henry Cooke.

The threat to property rights aroused supporters of the Union before 1886. The activities of the Land League made landowners feel uneasy. The Protestant Colonisation Society was formed in 1830 and the Property Defence Association in 1880.

The establishment of the Home Rule Association and the subsequent election of 59 Home Rule MPs in 1874 and 69 by 1880, served as a

warning for the supporters of the Union to mobilise even more. Before the introduction of Gladstone's first Home Rule Bill in 1886, southern unionists had set up the Irish Loyal and Patriotic Union (ILPU). Contemporary comment from literature or declarations from these organisations could be used to illustrate their motivation.

**(b) The supporters of the Union came together for similar motives to defend the Union. Yet their motivation took on different emphasis.**

**Religious** motives brought them together, with a notable difference in emphasis in the north of Ireland. Competition for jobs in Belfast added to sectarian tension, and it experienced rioting in 1872 and 1886. There were disturbances in Derry in 1870 and 1883. In response to O'Connell's talk of repeal, Henry Cooke organised a huge rally at Hillsborough and promised his audience that he would lead them against what he regarded as the onslaught of Roman Catholicism. Sectarianism underpinned the philosophy of the Protestant Colonisation Society, which sought to ensure that land vacated through emigration would continue to be occupied by Protestants. Candidates could refer to contemporary comment from individuals such as Henry Cooke to indicate the strength of religious feeling among northern unionists. Religious feeling was different among southern unionists. They were a scattered minority, and depended on the goodwill of their Catholic neighbours. As a consequence, unionists in the south highlighted the benefits of the Union for all religions. Moreover, Catholics were made welcome into southern unionist organisations, as well as being the object of conciliatory sentiments. Hence, the founders of the Cork Defence Union proclaimed in 1885 that the issue of the Union was "non-sectarian and non-political", and they aimed to unite "all friends of law and order of all classes". William Kenny, a notable Catholic lawyer, won the St. Stephen's Green seat in 1892, and was a prominent example of a Catholic who supported the Union in the south. In contrast, Denis Henry, who split with the Liberals over the issue of Home Rule in the 1880s, was to prove an exceptional example of a Catholic unionist in the north of Ireland. His retention of his South Derry seat in the General Election of 1918 represented the last occasion when the unionist interest in the north was represented by a Catholic. Candidates could refer to speeches made by Ulster and southern unionists which indicate the importance of religion in their response to the Union. Comments from historians such as Buckland could be similarly employed. Answers may reflect on the geographical distribution of unionism to explain these religious contrasts.

**Economic** fears about their material well-being brought unionists all over Ireland together in common bond of concern. In the north, the industrial progress of shipbuilding, linen and ropemaking were commented upon, as well as the prestige these industries brought to Ulster. Speeches made by Ulster Unionist businessmen such as Thomas Sinclair could illustrate the link between the Union and the prosperity of Belfast. Historians such as Kee and Rees have commented on the economic theme which underpinned many northern unionists' concerns about Home Rule. Concerns for agricultural prosperity figured highly in the attitudes of southern unionists as they

debated the impact of a Dublin parliament dominated by nationalists. The activities of the Land League in the period 1879–1882 made such apprehensions seem very real. The widening of the franchise in the Reform Acts of 1867 and 1884, along with the Secret Ballot Act of 1872 and the Local Government Act of 1898, made them feel more insecure. Reference to southern unionist literature produced by the Irish Unionist Alliance (IUA) or correspondence from landowners could be mentioned to indicate these apprehensions. Historians such as McDowell have written about the importance of agricultural concerns in resisting Home Rule. There was no significant distinction in the economic motives of northern and southern unionists, only in emphasis. Answers may link these economic views to the social structure of unionism.

**Imperial** concerns if the Union was broken were more common in the south than in the north of Ireland, and it was argued that the empire would be endangered if Ireland’s ties with Britain were loosened. It was said that Home Rule for Ireland would inevitably result in the breakup of the greatest empire in the world, and the demise of the imperial ideal. Answers may link the southern unionist affection for the imperial idea to their background, education and experience as administrators in the empire. Candidates could refer to southern unionist literature which associated Ireland’s prosperity with the empire, or evidence from historians such as McDowell on the importance the imperial ideal had in the affections of southern unionists.

**(c) The means by which the supporters of the Union in the north and south of Ireland defended the Union suggested that they had little in common.**

In the south, supporters of the Union employed methods which were quite different from their northern counterparts: propaganda, contesting elections and using their political contacts at Westminster. Southern unionists exploited their social and political influence in the House of Lords where, by 1886, of 144 peers with Irish interest, 116 owned land in the south and west of Ireland. In 1885 the Irish Loyal and Patriotic Union financed 48 election meetings in Ireland and Britain. In 1891 the ILPU was superseded by the Irish Unionist Alliance, which managed meetings, distributed manifestoes and petitions, and organised tours of Ireland for British electors. However, the threat of force featured in the north. Members of Young Ulster possessed firearms and ammunition. The Ulster Defence Union collected funds and organised resistance to Home Rule. Good answers may reflect on how the titles of the northern organisations indicated a difference from their southern counterparts. “Ulster” contrasts with the word “Irish”: Ulster Loyalist and Anti-Repeal Union, Young Ulster, Ulster Defence Union. Geographical considerations partly determined methods. While Ulster unionists comprised a population of 800 000 out of 1.2 million, their southern counterparts represented only 250 000 out of a population of 2.2 million. Candidates could refer to contemporary comments made at meetings held by these organisations which provide testimony about their methods.

*Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately* [50]

**Option 4**

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## Option 5: Clash of Ideologies in Europe 1900–2000

AVAILABLE  
MARKS

Answer **one** question.

- 1 “During the period 1917–1991 Mikhail Gorbachev was the only Soviet leader whose foreign policy was determined primarily by economic considerations.” How far would you agree with this statement?

This question requires an assessment of whether the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, under the rule of Mikhail Gorbachev, was primarily determined by economic considerations and how this contrasts with the factors that motivated other leaders.

Top level responses will reflect on the motives of both Gorbachev and other leaders and consider the significance of economic factors, as well as other relevant considerations which influenced Soviet foreign policy.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

**Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:**

**(a) Mikhail Gorbachev 1985–1991**

Candidates may wish to commence their discussion of the proposition by looking at the extent to which economic considerations motivated Gorbachev. When Gorbachev came to power, the Soviet Union found itself in challenging economic circumstances. An argument can be put forward that a combination of the cost of the arms race, Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and the general effects of the stagnation of the Brezhnev years led Gorbachev to adopt a new approach to foreign policy. Economic considerations could be used to explain the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the pursuit of cuts in nuclear capability and indeed Gorbachev’s ultimate rejection of the Brezhnev doctrine. For example, Phillips has argued that the Soviet Union “could not sustain the resources needed to pursue an Empire it no longer felt it needed.” Alternatively, candidates could challenge the assumption of the question and argue that, while economics may have played a role in Gorbachev’s foreign policy, more weight has to be given to the profound ideological shift that occurred under Gorbachev. The rejection of Marxist Leninist assumptions about the nature of history and the role of class is evident in Gorbachev’s “new thinking” and it was perhaps therefore a question of ideology being of greater significance than economics. Further to this, candidates could argue that Gorbachev was merely reflecting the actions of his predecessors in placing security at the heart of Soviet foreign policy and it was this consideration which brought about the foreign policy shifts witnessed under his rule.

Although candidates may adopt any particular approach that allows them to address each of the leaders of the Soviet Union, this mark scheme will adopt a chronological approach, commencing with Lenin.



**(b) Lenin 1917–1924**

Candidates may argue that Lenin's foreign policy challenges the proposition that only Gorbachev's foreign policy was motivated by economic considerations. The withdrawal from World War One and the cancellation of all foreign debts could certainly be regarded as decisions motivated by economic concerns in view of the perilous state of the country in the aftermath of the revolution. Equally, candidates could point out that the normalisation of Soviet foreign policy through diplomatic treaties were further examples of economics playing a role in decision making.

Candidates should also point out that Lenin's policies were motivated by a range of other factors. The expansionist revolutionary role of the Comintern and the Russo-Polish War could be considered examples of the role of ideology in explaining Soviet foreign policy. Equally, it could be argued that security was the prime force that shaped foreign policy. As Teddy Uldrick has noted: "Soviet foreign policy was motivated by a genuine and desperate search for security". Whether it was the withdrawal from World War One, the Russo-Polish War or the Civil War, the survival of the revolution and thus the security of the new state was the paramount concern of the Bolsheviks under Lenin.

**(c) Stalin 1924–1953**

Although Stalin did not assume full authority until the late 1920s, we can consider his rule to run from 1924 until his death in 1953. Obviously, such a lengthy period of rule will lead to many factors informing the foreign policy of the Soviet Union throughout this particular period. When analysing it in relation to the question, candidates may adopt a chronological or thematic approach. It is commonly noted that the arrival of Stalin brought about a break with his predecessors' approach to foreign policy. As Dmitri Volkogonov has written: "From a frontal attack on the citadel of imperialism, with the aim of igniting world revolution, Stalin switched to the strategy of prolonged siege." It has been widely noted that Stalin was less internationally minded and appeared more concerned with the Soviet Union *per se*. Candidates may wish to make this contrast with both Lenin and indeed Gorbachev. The limited internationalism, the approach to foreign communists and the ideological purity of the "left turn" could all be used as evidence for this argument. Equally, candidates may note that events determined many of Stalin's foreign policy decisions. The emergence of the fascist threat led to a greater engagement with the wider international community through the policy of collective security and joining the League of Nations. Candidates may observe that this pragmatic approach was to be found in all Soviet leaders at different times. The same pragmatism can be seen with regard to the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the subsequent Grand Alliance of 1941 and indeed the takeover of Eastern Europe between 1945 and 1948. Candidates may present these events as evidence of the importance of security in Stalin's thinking.

With specific regard to economic concerns, answers may note that Stalin's desire to build up the Soviet Union was based on domestic economic policy and, although there should not be an extensive discussion of domestic policy, credit could be given for this point. Equally, candidates may wish to point to the economic gains made through the Spanish Civil War, although sophisticated answers will note the multiplicity of motivations at work with regard to this event.

The Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe after 1945 was not bereft of economic considerations, particularly with regard to German reparations. Responses of the highest order may note that it was perhaps economic factors, as well as the divergent aims of the Western Allies and the Soviet Union, which led to the creation of Bizonia and the subsequent Berlin Blockade.

Undoubtedly, the Stalinist era presents candidates with a number of opportunities to highlight the multifaceted nature of foreign policy and the most skilful answers will acknowledge the role of different factors and the manner in which they can be interrelated.

**(d) Khrushchev 1953–1964**

Candidates may argue that economic concerns did matter to Khrushchev and this is evident in his desire to reduce the size of the Soviet armed forces and develop a defence policy based on increased missile capacity. Equally, candidates may point out that the construction of the Berlin Wall was not without an economic basis due to the persistent migration of skilled workers from East Germany, the famous "brain drain." Alternatively, candidates could argue that foreign policy under Khrushchev was motivated by security and that this is evident in his attempts to improve relations with the West, as shown by the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Austria in 1955, his willingness to engage with US Presidents and his attempts to find a solution to the question of Berlin. Khrushchev himself noted "there are only two ways: either peaceful co-existence or the most destructive war in history. There is no third way." Candidates may seek to draw a distinction between relations with the West and those states within the Soviet sphere of influence. Despite the break with Stalin, the years in question still witnessed the creation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955, the brutal suppression of opponents to communism in Hungary in 1956 and the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961.

**(e) 1964–1982 Brezhnev**

The leadership of Brezhnev is strongly characterised by détente. This offers candidates an opportunity to emphasise the economic motivations behind the policy. The impact on domestic policy of the vast military expenditure certainly influenced Brezhnev to seek improved relations with the West. Equally, improved relations would have the side benefits of greater trading possibilities and technological improvements that would further enhance the economic development of the Soviet Union. Evidence for détente is most obviously apparent in the signing of diplomatic treaties such as Salt I, Salt II and also the Helsinki Final Act.

However, candidates would also be expected to note that Brezhnev maintained an aggressive policy in Eastern Europe, most notably with the crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968 and the creation of the Brezhnev Doctrine of the same year. Candidates may argue that such events were the result of either ideology or security but it would be plausible to argue that economic concerns were not entirely absent from those drafting Soviet foreign policy at the time. Indeed, Hoffman has emphasised the importance of the Czechoslovakian economy to the Soviet Union. Equally candidates will seek to point out that the collapse of détente came about as a result of Soviet actions in Afghanistan. Once again, such actions cannot be understood as being the result of economic considerations but security factors.

**(f) 1982–1985**

The years subsequent to Brezhnev’s death were characterised by the short rule of Yuri Andropov from 1982 until 1984 and then Constantin Chernenko from 1984 until March 1985. Andropov maintained a strong grip over Eastern European countries and, like many leaders before him, was primarily concerned with improving the domestic economy, in ways that had little bearing on foreign relations. Although in 1983 Andropov did announce the end of all space based weapons programmes. Chernenko in his short reign did little to improve relations with the West. There was the boycott of the Los Angeles Olympics in 1984 which was seen as revenge for the US boycott of the Moscow games of 1980. However, one could perhaps sense a little rapprochement with the announcement in 1984 that arms control talks were to be commenced the following year.

Throughout the response candidates will thus have to evaluate a range of factors in response to the question. While they are expected to address whether Gorbachev was the only Soviet leader whose foreign policy was primarily motivated by economic factors, a broader consideration of the range of factors that affected each leader is required.

*Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately* [50]

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- 2** “The destruction of the Soviet Union was the main aim of the opponents of communism before 1945, whereas containment was their main aim after the Second World War.” To what extent would you accept this verdict on the opponents of communism in the period 1917–1991?

This question requires an assessment as to what degree the opponents of the Soviet Union sought the destruction of the Soviet Union in the years prior to 1945 in contrast to the proposition that they only sought to contain it after 1945.

Top level responses will reflect on the aims of the opponents of the Soviet Union at different junctures and assess how this changed after the Second World War.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

**Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:**

**(a) 1917–1945**

Initially, one can observe a policy that aimed to see the Soviet Union destroyed not long after its emergence. Churchill famously commented that he wanted see Bolshevism strangled in its cradle. Intervention by western powers during the Civil War, the Polish attack on the USSR and the initial isolation at Versailles and the League of Nations were evidence of this. However, this rapidly changed with the Treaty of Rapallo with Weimar Germany in 1922. Equally, mention could be made of the diplomatic ties that were established with Britain and France. No longer did their aim seem to be the destruction of the USSR, but rather an accommodation with the newest member of the international community. It could be argued that a distinction should be made between different opponents of the Soviet Union, most notably perhaps Britain and Germany.

Equally, the emergence of Hitler in 1933 and Mussolini in the 1920s saw the development of distinctive policies towards the Soviet Union, policies that would reverberate for the next decade. Hitler made no secret of his hatred of Bolshevism and considered it to be an ideology that had to be destroyed. Martin Collier among others has noted that Hitler loathed communism and promised its world-wide destruction if he came to power. The invasion of the USSR would bring the territorial expansion needed to gain the living space needed for the German people and regions of Eastern Europe would provide many of the raw materials needed for Germany to gain self-sufficiency. Fascist opposition developed with the Anti-Comintern pacts in 1936 between Germany and Japan and in 1937 when Italy under Mussolini joined. This demonstrates a return to not just an aggressive approach but one that actively sought the destruction of the Soviet Union. Candidates may also point out that, while there were some similarities to the policies that had existed in the early years after the October Revolution, the motivations of the opponents were somewhat different.

This period also highlights that the original opponents of the Soviet Union were now adopting a policy of collective security, with mutual assistance pacts established between France, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. Equally the full legitimisation of the Soviet Union appeared to have occurred with its acceptance into the League of Nations in 1934. Here was not so much an attempt to destroy the

Soviet Union but rather the use of traditional European diplomacy that sought to build protective alliances against the Fascist threat. However, with the Munich agreement, this strategy evaporated and the ensuing Nazi-Soviet Pact turned relations on their head. Here candidates may argue that it was neither destruction nor containment that was motivating the opponents of the Soviet Union, but rather traditional fears of isolation, war and the crude realities of *Realpolitik*.

However, the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact failed to prevent the Nazi invasion of the USSR in 1941. Here is without doubt an explicit example of the desire of the most forceful opponent of communism to seek the destruction of the Soviet Union. Candidates should note that the Grand Alliance which emerged in the wake of the Nazi invasion now witnessed former adversaries co-operating in the face of a common threat. However, it would be valid to point out that the Soviet Union felt that the Western Allies deliberately withheld the opening of a second front. The Soviet Union assumed that this was to allow the Nazis to continue their attack, thereby weakening the regime and possibly bringing about its fall.

**(b) 1945–1980**

After 1945 there is clearly a strong case to be made that the opponents of the Soviet Union explicitly sought its containment. A number of events can be utilised to highlight this. These include intervention in Greece, the ensuring of limited communist involvement in any western democracy, the almost immediate establishment of a military alliance across Europe to protect western interests in the form of NATO and the explicit statement by President Truman that the USA was engaged in containing the communist threat wherever it appeared. Truman remarked at Potsdam that: "Force is the only thing that the Russians understand."

Equally, it could be argued that the Western powers, and at this juncture candidates are primarily referring to the USA, were actively hostile to the Soviet Union, stalling over Berlin and post-war Germany and ignoring Soviet proposals for an independent neutral Germany. From a Soviet perspective, the Marshall Plan was a form of economic imperialism; the use of atomic weapons in 1945 was also a hostile gesture that went beyond mere proclamations of wishing to contain communism. Indeed Truman also remarked that: "The Russians would soon be put in their place and the United States would then take the lead in running the world the way the world ought to be run."

Further evidence that the opponents of communism were primarily motivated to contain communism can be drawn from the denunciations of certain Soviet actions, including its crushing of the Hungarian uprising in 1956, the response to the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 and the Soviet repression in Czechoslovakia in 1968. What could be suggested at this point is that, as far as Europe was concerned, there was in effect a stalemate.

The emergence of *Ostpolitik* and détente not only allows candidates to highlight different policies with regards to the opponents of communism, but also observe that there was a shift in policy once again. It would be acceptable to suggest that the policy of containment had shifted into one of active co-existence, with numerous treaties and trade developments taking place. Although there is an improvement in relations, there is not a complete sea change. As Mason has written: “Détente was a device to minimise tension and avoid dangerous crises. It was not intended to end the arms race or lead to the reform of the Soviet Union.”

**(c) 1980–1991**

However, the emergence of Ronald Reagan presents candidates with an opportunity to highlight a new phase of the Cold War. Whether it is portrayed as a case of the opponents of communism reverting to a more aggressive set of relations with the Soviet Union, or an explicit attempt to bring about the collapse of communism, is open to interpretation.

Candidates could argue that Reagan was aggressive in pursuing an escalation of the arms race and also turning up the volume in terms of hostile language and propaganda. Reagan commented that the Soviet Union was “the focus of evil in the modern world.” Once again candidates may point out that there was no real attempt to destroy the Soviet Union. Indeed, it could be argued that the US did not destroy the Soviet Union; on the contrary, it crumbled from the inside as a result of its own internal contradictions that could no longer be maintained.

*Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately*

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**Option 5**

**50**

**Total**

**50**







