



Rewarding Learning

**ADVANCED
General Certificate of Education
2014**

History

Assessment Unit A2 1

[AH211]

WEDNESDAY 14 MAY, AFTERNOON

**MARK
SCHEME**

Level of response mark grid

This level of response grid has been developed as a general basis for marking candidates' work, according to the following assessment objectives:

- AO1a** recall, select and deploy historical knowledge accurately and communicate knowledge and understanding of history in a clear and effective manner;
- AO1b** present historical explanations, showing understanding of appropriate concepts and arrive at substantiated judgements;
- AO2** In relation to historical context:
- interpret, evaluate and use a range of source material;
 - explain and evaluate interpretations of historical events and topics studied.

The grid should be used in conjunction with the information on indicative content outlined for each assessment unit.

Level	Assessment Objective 1a	Assessment Objective 1b	Assessment Objective 2
	Answers at this level will:	Answers at this level will:	Answers at this level will:
1	recall, select and deploy some accurate factual knowledge and communicate limited understanding in narrative form. There will be evidence of an attempt to structure and present answers in a coherent manner.	display a basic understanding of the topic; some comments may be relevant, but general and there may be assertions and judgements which require supporting evidence.	limited recognition of the possibility of debate surrounding an event or topic.
2	be quite accurate, contain some detail and show understanding through a mainly narrative approach. Communication may have occasional lapses of clarity and/or coherence.	display general understanding of the topic and its associated concepts and offer explanations which are mostly relevant, although there may be limited analysis and a tendency to digress. There will be some supporting evidence for assertions and judgements.	an attempt to explain different approaches to and interpretations of the event or topic. Evaluation may be limited.
3	contain appropriate examples with illustrative and supportive factual evidence and show understanding and ability to engage with the issues raised by the question in a clear and coherent manner.	display good breadth of understanding of the topic and its associated concepts. Analysis is generally informed and suitably illustrated to support explanations and judgements.	there will be an ability to present and evaluate different arguments for and against particular interpretations of an event or topic.
4	be accurate and well-informed and show ability to engage fully with the demands of the question. Knowledge and understanding will be expressed with clarity and precision.	display breadth and depth of understanding of the topic and its associated concepts. Explanations will be well-informed with arguments and judgements well-substantiated, illustrated and informed by factual evidence.	there will be appropriate explanation, insightful interpretation and well-argued evaluation of particular interpretations of an event or topic.

Synoptic Assessment

Examiners should assess the candidate's ability to draw together knowledge and skills in order to demonstrate overall historical understanding. Candidates' answers should demonstrate breadth of historical knowledge and understanding by ranging comprehensively across the period of study as a whole. They should make links and comparisons which are properly developed and analysed and thus indicate understanding of the process of historical change. The knowledge and understanding of the subject should come from more than one perspective – political or cultural or economic – and there should be understanding demonstrated of the connections or inter-relationship between these perspectives.

Generic Levels of Response for Synoptic Assessment

The generic levels of response should be used in conjunction with the information on the indicative content outlined for each answer.

Level 1 ([0]–[5]) AO2(b), ([0]–[7]) AO1(b)

Answers at this level may recall some accurate knowledge and display understanding of mainly one part of the period and one perspective. The answer will be characterised throughout by limited accuracy and a lack of clarity. Answers may provide a descriptive narrative of events. There will be few links and comparisons made between different parts of the period. Answers will be mainly a series of unsubstantiated assertions with little analysis **AO1(b)**. There may be perhaps an awareness of contemporary **or** later interpretations but the answer may focus only on one interpretation **AO2(b)**. Answers at this level will be characterised throughout by unclear meaning due to illegibility, inaccurate spelling, punctuation and grammar; there will be an inappropriate style of writing; and defects in organisation and lack of a specialist vocabulary.

Level 2 ([6]–[10]) AO2(b), ([8]–[15]) AO1(b)

Answers at this level may recall and deploy knowledge which draws from examples across the period. The answer will have frequent lapses in accuracy and at times lack clarity. The answer will provide some explanation though at times will lapse into narrative. Links and comparisons will be made but these will not be fully developed or analysed. Answers will contain some unsubstantiated assertions but also arguments which are appropriately developed and substantiated **AO1(b)**. There will be an awareness of contemporary **or** later interpretations about the subject but this will be limited and in need of further development **AO2(b)**. Answers at this level will have frequent lapses in meaning, inaccurate spelling, punctuation and grammar; at times the style of writing will be inappropriate; there will be occasional defects in organisation and little specialist vocabulary.

Level 3 ([11]–[15]) AO2(b), ([16]–[22]) AO1(b)

Answers at this level will recall and deploy knowledge accurately, drawing from all parts of the period with clarity and focus. Answers provide focused explanations and make links and comparisons which are developed and analysed, indicating an understanding of the process of historical change. Arguments are developed, substantiated, illustrated and reach a judgement **AO1(b)**. There is a satisfactory evaluation of either contemporary **or** later interpretations of the subject **or** a partial evaluation of both **AO2(b)**. Answers at this level will be characterised by clarity of meaning due to legibility, accurate spelling, punctuation and grammar; the style of writing is appropriate; there is good organisation and with some specialist vocabulary.

Level 4 ([16]–[20]) AO2(b), ([23]–[30]) AO1(b)

Answers at this level will demonstrate accurate recall of knowledge from across the period studied with clarity and precision. Answers will provide detailed and focused insightful explanations drawing on actions, events, issues or perspectives across the period, and there is an excellent understanding of the connections or interrelationships between these. A judgement is reached using arguments that are fully developed, illustrated and substantiated **AO1(b)**. There is a well informed and insightful evaluation of contemporary **and** later interpretations **AO2(b)**. Answers at this level will be consistently characterised throughout by clarity of meaning due to legibility, accurate spelling, punctuation and grammar; the style of writing is most appropriate; there is very good organisation and appropriate use of specialist vocabulary.

Option 1: Anglo-Spanish Relations 1509–1609

AVAILABLE
MARKS

Answer **one** question.

- 1 “Spain was responsible for the deterioration in Anglo-Spanish relations in the period 1509–1609”. How far would you accept this verdict?

This question requires an assessment of whether Spain was responsible for worsening Anglo-Spanish relations in the period 1509–1609. Answers should consider how each monarch interacted with his or her counterpart and how the relations between them changed throughout the period. Responses should consider the influences of other nations and events on Anglo-Spanish relations. Answers should consider the growing power of England and discuss the view that it was responsible for the deterioration in Anglo-Spanish relations.

Top level responses will reflect on the influence of each individual monarch on declining Anglo-Spanish relations and discuss how they were affected by the relative strengths of their nations. Answers should consider how far Spain was the driving factor and whether any one factor could be said to be the consistent cause of the deterioration in Anglo-Spanish relations. Responses should take into consideration the changing nature of the sixteenth century and the power of nations such as France.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

(a) Henry VIII and Ferdinand 1509–1516

This is an important period which defined relations between the two nations. The Treaty of Medina del Campo of 1489 had established close ties between the two nations which were cemented by the royal marriage of Henry VIII to Catherine of Aragon in 1509. Candidates may include contemporary material from Catherine of Aragon on her views on Anglo-Spanish relations. As a newly united state, Spain sought to gain an ally to balance the power of France on its northern border, while England sought stability after a long period of civil war and question marks over the legitimacy of the Tudor claim to the throne. Answers should show that Anglo-Spanish relations were very strong at the beginning of the period and that both England and Spain sought to maintain this.

The death of Henry VII in 1509 left an imbalance in the relationship between the two nations. Spain was ruled by one of Europe’s most experienced and wily monarchs, while England had the young and inexperienced Henry VIII. Machiavelli’s view of Ferdinand as a dominating figure could be used as a contemporary opinion and the influence of the Spanish monarch on Anglo-Spanish relations is demonstrated by his manipulation of Henry in the war of 1512 against France. Candidates could use Henry VIII’s view of himself as a warrior Prince in the mould of Henry V as a contemporary opinion and as justification for his rush to war with France. Ferdinand used the English as a diversion to gain the Kingdom of Navarre and then made his own peace with France, leaving Henry unable to continue the war and so accepting

a peace he did not seek. The strong Anglo-Spanish relations during the alliance against France were clearly damaged by Spain's manipulation of Henry VIII. Catherine of Aragon may have encouraged Henry's pro-Spanish policy and made her father's control of her husband even easier. Answers might conclude that this Spanish domination had declined as Ferdinand approached his death and Henry gained more international experience and that Anglo-Spanish relations had recovered by this time. Responses could suggest that it was Spain's manipulation of England which caused a decline in Anglo-Spanish relations in this period.

(b) Henry VIII and Charles V 1516–1547

Answers should consider which of these monarchs was responsible for the deteriorating Anglo-Spanish relations. Alliances against France in 1521 could be used to show how strong Anglo-Spanish relations were and candidates might point to the threat of France as the real influence on the relationship between England and Spain. The importance of Wolsey in international affairs could be used to show his influence on Anglo-Spanish relations. Candidates might use the historical debate on Wolsey of historians such as Elton or Guy to demonstrate his impact on the relationship between England and Spain. Answers might show that Wolsey's dealings with both France and Spain made the Spanish doubt English sincerity and led to worsening relations. By contrast, responses might suggest that Charles V's victory at Pavia in 1525 allowed him to dominate relations with the French and this damaged Anglo-Spanish relations as he no longer required Henry VIII as an ally.

Answers should also consider who was at fault on the divorce issue. Henry VIII's divorce of Charles V's aunt, Catherine of Aragon, damaged Habsburg prestige. Charles V's opposition to Henry could be portrayed as unreasonable and the source of declining Anglo-Spanish relations. Candidates could use contemporary comments from both Charles V and Henry VIII to show how both sought improved relations in the late 1530s which became a reality with an alliance against France in 1542.

(c) Edward VI, Mary I and Charles V 1547–1558

Answers should show the strength of relations in this period. Edward VI's Protestant faith could have been an impediment to good relations, yet Charles V's attitude to Anglo-Spanish relations was by necessity positive. Faced with the continuation of the long Habsburg-Valois dynastic wars, Charles was desperate to maintain an alliance with England against France and its ally Scotland. Candidates might use the contemporary description of Charles V as 'the sword of Catholicism' to highlight the importance of a Catholic-Protestant alliance. Faced with conflict with the Scots, we see Protector Somerset limiting his religious reforms to maintain good relations. Clearly both England and Spain were attempting to preserve cordial relations. This is further highlighted during Mary's reign when Charles V accepted humiliating marriage terms for his son Philip's marriage to the English Queen. Candidates might consider the historical debate on the strength of Mary I's government, using Elton's or Pollard's arguments to show the damage inflicted on future Anglo-Spanish relations by Philip's arrogance towards the English court during his time there. Responses might suggest that it was Philip II's manipulation of England in a war with the French which led to a deterioration in Anglo-Spanish relations. The loss of Calais was blamed on Mary and her Spanish husband.

(d) Elizabeth I and Philip II 1558–1598

Answers should show that this is the most sustained period of decline in Anglo-Spanish relations. Responses should be able to describe a series of events which might be attributed to both nations in explaining the decline in Anglo-Spanish relations. The actions of the Spanish at San Juan in 1568 could be said to have caused Englishmen like Drake and Hawkins to hate the Spanish. England's trading in the New World had annoyed the Spanish and Drake's campaign against them over the next twenty years led to a decline in relations. Candidates might compare Philip II's support for plots in England with Elizabeth's support for the Dutch. Both nations worried about religious crusades from the other and candidates might use Davies' *Weltpolitik* against Neale's view of Elizabeth being manipulated by the 'Puritan Choir' as evidence of this. Answers might also establish that the decline in Anglo-Spanish relations was partly due to misunderstandings rather than being either nation's fault. Elizabeth's reaction by signing the Treaty of Nonsuch with the Netherlands in 1585 could be said to be justified, yet it led to a decline in Anglo-Spanish relations, culminating in the Spanish Armada.

Responses might identify a change in English attitudes as a cause of declining relations. In the early part of the period England was a second rate nation compared to Spain but by the 1580s growing English power threatened the Spanish and created an attitude among the English which led to conflict. Candidates might use anti-Spanish comments by Walsingham, Drake or Robert Dudley in support of this argument. Answers could show that both Elizabeth and Philip II were responsible for the continuation of conflict for 18 years.

(e) James I and Philip III 1603–1609

Responses should show that improved relations appeared with the signing of the Treaty of London in 1604. Both nations sought an improvement in relations and the contemporary opinions of Lerma or Robert Cecil could be used by candidates to support this. Answers should discuss which nation was most responsible for improved relations and could use historians like Starkey and Roper to highlight this.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately.

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- 2 "In the period 1509–1609 religious differences had a greater impact on Anglo-Spanish relations than political considerations." To what extent would you agree with this statement?

This question requires an assessment of how far religious differences between England and Spain affected Anglo-Spanish relations in the period 1509–1609. Answers also need to consider the impact of political factors on Anglo-Spanish relations and compare and contrast this with the influence of religious differences. Responses should consider how these factors are interlinked and show how these relationships changed across the period.

Top level responses will reflect on the nature of religious differences by comparing the nature of English and Spanish Catholicism before England's split with Rome. Answers might discuss the growing Protestant influences of the 1530s and 1540s before considering the impact of Mary Tudor's religious

settlement. Elizabeth's Protestant settlement could be analysed to see the extent of the difference with Catholic Spain.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

(a) Henry VIII and Ferdinand 1509–1516

Answers may argue that the strong relations between England and Spain in this period can be attributed to the absence of religious differences. This period was characterised by strong links between the two states as demonstrated by the continuation of the Treaty of Medina del Campo, the marriage of Henry VIII to Catherine of Aragon and the military alliance and war with France. These strong links could be maintained as there were few religious issues between the two states. Responses might suggest that Spanish Catholicism was a much more radical version due to its struggle against the Moors and that this was shown through the work of the Spanish Inquisition.

Answers should discuss whether political considerations had a greater impact on Anglo-Spanish relations than religion in this period. Both nations feared and clashed with France and this naturally drew them together. The alliance between England and Spain against France in 1512 is a clear example of international relations having a major impact on Anglo-Spanish relations. Contemporary comments from Wolsey could be used to demonstrate the importance of Spain in the war against France and in fulfilling Henry VIII's desire for glory in France. Responses might suggest that Ferdinand had other political aims of developing his possessions in Italy and Navarre and that Henry's zeal for war with France allowed him to achieve this. Candidates could use the views of the historian JH Elliott to support this argument.

(b) Henry VIII and Charles V 1516–1547

Answers should show how religious differences between England and Spain grew during this period. Luther's criticisms of both the beliefs and behaviour of the Catholic Church created the great 'schism' in the Church, yet England and Henry opposed such changes. Indeed, Henry was awarded the title 'Defender of the Faith' by the Pope for his attacks on Luther. Only Henry's need for a male heir was to create a religious issue between England and Spain. Henry's failure to gain a divorce from the Pope forced him to seek another method to remove Catherine of Aragon. Cromwell's and Cranmer's legislation was to split the English Church from Rome and allowed Henry, as head of the Church, to grant his own divorce. This difference in religion was minimal but coincided with a period of poor Anglo-Spanish relations and answers might suggest that religious differences did have the greatest impact on relations in this period. Candidates might use contemporary comments by Cromwell to demonstrate how he sought further religious change in favour of the Protestant elements in the English Church, observing that this increased religious differences, thus damaging Anglo-Spanish relations.

Answers could contrast these religious differences with the political clashes of the period. Henry's failure to gain a divorce was due to Charles V's opposition to his aunt, Catherine of Aragon, being divorced. Charles saw this as an attack on the Habsburg family and responses could suggest that poor Anglo-Spanish relations were due to this and not religious differences. Earlier links between England and Spain had been driven by conflict with their common enemy, France. Answers might suggest that Charles V's victory at the battle of Pavia, in 1525, made English support less important and this led to a decline in Anglo-Spanish relations. Candidates might use J Guy's comments to explain how good relations were restored to create an alliance against France. Religious differences were overlooked when political expediency demanded good Anglo-Spanish relations.

(c) Edward VI, Mary I and Charles V 1547–1558

Answers should identify the religious reforms of Somerset and Northumberland as increasing religious differences with Spain to their highest point. Even though Protestant beliefs were introduced for the first time in England, good Anglo-Spanish relations were maintained. Responses should show that the political requirements of war with Scotland made England work to maintain good relations with Spain. Candidates might use Somerset's comments on limiting the extent of religious reform as a contemporary opinion which supports this argument. Spain was so engrossed in the Habsburg-Valios dynastic wars that it was prepared to turn a blind eye to the religious situation developing in England. Candidates might use the idea of Charles V as 'the sword of the Church' to draw a contrast with this situation.

Answers might suggest that the good Anglo-Spanish relations of the Marian period were due to her reforms which removed religious differences between the nations. Consideration of Philip Habsburg's marriage to Mary I could be used to show the political motivation behind this union. Charles V was so desperate to gain an ally against France that he accepted very strong restrictions on Philip in this marriage. Wyatt's rebellion could be used to show contemporary opinion which was opposed to the marriage, Catholicism and Spain. Candidates might use ST Bindoff's criticism of Mary's foreign policy to support the idea that it was politics and not religion which had the greatest impact on Anglo-Spanish relations during her reign.

(d) Elizabeth I and Philip II 1558–1603

Since the Elizabethan Church Settlement created a Protestant state, religious differences with Spain were great, yet Anglo-Spanish relations did not decline immediately. Philip II's proposal of marriage would seem to suggest that he was able to overlook Elizabeth's Protestant faith. Candidates might quote Philip when he stated "better a heretic on the English throne than a French woman." This contemporary opinion would seem to suggest that religious differences were not the greatest influence on Anglo-Spanish relations during the period. JB Black supports this idea when he states that Elizabeth only wanted to establish her power and not spread Protestantism, as Wernham suggests. Answers should show that both Philip and Elizabeth sought to deal with France and this factor made religious differences less important. France's decline into civil war after 1562 lessened its threat and allowed religious differences to affect Anglo-Spanish relations. Elizabeth was always fearful of a Catholic crusade against her which the Treaty of Joinville in 1584 seemed to herald, while Philip feared Elizabeth's support for Protestant rebels in the Netherlands.

(e) James I and Philip III 1603–1609

Religious differences were now well entrenched in the period 1603–1609, yet this did not stop an improvement in relations after the long years of war. The Treaty of London restored relations between the countries and answers might suggest that it was the political and economic cost of the war which drove both nations to seek an agreement. Contemporary opinion of the Duke of Lerma clearly encouraged Philip III to seek peace, despite religious differences. The historian Roper suggests that this was one of Philip III's great achievements when he turned his back on his father's militaristic methods.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately.

[50]

Option 1

**AVAILABLE
MARKS**

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Option 2: Crown and Parliament in England 1603–1702

AVAILABLE
MARKS

Answer **one** question.

- 1 “The Crown won only small victories but suffered huge defeats.” How far would you agree with this assessment of the relationship between Crown and Parliament in England in the period 1603–1702?

This question requires an assessment of the extent to which the period 1603–1702 can be interpreted as one of major defeats and only minor successes for the Crown.

A comparative analysis should be made of the pivotal events in the seventeenth century, including the Constitutional Revolution, the Civil Wars and execution of Charles I, the Restoration Settlement, the Glorious Revolution, the Revolution Settlement and the reign of William and Mary.

Top level responses will reflect on the extent to which these events can be interpreted as small victories or huge defeats for the Crown. The response should discuss the extent to which the monarchy in England was challenged and changed in this period.

It would be legitimate to argue that no single event in the period saw a major permanent change in the power and position of the monarchy. The Whig analysis of a gradual, inevitable rise in the power and position of Parliament may be explored. Alternatively, candidates may argue that, although the relationship between the Crown and Parliament changed, monarchy remained in a strong position and recovered from any major defeats it suffered.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

(a) The reign of James I 1603–1625

Although this reign saw a number of clashes between King and Parliament, there was little significant change in their relationship. Conflict over finance, foreign policy and religion had not resulted in any major defeats for the Crown by 1625. Contemporary opinion of leading figures such as the Earl of Salisbury may be utilised to explain the impact of key events. Good candidates may note that the Monopoly Act, impeachment of Cranfield and the parliamentary foreign policy debates suggest that the King faced increasing challenges to his position. Nonetheless, this period was one of minor victories rather than major defeats for both sides. Candidates may employ an observation from a historian such as Bingham.

(b) The Constitutional Revolution of 1640–1642

The Constitutional Revolution can be interpreted as a major defeat for the Crown as it saw the abolition of prerogative courts and removal of the King’s financial devices. The Crown’s financial independence was restricted by Parliament, insisting that taxation could not be levied without its consent. The power of the Crown to summon and dissolve Parliament was weakened

by the passing of the Triennial Act and the Act Against Own Dissolution.

However, arguably the Crown had not suffered a devastating defeat and the King remained in a position of strength. Parliament failed to significantly limit the King's control over the church, army and appointment of advisers. The King remained able to become self-financing through an expansion of trade. Certainly, the period represented a defeat for the monarchy but the extent of the long-term change in the relationship between Crown and Parliament is debatable. Contemporary comment from leading figures such as Laud and the views of Marxist historians could be used.

(c) The Civil Wars and the Execution of Charles I in 1649

The defeat of Charles I in two civil wars and his execution represented the most obvious and greatest defeat of the Crown in this period. Candidates may explore the military and political defeat of the Royalists and show how the execution was the ultimate victory for Parliament. The Interregnum saw the monarchy at its weakest, even if finding a workable settlement to replace the King was to prove impossible. Despite this huge defeat, the restoration of Charles II suggests that royalist failures in the 1640s had not caused irreparable damage to the Crown. Contemporary opinion from Cromwell may be employed, while historians such as Graves and Silcock could be used to explain the importance of these events.

(d) The Restoration Settlement and the reign of Charles II 1660–1685

Perhaps the most significant victory for the Crown came with the restoration of Charles II. Despite many of the Constitutional Revolution's reforms remaining in place, it still represented a remarkable comeback by the Crown. The Cavalier Parliament restored most of Charles II's prerogative powers. While prerogative taxation and courts remained illegal and the subsidy level from Parliament was fixed, growing income from trade made the Crown financially stronger. The weakened Triennial Act of 1664 enabled Charles II, buoyed by French subsidies and the trade revolution, to pursue personal rule in the final years of his reign. Increased censorship also made it more difficult to criticise the King without facing charges of treason. Charles left his brother James a stronger and more stable throne than he himself had inherited. This is especially evident in the King's reform of local government.

Candidates may argue that the Crown did suffer a number of significant, if not huge, defeats. The Clarendon Code and Test Acts reasserted Parliament's influence over the church and the failed Declarations of Indulgence displayed Charles II's inability to dictate religious policy. Perhaps the most significant challenge to the Crown's position came during the Exclusion Crisis, even if the King did manage to avoid a major defeat. Contemporary opinion of leading figures such as Danby may be employed, while the views of historians like Hutton could be utilised.

(e) The reign of James II and the Glorious Revolution

James II's attempts to secure religious and political toleration for Catholics may have resulted in a number of small personal victories but ultimately led to a major defeat for the Crown. His actions were interpreted by Parliament as an attempt to create an absolutist, Catholic England. While the prerogatives of the monarchy were not directly changed, it was James II's abuse of these powers which led to widespread opposition and the Glorious Revolution. The contemporary opinion of the Earl of Sunderland could be

employed to illustrate James II's perspective.

(f) The Revolution Settlement 1688–1689

The Revolution Settlement allowed the Crown to retain control over foreign policy and the armed forces, the appointment of ministers, the power to veto legislation and supremacy over the Church. These represented small, yet significant, victories for the Crown. However, monarchy was now financially dependent on Parliament and the principles established in the Bill of Rights meant that the King had to work with his Parliament. The relationship between Crown and Parliament had been significantly altered. While joint monarchy undermined the concept of the divine right of kings, it was William who insisted on this partnership. His personal success had, however, resulted in a weakening of the long-term position of the Crown. Candidates may argue that the Glorious Revolution was not, in itself, a major defeat for monarchy but that it did set the foundation for the changes which were to come in the following decade. The views of historians like Farmer could also be used to explain the impact of these events on the Crown.

(g) Changes to the power and position of the monarchy in the reign of William III.

The most substantial changes to the power and position of the monarchy came in this period, although it is debatable whether this represented a major defeat. The Commission of Accounts, Civil List and Bank of England all contributed to a greater financial dependency of the monarchy on Parliament. The Triennial Act of 1694 further contributed to making Parliament a permanent aspect of government. The Act of Settlement secured a Protestant succession and reflected the increasing influence of Parliament. The reigns of William and Mary had seen the establishment of a working relationship between Crown and Parliament. Candidates may employ the contemporary opinion of leading figures such as John Churchill and the views of historians like Plumb.

Candidates may argue that a partnership in government between Crown and Parliament was nothing new as James I had also depended on Parliament for finance and new laws. The events of the seventeenth century had not resulted in a dramatic change in the power and position of the monarchy and to describe the period as one 'huge defeat' is misleading. It could even be argued that, from a financial point of view, the Crown had emerged from the Stuart period in a stronger, not weaker, position.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately. [50]

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- 2 "Of all the events in the period 1603–1702, the Glorious Revolution caused the most significant changes to the relationship between Crown and Parliament in England." To what extent would you accept this statement?

This question requires an assessment of the impact of the Glorious Revolution upon the relationship between Crown and Parliament. A comparative analysis should be made with other pivotal events, including the Constitutional Revolution, the execution of Charles I, the Restoration Settlement and the impact of war during the reign of William and Mary.

Top level responses will reflect on the ways in which the Glorious Revolution had

an impact on the prerogative powers of the monarchy and changed the role of Parliament. It may be argued that the changes in the power and position of the monarchy during the seventeenth century were more gradual and not dependent on one pivotal turning point. It may even be suggested that the extent of the change has been exaggerated and the Crown remained in a powerful position at the end of the century.

Responses may begin by outlining the relationship between Crown and Parliament in the reign of James I. Candidates may include an explanation of the traditional Whig interpretation of the gradual, inexorable change in the relationship across the period.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

(a) The Glorious Revolution and the Revolution Settlement 1688–1689

James II's religious views and controversial actions had resulted in the Glorious Revolution and the creation of a joint monarchy. The relationship between the monarchs and their Parliament was altered by the new Coronation Oath, the Bill of Rights, the Mutiny Act, the Toleration Act and the revised financial arrangements. Contemporary comment from William III could be used to illustrate the impact of these changes. Despite this emergence of a new style of monarchy, the Crown retained most of its major prerogative powers in reality. Arguably, the removal of James II was more of a restoration rather than a revolution in the relationship between Crown and Parliament. The main achievement of Parliament in this period was to fix what it perceived to be the abuses of the two previous monarchs. Alternatively, candidates may argue that the Glorious Revolution was critical in establishing the foundations for the creation of a new relationship between King and Parliament. Candidates may employ an observation from a historian such as Fellows on the importance of the Glorious Revolution.

(b) The Relationship between Crown and Parliament in 1603

At the beginning of the century, Parliament maintained contact between the monarch and his or her subjects and was responsible for providing the king or queen with advice and supply, as well as passing bills. The Crown appointed officials, made foreign policy decisions and controlled the armed forces. It could summon, prorogue and dissolve Parliament, obstruct legislation, dispense individuals from or suspend law, issue proclamations and vary customs duties. As Parliament was entirely dependent on the monarch for its existence, it had limited status and influence in early Stuart England. It was further weakened by the predominance of factions rather than political parties. Parliament's main strength was in its power to help the monarch change the law and its influence over the monarch's finances. While the reign of James I (1603–1625) saw some significant clashes between King and Parliament, there was little significant change to their relationship.

(c) The Constitutional Revolution 1640–1642

It is valid to argue that the Constitutional Revolution was the most critical event in changing the relationship between Crown and Parliament in the seventeenth century. The Long Parliament was able to impose limits on royal power and secure an increased and more permanent role. The Triennial Act and the Act Against Own Dissolution were designed to ensure regular Parliaments and limit the possibility of another period of Personal Rule. To cement the need for a regular calling of Parliament, the Crown's prerogative financial devices were abolished and the prerogative courts were ended to prevent the King using the judicial system to enforce his will. The extent of the challenge to the King is evident in the execution of the King's favourite, the Earl of Strafford, as Parliament sought to gain an influence in choosing the King's advisers.

However, the term 'revolution' can be misleading and there were limits to what was actually achieved by Parliament. The King refused to accept that the appointment of royal ministers should be subject to parliamentary approval and the Root and Branch petition, proposing the abolition of the episcopacy, was never implemented. The King remained in control of the armed forces and could be financially independent of Parliament if trade revenues rose sufficiently. Nevertheless, Parliament had substantially challenged the King's prerogative power and the relationship between the two broke down into bloody civil war. Contemporary comment from MPs such as Holles, and the views of historians like Morrill, could be used to explain the impact of the Constitutional Revolution on the relationship between Crown and Parliament.

(d) The Execution of Charles I 1649

The most significant change to the relationship between Crown and Parliament came with the execution of the King and the creation of an English republic. Good candidates may note that the execution never had the support of the majority of the King's subjects and the army had played a vital role in the transfer of power. Charles II was exiled and the interregnum allowed Parliament its greatest opportunity to establish a working political settlement without the King. The contemporary opinion of leading figures such as Fairfax and the views of leading historians like Gregg may be included. The collapse of the republic and the subsequent restoration of the monarchy suggest that the breakdown in the relationship between the King and Parliament was only temporary and the execution had not signified a long-term shift in political power.

(e) The Restoration Settlement 1660–c.1665

While the monarchy made a remarkable comeback in 1660, the Restoration Settlement did not represent a return of the King with unlimited power. The settlement confirmed all the bills passed by Parliament up to the end of 1641. The prerogative taxes and courts of Charles I's reign remained illegal and the King was no longer able to collect taxes without Parliament's consent. The King's permanent revenue was limited to £1.2 million per annum in order to ensure his dependence on calling a regular Parliament for supply. However, arguably Charles II had been restored on his own terms and with most of his prerogative powers intact. His position was further strengthened by the actions of the Cavalier Parliament. For example, the Triennial Act allowed the King to decide when he 'ought' to call Parliament, an option he was to exploit in the final period of his reign. Contemporary

opinion of leading figures such as Buckingham may be included to explain the impact of the Restoration Settlement. The relationship between Charles II and his Parliament was strained by his foreign and religious policies and broke down completely during the Succession crisis. Candidates may explore the impact of this crisis and the King's subsequent policies to secure a loyal, Tory Parliament for his brother. Comments from historians such as Ollard may be included to explain the changing relationship between Crown and Parliament in the period.

(f) The Reign of William III

William III's Dutch loyalties and rivalry with Louis XIV committed England to an expensive and lengthy war in Europe. To finance his foreign policy exploits, William was prepared to create a working partnership with the gentry. Candidates may include an observation by an historian such as Lockyer to illustrate his views on the changing relationship between King and Parliament. To ensure a regular supply of income, William allowed Parliament a greater say in how the money was spent and the reformed Triennial Act ensured a regularity that allowed it to become more efficient and effective in its operation. Parliament became an integral instrument of government and was able to play an enhanced role in forming policy, even in foreign affairs. The contemporary opinion of leading parliamentarians such as Russell may be included. The Commission of Accounts and Civil List increased the Crown's financial dependency on Parliament. This new relationship was cemented by the Act of Settlement which achieved the independence of the judiciary, determined the religion of the monarch and dictated that the Crown could not go to war in defence of its foreign dominions without parliamentary support. By the end of his reign, William was under pressure to appoint ministers who could command support in the House of Commons even if he retained the right to determine who they should be.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately.

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Option 2

**AVAILABLE
MARKS**

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Option 3: Liberalism and Nationalism in Europe 1815–1914

AVAILABLE
MARKS

Answer **one** question.

- 1 “Between 1815 and 1849 liberalism in Europe experienced only failure; from 1850 to 1914 it achieved limited success.” How far would you accept this verdict?

This question requires an assessment of the progress, stagnation or regression experienced by liberalism between 1815 and 1914. The progress of both economic and political liberalism will be discussed, each of the two periods mentioned in the question should be considered, and a judgement made as to whether the verdict quoted is fair. Top level responses will reflect on both the failures and the limited successes of the earlier period, and, while showing the undoubted successes achieved by liberalism after 1850, will also note, for example, the decline of free trade and the persistence of authoritarian government late in the period.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

(a) 1815–1848

As early as 1815 liberalism was thwarted in the arrangements made by the Vienna treaty-makers. The restoration of ancien regime monarchies and Habsburg hegemony over central Europe were clear setbacks to those liberal aspirations which had been fostered by the French Revolution. Metternich provided leadership to those determined to preserve their despotic powers, acting in the spirit of the reactionary Holy Alliance to crush rebellion (Metternich’s own rationale for resisting liberalisation might well be quoted here.) As a result, France intervened in Spain in 1823, and Austria itself sent troops to Piedmont and Naples in 1820 and to Parma and Modena in 1831. In Germany, the Carlsbad Decrees (1819) and the Six Articles (1832) crushed tentative liberal protests by limiting academic freedom and increasing federal power over the individual states. Within the Empire, Metternich brought surveillance and spying to a new art, while in France Charles X tried to ignore the Charter, and Louis Philippe’s regime suggested that, once liberals had achieved power, they refused to share it even with those immediately below them. Answers might cite historians such as Cobban to shed light on the apparent selfishness of liberals in power. All of the above would seem to support the verdict of “failure” between 1815 and 1848.

Better answers, while acknowledging the stumbling blocks placed in the way of liberalism, will nonetheless point to some glimmers of liberal success prior to 1848. In the German Confederation the rapid growth of the free trade area known as the *Zollverein* was a startling success for economic liberalism (Britain also witnessed considerable progress in free trade), while some German states, particularly in the south west, fulfilled their obligation under the terms of the Confederation to introduce a constitution. In France, both the Bourbon and Orleans monarchies were overthrown by revolution, but at least France persisted with these constitutional regimes, and for much of the

period 1830–1848 liberals were in power.

(b) 1848–1849

1848 marked the great opportunity for liberals, but it was not seized. Again liberals failed in their desire to extend individual freedoms and establish parliamentary governments, partly through determined opposition and partly through their own failings. Although they found themselves in control of or working with existing governments, they lost that advantage, along with their constitutional gains. In France a Second Republic was within a few years overthrown by Napoleon III, the chance to set up a united, liberal Germany was squandered, constitutions throughout Italy were lost as Austrian power was reasserted, and in the Habsburg Empire reaction triumphed after a short period. The liberals had no armed forces at their disposal, their leaders were inexperienced and indecisive, they feared and refused to work with radicals, and in the end were probably too bourgeois and too few in number, and in Italy too weak, to survive Papal condemnation. By contrast, their opponents were ruthless and experienced, retaining control of loyal armies, knowing how to play for time and make tactical retreats, and profiting from divisions in the liberal ranks. Frederick William's scorn for the liberals might be mentioned in this context. Better answers may make reference to the handful of successes which survived the wreckage of 1848, such as the newly granted Piedmontese constitution, the exile of Metternich and the end of feudal obligations for the Austrian peasantry. Above all, liberalism had raised its profile and given the old rulers a fright, with consequences soon to follow. The views of historians such as Price might be used to support such a conclusion.

(c) 1850–1871

The decades after 1850 will probably be seen as a time of success for liberalism, as rulers began to grant individual liberties. The best answers may, however, recognise the limitations of these successes. Thus, Prussia was given a constitution by its King, but the franchise was soon watered down, and Manteuffel, the leading political figure of the 1850s, was hostile to liberals. Nonetheless, his reforms in favour of the peasantry and the urban workers will probably be seen as "liberal". In Piedmont, Cavour attracted admiration as he passed a series of liberal reforms and showed that economic liberalism was the route to economic success, yet Naples remained a tyrannical regime. France in the 1850s was still an authoritarian empire, but in the following decade Napoleon III began moves to liberalise his rule, finally working easily with a Prime Minister, Ollivier, who was a republican. Historians' observations on the political transformation of the Second Empire in France could help shed further light on this phenomenon. After 1860 the Kingdom of Italy was governed under what was in essence the *Statuto*, the old Piedmontese constitution, while in Prussia the liberals, in the shape of the Progressive Party, were the largest parliamentary grouping by 1860. They objected to the proposed army reforms and tried to block them by refusing funds, but liberalism suffered a further setback when Bismarck unconstitutionally ignored their opposition and collected the taxes regardless. Bismarck's private opinions of liberals might usefully be introduced here. After the 1866 war, which resulted in the formation of the North German Confederation, the Prussian liberals, accepting reality, regrouped as the National Liberals, going on to work with Bismarck, demonstrating that liberals could work with traditional rulers, but damaging their liberal credentials by supporting the Falk Laws. The Fundamental

Laws of 1867 gave the Habsburg lands a constitution which granted individual freedom, while offering only a restricted franchise which seemed to guarantee continued liberal domination of the *Reichsrat*. During these years economic liberalism blossomed as free trade extended outwards from Germany and Britain to become the norm, notably in its acceptance by previously protectionist France.

(d) 1871–1914

The best answers will note that inconsistency remained a feature of liberalism until 1914. The French Third Republic was essentially liberal, and deserves credit for surviving a series of crises, yet it would be possible to argue that these recurrent threats, from both left and right, were in themselves a reflection of the shallow roots liberalism had laid down. The Commune of 1871, the subsequent threat of royalist restoration, the neo-Bonapartist Boulanger in the 1880s – all these displayed both the precariousness and the resilience of liberalism. But the Panama scandal revealed only corruption and greed within the political class, something already apparent in Italy, where the new Kingdom also suffered from nepotism and cynical political deals in parliament. The Dreyfus affair revealed the continuing strength of those opposed to the (liberal) Republic, and it was unsurprising that much anti-clerical legislation followed. In the Habsburg Empire, Franz Josef, in spite of the constitution, ruled as a neo-despot by 1900, while a similar picture prevailed in Germany, where the *Reichstag's* powers were limited and the Emperor and the army seemed to exert undue influence (Contemporary interpretations from frustrated liberals might be included in this context.) All this is in paradoxical contrast to the spread of individual liberties throughout the continent, and answers may debate whether this constitutes “limited success” or not. Economic liberalism undoubtedly was in retreat from 1880, as Bismarck broke with the National Liberals to reintroduce protection, a lead followed by most of continental Europe. In addition, the increasing involvement of the state in economic supervision and in the provision of welfare went against classical liberal ideals. The views of Collins could be utilised here. Finally, the rise of socialism (by 1914 the Socialists were the largest party in the *Reichstag* and the Third Republic faced near-overthrow by syndicalist strikers) suggested that the predominantly middle class, individualist liberals were on the retreat.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately.

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- 2 “Despite the growth of nationalist groups and movements in many countries, it was Europe’s rulers and statesmen who were most influential in shaping the fortunes of nationalism in Europe between 1815 and 1914.” To what extent would you agree with this statement?

This question requires consideration of the general growth of nationalism, as well as those political leaders who, like Bismarck and Cavour, were instrumental in expelling foreign control and uniting the disparate regions of Germany and Italy into a single state. Nationalist figures such as Mazzini and Kossuth could be mentioned as having great influence on nationalism without necessarily achieving success during their own political careers. Metternich should be seen as thwarting “the fortunes of nationalism” during the comparatively less successful period between 1815 and 1850. Better answers may also consider the roles of the foot soldiers of nationalism, the writers and musicians who

stimulated nationalist consciousness, those who took up arms, and those who campaigned politically. The best answers will note the adoption of nationalism as an instrument of state policy late in the period.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

(a) 1815–1850

The period between 1815 and 1850 could arguably be perceived as one of nationalist failure. The statesmen of Europe ruthlessly redrew the map of the continent in 1815, strengthening dynasticism, particularly that of the Habsburgs, and nipping nationalism in the bud. For the next forty years Metternich played a leading part in suppressing nationalism, organising an elaborate system of surveillance and spying within the Habsburg Empire, and persuading those countries which feared nationalism's potential for instability to join in a crusade to crush it. (His justification for his opposition to nationalism would be a relevant example of contemporary interpretation). Thus, usually at the invitation of their rulers, Austrian troops put down risings in Piedmont and Naples in 1820, and in Parma and Modena in 1831. In Germany, after Kotzebue's assassination, Metternich prevailed upon the Confederation to pass the Carlsbad Decrees of 1819, greatly hampering intellectual leadership of German nationalism, while in the wake of the Hambach Festival he secured the passage of the Six Articles (1832), which further curbed intellectual freedom. The year 1848 has to be seen as a failure for nationalism, with the responsibility shared between the existing rulers and inexperienced nationalists. In Italy, Pius IX's condemnation of the Austrian War was a fatal blow to nationalism, the various rulers were unwilling to give up their power, and most "Italians" showed greater loyalty to their own region. In Germany, Frederick William IV would not accept an all-German crown from the hands of middle class liberals, who, for their part, vacillated and did not seem to understand power politics. This was in contrast to the existing rulers, who retained the loyalty of their armies, made tactical withdrawals when necessary, and proved ruthless in finally stamping out the last vestiges of nationalist revolt. Although Metternich had gone, his spirit lived on in the use of Russian troops to crush Kossuth's Hungarian rising.

But Metternich was not able to suppress all signs of nationalist enthusiasm, and there were successes as well during the earlier part of the period. For example, there was the *Zollverein* which, in the decades after 1818, gave economic unity to most of Germany under Prussian leadership. Better answers may point out that the Customs Union, and the growth of railways, which both fostered a greater sense of nationalism in Germany, were also prompted by the needs of businessmen. Responses may refer to artists and thinkers who promoted nationalism during these years: the Grimm brothers, Palacky, and Mazzini, who had little practical success to show for his plotting, but whose formation of Young Italy (1831) and idealistic pursuit of a peaceful "Europe of Nations" influenced nationalist groups from Germany to Turkey, as well as individuals like Garibaldi. The views of historians on the degree of importance of cultural nationalism in shaping its fortunes might be used for "interpretation". More immediate nationalist success came with the independence of Belgium and Greece. The former originated with rioting from a discontented populace, the latter from a secret society, but in both cases statesmen from the Powers were also involved, offering both

diplomatic and military support to those seeking their own nation-state.

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MARKS

(b) 1850–1870

The period 1850–1870 is generally seen as the high point of nationalist success between 1815 and 1914. The ideology's greatest successes were the creation of the Kingdom of Italy and the German Empire, and the granting of "home rule" to Hungary. Answers will probably concentrate on the "rulers and statesmen" angle here. Cavour, Garibaldi and Napoleon III were crucial in achieving Italian unity. Cavour built up Piedmont's economy and its credentials as a modern, liberal state, making it the envy of increasing numbers of Italians. The French Emperor, a self-professed nationalist, helped to start the process of unification when he ejected the Austrians from Lombardy. Garibaldi's campaign, which began in Sicily, forced Cavour to incorporate the South into his new kingdom, between them out-facing the Pope who had done much to ensure the failure of Italian nationalism in 1848. Better answers will observe the above, but will also note the part played by those who fought as volunteers alongside Garibaldi, and the politically minded, whose National Society attached the duchies to Piedmont when the whole project of unification was faltering. Some recent interpretations, such as those of Stiles, emphasise the presence of genuine nationalism in Italy, as well as the achievement of Cavour, as stressed by earlier orthodoxy. Bismarck's drive to replace Austrian control of Germany with Prussian dominance was seized upon by German nationalists, and even those who regretted his illiberalism accepted the Empire he created in 1870, a tribute to those intellectuals who had laboured assiduously since 1815 to argue the nationalist cause. The Prussian conquest began when, in alliance with Austria, a war against the Danes was fought over the future of Schleswig and Holstein. Quarrels over the occupation of the conquered duchies led to the Seven Weeks' War of 1866, when Prussian forces overran those of Austria and many of the North German states. The resultant North German Confederation became the German Empire after the Southern states were obliged to throw in their lot with Bismarck at the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870. The role of Bismarck as a statesman in the unification of Germany will be noted: throughout these years he had adroitly sidestepped parliamentary opposition to Prussian rearmament and by clever diplomacy had ensured Great Power neutrality in the wars of 1866 and 1870. He had also consistently outmanoeuvred the French and their ailing Emperor. Throughout the whole process grass roots German nationalists had followed rather than led. Bismarck's own views on German nationalism would be a useful example of interpretation here. The *Ausgleich* of 1867, which gave self-government and equal partnership within the Habsburg Empire to Hungary, could be argued to owe most to Bismarck, as the long-sought autonomy was granted by a reeling Austria in the immediate wake of the Seven Weeks' War, although Deak's willingness to water down Hungarian demands for complete independence was a further example of a statesman's influence.

(c) 1870–1914

This period saw a slackening of the nationalist pace, although Bulgaria was unified and freed from Ottoman rule between 1878 and 1908, Rumania and Serbia were formally recognised as independent by the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, and Albania was created in 1913 as a result of the Balkan Wars. These Balkan successes owed much to Great Power intervention (usually against Turkey) and influence (the creation of Albania was Austria's

means of preventing Serbian access to the sea). But the creation of these nation-states could not have come about without the steady rise of national consciousness and the often self-sacrificing efforts of those patriots who had earlier revolted unsuccessfully against the occupying power. The failures of the late period should be seen primarily as the result of the determination of statesmen and rulers to maintain their dominant position. Thus, the Russians in Poland, the British in Ireland, the Austrians in the Czech lands and in Bosnia and Herzegovina were not to abandon power until the Great War ended. Better answers may consider the way in which governments began to promote nationalism as a distraction for working classes who might be tempted towards socialism. This may be supported by quotations from contemporaries or historians such as Berghahn referring to Germany's *Weltpolitik* in the years before the First World War. This phenomenon, representing a failure for nationalism, can be laid at the door of rulers, but can also be attributed to those thinkers who saw the ideal organisation of society as hierarchical or Darwinian.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately.

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Option 3

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MARKS**

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Option 4: Unionism and Nationalism in Ireland 1800–1900

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MARKS

Answer **one** question.

- 1 “Irish nationalists succeeded when British governments were weak, but failed when British governments were strong.” How far would you agree with this assessment of the reasons for the successes and failures of constitutional and revolutionary nationalism in Ireland in the period 1800–1900?

This question requires candidates to assess two strands of Irish nationalism, constitutional and revolutionary.

Top level responses will examine a wide range of possibilities raised by the question. Regarding constitutional nationalism, it can be argued that weaknesses in British governments facilitated success, especially in the case of Daniel O’Connell. However, other factors influenced success, such as the capability of the campaigns conducted by constitutionalists, and the nature of their objectives. The strength of the British government was but one factor in the assessment of failures for constitutionalists. While revolutionary nationalists failed to achieve their objectives in undoing the Union, the role of British governments was only one of several reasons for their lack of success.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

- (a) **In the first half of the period, the strengths and weaknesses of British governments did play a role in the political fortunes of constitutional nationalists such as Daniel O’Connell**

Government weakness in the period 1827–1829 helped O’Connell in his pursuit of Catholic emancipation. The departure of Lord Liverpool in 1827 brought to the surface fundamental divisions among the Tories over emancipation, with the brief and unhappy tenures of Canning and Goderich testifying to government instability. When Wellington became Prime Minister, he was advised by Peel to support plans for Catholic emancipation. He therefore recommended to the King, his party and parliament that emancipation should be granted. Yet other factors contributed to O’Connell’s success. He created a formidable force of Catholic opinion in Ireland which exerted pressure on Wellington. O’Connell mobilised the masses by means of the Catholic Association, financed by the penny rent, and won the support of the Catholic clergy and Presbyterians, as well as the Catholic middle class. His tactics of rhetoric, mass rallies and contesting by-elections effectively meant that no government could ignore the demand for emancipation. O’Connell’s victory in the Clare by-election coincided with the crisis within the Tory government, so in this sense it was a combination of government weakness and O’Connell’s ability which resulted in emancipation being granted. Candidates could include an observation by an historian such as Kee about the effectiveness of the emancipation campaign, or a contemporary comment from Peel or Wellington explaining the pressures on the government to concede emancipation in 1829.

The strength of the Whigs, backed by the Tories, thwarted O'Connell's motion for repeal of the Union in 1834, since this was an issue on which there were no party political differences. Weaknesses in the Whig governments after 1835 enabled O'Connell to negotiate the Lichfield House Compact, in which he guaranteed the Whigs much needed parliamentary support in return for Irish reforms. The result was legislation regarding the Irish Poor Law, tithe, municipal corporations and the benevolent changes brought about by the Under-Secretary, Thomas Drummond. However, political realities at Westminster curbed O'Connell's satisfaction with virtually every aspect of the Compact, as the Tory-dominated House of Lords was able to veto all legislation. Candidates may include a contemporary observation from O'Connell about the Lichfield House Compact, or the opinion of a historian such as Boyce assessing how successful the compact was for O'Connell. Peel's strength in the 1840s presented O'Connell's repeal movement with a formidable obstacle. Backed by both a unified parliament and the Conservative Party, Peel deployed all his political skill and experience of Irish affairs to uphold the Union. A combination of firmness, such as the banning of the famous Clontarf rally, and conciliatory reforms, such as the Maynooth Grant, undermined the repeal campaign. Contemporary comment from Peel could be employed to show his determination to uphold the Union. However, O'Connell's shortcomings also played a role in his failure. He underestimated Peel, undermined the unity of his movement with his quarrel with Young Ireland, and made the fatal error of adopting the same tactics from the emancipation campaign for what was clearly a different constitutional issue. Reference could be made to the views of historians such as McCartney regarding the flaws in O'Connell's repeal campaign.

(b) The strengths and weaknesses of British governments partly influenced the political fortunes of Parnell

Parnell succeeded in bringing about land reform, in the form of the Land Act of 1881 and the Arrears Act of 1882. However, one key factor at play was the determination of the Liberal Prime Minister, Gladstone, to become more involved in Irish affairs and seek to redress valid grievances. This sentiment owed more to ideology and personal inclination than weakness. However, Parnell deserves credit for, like O'Connell, he created a mass movement which contributed to the political climate in which reform could take place. The "New Departure" embraced the Irish Parliamentary Party, the Land League and former members of the Fenian movement, backed by the peasantry, middle class and the Catholic Church. Parnell thus helped to concentrate the minds of those in government to confront the Irish land question. He succeeded in placing the question of home rule at the forefront of British politics by his own efforts and initiative. He established at Westminster a modern day political party, whose members were the first in Europe to receive a salary and who were bound in a disciplined way by a pledge of unity. Parnell's Home Rule Party earned the respect of both the Liberals and Conservatives, and, while the Home Rule Bills introduced by Gladstone failed in 1886 and 1893, there was a political legacy bestowed from the Irish Party into the next century. Candidates could utilise contemporary comment from Parnell outlining his attitude towards the organisation of his Party, or refer to historians such as Lyons about the role played by Parnell in the success of constitutional nationalists in this period. Failure to achieve Home Rule was due to the political circumstances of Westminster politics. The House of Lords, dominated by Conservatives,

held the veto on all legislation and regardless of Gladstone's good intentions, this was an obstacle which could not be overcome. Parnell's downfall in 1890 owed more to the moral standards of the time than the political circumstances of government. Parnell's divorce scandal split his party and public opinion in Ireland, and lost him the endorsement of the Catholic Church. Gladstone disowned him in the knowledge that to do otherwise would alienate the nonconformist feeling in England to which his party appealed. Reference could be made to historians such as Bew about the circumstances of Parnell's downfall.

(c) The failure of revolutionary nationalists was undoubtedly influenced by the strength of government

Emmet's revolt in 1803 was easily suppressed by an official response which acted only in a half-hearted way in spite of Dublin Castle having indications to supplement its vague suspicions in the preceding weeks.

The revolt of the Young Irelanders in 1848 was firmly yet appropriately dealt with by the authorities. A few counties had already been "proclaimed" under the Crime and Outrage Act of the previous year. In March the government instituted prosecutions against Young Ireland leaders such as O'Brien, Meagher and Mitchel for sedition. A badly armed and disorganised insurrection was easily suppressed at Ballinacorney, County Tipperary, in July 1848. Candidates may include an observation by an historian such as Lyons about the failure of the Young Ireland rebellion.

The Fenian Rising of 1867 was resolutely dealt with by the government. Habeas corpus was temporarily suspended, the Fenian newspaper was suppressed and Irish regiments suspected of Fenian sympathies were replaced. A network of spies kept the authorities fully informed of Fenian plans. One such example was Nagle, a former Fenian, who had kept Dublin Castle informed in receipt of payment for eighteen months. The guard on Chester Castle was strengthened before a planned attack. Thousands of Fenians were arrested before they could even fire a shot. Historians such as Moody could be referred to in order to assess the factors behind the failure of the Fenians in 1867. Other factors undermined revolutionary nationalists. Emmet's revolt had no basis of support, and was badly organised. The onset of the Famine in 1845 meant that there was little enthusiasm for the Young Ireland revolt in 1848. The Fenians were confronted with the hostile and active condemnation of the Catholic Church, led by Cardinal Cullen, whose stance made it impossible for Catholics to reconcile their faith with membership of an oath-bound organisation. The Fenians were badly led; arms from the USA were not forthcoming, while the Catholic middle-class and Presbyterians were at best indifferent to their cause. Comments from contemporaries such as Cullen could be employed to illustrate the firm stance taken by the Catholic Church against the Fenians.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately.

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- 2 “While they shared strong economic motives, they had nothing else in common.” To what extent would you accept this verdict on the motives and methods of the supporters of the Union in the north and south of Ireland in the period 1800–1900?

This question requires candidates to assess the motives of Unionists in the north and south of Ireland, as well as reflecting on other aspects of their relationship. For example, candidates should comment on the nature of the influence of economic, religious and imperial motives for the supporters of the Union, and examine the similarities and differences in the methods used to uphold the Union. Candidates may comment on the common bond of economic apprehensions among Unionists in the north and south. While differences emerged in the themes of religion and empire, candidates may reflect on whether these contrasts meant that they had “nothing else in common”. Regarding methods, the inclination to use force marked the northern Unionists out more clearly from their southern counterparts. Answers may draw attention to social and geographical considerations, as well as self-perception, to indicate how much there was in common between unionists in the north and south of Ireland.

The structure of the question is immaterial; whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

- (a) **Unionists in the north and south of Ireland were motivated by common economic fears for their economic prosperity if the Union was broken**

One of the key features in the history of the Union was the industrial development of the north of Ireland, particularly the prosperity of Belfast. In the second half of the nineteenth century, its population grew faster than any other British city. In fact, Belfast rapidly became an outpost of industrial Britain. The linen industry flourished in Ulster. In the early nineteenth century cotton expanded and, while its success was of short duration, it attracted labour into Belfast and served as a model for the technical reorganisation of the linen industry. Between 1831 and 1841 Belfast’s population increased from 53 000 to 75 000. Its ropeworks became one of the largest in the world. In the 1850s, Edward Harland’s revolutionary designs for iron and steel ships gave Belfast its international reputation for shipbuilding. By the time of the first Home Rule Bill in 1886, the livelihood of Ulster Protestants was wholly bound up with the prosperity of the United Kingdom, and this partly explains their resentment towards any proposal which appeared to undermine their economic position. Candidates could refer to expressions of economic concern from contemporary Ulster Unionists, especially those from the business community.

Like their northern counterparts, economic concerns were equally strong among Southern Unionists, though their emphasis was on agriculture rather than industry. The second half of the nineteenth century witnessed legislation which changed the relationship between landlord and tenant to such an extent that Southern Unionists expressed apprehension about their economic well-being in the event of a Dublin parliament being established under any Home Rule scheme. The role of the Land League and the “Land War” of 1879–1882, which involved assaults on landlords and their property,

caused much apprehension. Even in the 1880s, the Cork Defence Union was relaying stories of the evils of boycotting to Gladstone. Southern Unionists believed that their economic position had been undermined by the Land Acts of 1870 and 1881. In 1893 a publication by the Irish Unionist Alliance claimed that Irish stocks fell during the first Home Rule crisis of 1886. Moreover, the widening of the franchise as a result of the Parliamentary Reform Acts of 1867 and 1884, along with the introduction of the Secret Ballot Act in 1872, threatened to transform the relationship between landlord and tenant to the advantage of the latter. Candidates may link these economic concerns of the supporters of the Union to the social structure of Unionism. In the north, many leading businessmen were associated prominently with the Unionist cause, while landlords led the way in the south. Candidates could refer to the economic apprehensions of contemporary Southern Unionists, in the form of statements from the Cork Defence Union. Observations from historians such as McDowell could be used to illustrate Southern Unionist anxiety about their property rights if the Union was broken.

(b) Supporters of the Union shared religious concerns, yet the emphasis was more prominent in the north than in the south

Competition for employment between Catholics and Protestants added to the sectarian feeling in Belfast, and there was civil unrest during the debates over the Home Rule Bills of 1886 and 1893. Throughout 1886, unrest in Belfast resulted in 32 killed and 371 injured. Londonderry also experienced unrest in 1870 and 1893. Earlier in the period, in response to Daniel O'Connell's repeal campaign in 1834, the Rev. Henry Cooke addressed a crowd of 40 000 at Hillsborough. The Protestant Colonisation Society was formed to ensure that lands in parts of Ulster which were vacated through emigration would continue to be occupied by Protestants. While less strident, Southern Unionists indicated some common religious concerns through literature rather than action. During the debates over the second Home Rule Bill of 1893, the Irish Unionist Alliance published a statement from the Methodists of Ireland, which argued that a Home Rule parliament would mean an excessive and unfair Catholic influence over the whole country. However, a key contrast with their northern counterparts was the willingness of Southern Unionists such as W H Lecky and William Kenny to deny that the question of the Union was a religious matter at all, arguing that the Union itself brought benefits, in terms of both social and economic advancement, to Catholics as well as Protestants. Candidates may refer to the geographical distribution of Unionism to explain these religious contrasts. Answers may include some comment about religious concerns from contemporaries such as Cooke or Lecky.

(c) Imperial concerns, while shared by Unionists in the north and south of Ireland, were markedly more prominent among the latter

For Southern Unionists, the "imperial ideal" and Ireland's role in and benefits from the Empire occupied much of their literature and speeches in defence of the Union. Southern Unionists argued that, if the Union was broken, it would create a precedent for the eventual loosening of all imperial ties, with the end of the great Empire the ultimate outcome. Many Southern Unionist leaders, such as Dunraven, Lansdowne and Middleton, served in the Empire as administrators or diplomats. Undoubtedly, the importance they attached to the Union in the imperial context was enhanced by the fact that they were educated outside Ireland and were widely travelled. Candidates may link the

affection of Southern Unionists for the Empire to their education and social background. They could refer to a declaration from the Southern Unionist organisation, the Irish Unionist Alliance, indicating its attachment to the Empire. Ulster Unionists argued that Home Rule would undermine imperial integrity. Candidates could employ the later interpretations of historians such as Jackson and Loughlin to illustrate the Ulster Unionist perception of the imperial ideal.

(d) An examination of the methods used by the supporters of the Union in the north and south of Ireland reveals further points of comparison

Ulster Unionists tended to be more forceful, strident and threatening when mobilising to defend the Union than their southern counterparts. For example, members of Young Ulster, led by Frederick Crawford, required its members to possess firearms and ammunition. Saunderson created the Ulster Defence Union in 1894 in order to collect funds and organise resistance to Home Rule. The use of force was mentioned at the great Unionist Convention in Belfast in 1892. Even the titles of northern based Unionist organisations, such as the Ulster Loyalist Anti-Repeal Union, indicate a contrast with their southern colleagues, with the focus suggesting a narrow self-interest. Candidates could refer to public declarations from meetings organised by these organisations to indicate their resolve to maintain the Union. Southern Unionist methods tended to emphasise the publication of literature, addressed members of government and held rallies. Additionally, political and family connections were employed to contest elections and exercise influence at Westminster. For example, Southern Unionists exploited their important social and political influence in the House of Lords, where, by 1886, of 144 peers with Irish interest, 116 owned land in the south and west of Ireland. The Irish Loyal and Patriotic Union (ILPU) was formed in Dublin on the eve of the first Home Rule Bill. Its leading members were Irish peers: Castletown, Longford and de Vesci. The ILPU was replaced by the Irish Unionist Alliance in 1891. The Cork Defence Union was established in 1885, while the Property Defence Association aimed to defend property rights. Candidates may comment on the titles of the various organisations and link this to the self-perception of the supporters of the Union. Additional comment may be made about the geographical distribution of Unionism in order to explain the contrast in methods. For example, since Ulster Unionists represented a clear majority in Ulster, they could afford to mobilise in a more forceful manner than Southern Unionists, who were a distinct minority in the south and west of Ireland. Candidates could refer to the observations of historians such as Kee, Rees or Buckland to illustrate these contrasts in methods. Candidates could also employ contemporary comment from any of the southern Unionist organisations, such as the Cork Defence Union, to highlight the inconsistency in methods employed by the supporters of the Union in the north and south.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately.

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Option 4

**AVAILABLE
MARKS**

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Option 5: Clash of Ideologies in Europe 1900–2000

AVAILABLE
MARKS

Answer **one** question.

- 1 “Soviet foreign policy in Europe in the period 1917–1991 was characterised by continuity rather than change.” How far would you accept this verdict?

This question requires an assessment of how far the foreign policy of the Soviet Union was characterised by continuity rather than change.

Top level responses will reflect on the motivation of Soviet foreign policy and consider to what extent one can see continuity as the primary characteristic of that policy throughout the period or whether in fact it displays more evidence of change.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

(a) 1917–1924

According to Marxist ideology, Russia was not the most appropriate country to stage a communist revolution in 1917. Lenin justified staging a revolution in a relatively underdeveloped capitalist country by claiming that, if a communist revolution succeeded in Russia, this would inspire proletarian class-based communist revolutions in advanced industrial societies. By 1919, it was clear that the USSR was the only communist regime in Europe. Lenin set up the Comintern in 1919 with the ideological goal of trying to spread communism internationally. This intention to export communism was also evident with regard to the Russo-Polish War. This war has frequently been characterised as an attempt to build what Lenin called “a red bridge” into the heart of Europe through which the revolution could be exported. In this regard it could be argued that foreign policy was intended to follow a particular path and might expect to see continuity rather than change.

However, capitalist intervention from western countries in the Civil War also demonstrated to the Bolsheviks that an isolated USSR was vulnerable and for a Communist regime to survive it would have to ensure its security in the future. Survival was the main priority in this phase and, with the Treaty of Rapallo with Weimar Germany in 1922, the USSR showed that it could be pragmatic and, if necessary, work with capitalist states for survival. Equally, the same willingness to deviate from a strict ideological adherence to the primacy of exporting the revolution is also present with the Anglo-Soviet Trade Treaty of 1921. As Michael Lynch has argued: “Lenin adopted an essentially realistic approach.”

(b) 1924–1941

With the death of Lenin and the emergence of Stalin, candidates can further test the assertion of the question. They could argue that Stalin continued the more inward-looking policies of the latter years of Lenin’s rule. He concentrated upon the economic reconstruction of the USSR. The policy of “Socialism in One Country” focused partly on industrialisation to develop its

ability to increase its levels of rearmament to protect it from potential attacks by capitalist states. As Stalin himself commented: “We are 50 to 100 years behind the advanced nations of the West, we either make up the difference or be crushed.” Equally, candidates might point out that Stalin also took a strong ideological stance with foreign communists prior to 1934, before there was a reversal of this policy. However, such a view may be challenged by candidates who may argue that Stalin’s foreign policy was in fact a betrayal of the internationalism of Lenin’s policies.

By 1933, with the rise to power of Hitler, the USSR recognised the potential threat of Nazism. In 1934 it joined the League of Nations to try to co-operate with capitalist states such as the UK and France to achieve collective security. Here perhaps is a very obvious break with Lenin who had described the League of Nations as a “robbers’ den.” Equally, candidates should give consideration to the role the Soviet Union played in the Spanish Civil War. Obviously, such engagement is open to interpretation and candidates could argue that this is a further example of continuity in Soviet foreign policy dating back to 1917, or they could maintain that it is an example of continuity within Stalin’s approach to foreign affairs, but still distinct from Lenin.

After the Munich Conference in 1938, the USSR gradually realised that the West could not be relied upon and in 1939 it agreed the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact with its ideological enemy, Nazism. Such pragmatism revealed that the USSR needed to gain time to rearm more but, also partly in the interests of security, it would be beneficial to acquire the Baltic states and Eastern Poland as a potential buffer zone against possible attack from the West. The USSR was also able to recover territory lost in the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Candidates may regard this as a clear example of change or indeed they could argue that the Nazi-Soviet Pact was an example of continuity in view of the treaties with Germany in the 1920s. Answers could note that this argument is very evident in the literature with similar divisions being apparent, most notably between the German School and the Collective Security School.

(c) 1941–1945

The Nazi invasion of the USSR in June 1941 forced it into a temporary alliance with capitalist states to defeat the forces of Fascism. It could be argued that here is another example of a change in foreign policy or candidates could suggest that it is an example of further pragmatism and the nature of how security consistently influenced Soviet foreign policy.

(d) 1945–1953

The post-war years and the emergence of the Cold War provide ample scope for candidates to consider in what ways there was a change in Soviet foreign policy and in what ways there was continuity. The traditional interpretation of the origins of the Cold War suggests that the USSR occupied the states of Eastern Europe it liberated from Nazi Germany for ideological motives to spread communism. Revisionist interpretations suggest that Stalin broke the Yalta Agreement of 1945 more for reasons of security and survival. The USSR only narrowly escaped defeat during the Second World War and by 1945 it was near economic ruin. Its security needs led it to seek governments in nearby states which were not anti-Soviet to ensure that no military threat ever emanated from German soil again. Stalin not only wanted to maintain a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe amongst the People’s Democracies through the Cominform in 1947 and Comecon in 1949, but he also wanted to prevent a united capitalist Germany

rising up again to threaten the USSR. Equally, answers may discuss the Berlin Blockade of 1948/1949 and determine whether this was a desperate defensive measure or an overtly aggressive one. Candidates are thus able to make a case for either continuity or change being at the heart of Stalin's policies.

(e) 1953–1964

Candidates would be able to argue that the emergence of Khrushchev marks a clear break with Stalinism. For example, the "Secret Speech" and Khrushchev's denunciations of Stalin would appear to indicate a clear break with the previous regime. However, candidates can refer to the creation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955 and subsequent invasion of Hungary in 1956 as further examples of continuity rather than change. Such policies could be considered in a similar light to the Russo-Polish War, the Nazi-Soviet Pact and Stalin's manipulation of elections to establish control of Eastern Europe after the Second World War. The Berlin crisis of 1961 could be considered in the same vein. However, candidates could also suggest that the Soviets were merely reacting to events as they unfolded. They had consistently sought a resolution of the German question since 1945 and that to present it as a further example of Soviet aggression, and thus another example of continuity, is incorrect.

(f) 1964–1982

The Brezhnev years offer a range of opportunities for candidates to consider the proposition at the heart of the question. On the face of it, it is possible to argue that initially Brezhnev marked a change from Khrushchev and a return to a more Stalinist approach. However, candidates may argue that, although the style was different, Brezhnev's approach and concerns were remarkably similar to previous leaders. On the one hand, the willingness of the Soviet Union to achieve some form of accommodation with its opponents was evident in Brezhnev's rule. This is most notably the case with regard to détente. The series of treaties regarding both military and economic matters have clear echoes of the Lenin years, Stalin's efforts to work with capitalist states in the 1930s and Khrushchev's talk of "peaceful co-existence." Equally, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the creation of the Brezhnev doctrine are in some ways similar to the actions of Khrushchev and Stalin before him. Whether candidates argue that this type of continuity was the result of security concerns or was ideologically motivated or merely pragmatic responses to unfolding events, is a matter of choice. However, answers could challenge this approach and argue that Brezhnev inherited a particular set of circumstances, especially with regard to the economy, that necessitated a distinctive approach from that of his predecessors. As Kennedy-Pipe has argued: "Brezhnev demonstrated a clear break both in style and substance from his predecessor."

(g) 1982–1985

The years succeeding Brezhnev and prior to Gorbachev were characterised by the short rules of Andropov and subsequently Constantin Chernenko. Candidates can argue that in many ways little changed in Soviet foreign policy under the guidance of Andropov and Chernenko. Volkogonov is particularly dismissive of the latter, while Andropov undoubtedly recognised the need for the change that Gorbachev was to subsequently attempt. In foreign affairs there were abortive attempts at arms reductions' talks and, although the Americans blamed the Soviets, and Reagan made his

famous reference to the “Evil Empire”, there is little doubt that the poisonous atmosphere of the “Second Cold War” (Halliday) meant that continuity rather than change dominated the nature of foreign relations.

(h) 1985–1991

Candidates could argue that Soviet foreign policy was transformed after Gorbachev became the new leader in 1985. He was not prepared to shore up a USSR dominated-structure in Eastern Europe which was failing economically and threatened to bankrupt the USSR itself if it continued to try to match the USA as a military force. From 1986 to 1989 Gorbachev withdrew troops from Afghanistan; in 1987 he reached agreement with President Reagan to destroy all stocks of intermediate nuclear weapons and in 1989 did not intervene to prop up unpopular communist regimes in the former Warsaw Pact. Gorbachev was not interested in spreading communism or maintaining the balance of power in Europe. He wanted to reform communism within the USSR but his policies resulted in its disintegration in 1991. In this regard, candidates may argue that Gorbachev represented a genuine change in Soviet policy. This distinctive approach was evident in a speech to the United Nations in 1988, when Gorbachev committed himself to ending the Cold War, renounced the emphasis of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 on trying to export the communist doctrine abroad and also discarded the Brezhnev Doctrine, committing the USSR instead to disarmament. Of course, other candidates may seek to argue that Gorbachev was just as concerned with the security of the Soviet Union as any of his predecessors and it was not his intention to destroy the Soviet Union, even if this ended up being the case. As McCauley pithily remarked: “If Lenin was the founder of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev was its grave digger.”

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately.

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- 2 “The opponents of communism in Europe enjoyed more success after the death of Stalin in 1953 than in the period 1917–1952.” To what extent would you agree with this statement?

This question requires an assessment of how far the opponents of the Soviet Union were more successful after 1953 than they were in the period 1917–1952.

Top level responses will reflect on whether the opponents of communism in Europe were indeed more successful after the death of Stalin and why this was so. They will consider not only the factors that were present after 1953 that might explain this, but also whether it was the absence of these factors that explained the lack of success between 1917 and 1952. Alternatively, candidates can seek to challenge the question and argue that success took different forms at different times and such neat chronological divisions are not particularly useful. Balanced answers must discuss both the 1917–1952 and 1953–1991 periods.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

(a) 1917–1933

Democratic hostility towards the USSR through intervention by the Western powers during the Russian Civil War was not very successful as the Bolsheviks were victorious. There followed an attempt to isolate the Soviet Union, since, as Todd has argued, the Bolshevik Revolution meant that: “Russia was increasingly boycotted. Restrictions on trade and economic relations were reflective of the hope that this would bring about its collapse.” Despite this attempted initial isolation, democratic regimes reluctantly accepted the existence of the USSR, as the Treaty of Rapallo with Weimar Germany showed, once again highlighting their lack of success.

(b) 1933–1939

From 1933 onwards the main threat to the USSR was not from democratic regimes but from Nazi Germany. Hitler made no secret of his loathing of Bolshevism and considered it to be an ideology that had to be destroyed. As Martin Collier has pointed out, Hitler promised the world-wide destruction of communism if he came to power. The invasion of the USSR would bring the territorial expansion needed to gain living space for the German people and regions of Eastern Europe would provide many of the raw materials needed for Germany to achieve self-sufficiency. Fascist opposition developed with the Anti-Comintern Pacts in 1936 between Germany and Japan and in 1937 when Italy under Mussolini joined. Equally, fascist opposition can be witnessed with the struggle in Spain in 1936. As Collier has argued: “Italy became heavily involved in the Spanish Civil War because it could not permit a communist government in the Mediterranean.”

(c) 1939–1945

The Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939 failed to prevent the Nazi invasion of the USSR in 1941. Towards the end of the Second World War the democratic regimes were unable to prevent Stalin from liberating countries in Eastern Europe from Hitler. This particular period affords candidates the opportunity to discuss some of the distinct interpretations that seek to explain these events. Candidates could consider whether, prior to 1939, fascist and democratic forces aligned themselves in an attempt to see the defeat of Bolshevism, as argued by the Collective Security School, or whether Stalin proved to be highly manipulative and highly successful in driving a wedge between the democratic and fascist states at this critical juncture.

(d) 1945–1953

Democratic governments soon distrusted Stalin as he broke the Yalta Agreement signed in 1945 and did not allow free elections in the states of Eastern Europe. The creation of a Soviet satellite empire behind an iron curtain led the capitalist democratic western powers to adopt a policy of containment of communism as the Cold War escalated. The immediate post-war period again offers candidates the chance to integrate arguments developed by different schools of historians. The possibility that the democratic states failed to fully understand the nature of Soviet foreign policy is used by Orthodox historians to explain the Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe and this in turn could be challenged by the Revisionist arguments that the United States was highly aggressive and indeed successful in its containment of communism in both Southern and Western Europe. The Truman Doctrine in 1947 illustrated America's determination to contain the spread of communism in Western Europe and the Marshall Plan, implemented in 1948, gave vital economic aid to democratic states in Western Europe to produce stable economies and thus reduce the chances of internal communist revolutions. As Truman himself noted: "It must be the policy of the United States to support free people." The Berlin airlift in 1948–1949 prevented Stalin taking the whole of Berlin and the formation of NATO in 1949 showed that the West was determined to contain communism to Eastern Europe. In this way candidates could argue that the proposition is not quite accurate; there were indeed notable successes prior to the death of Stalin in 1953.

(e) 1953–1979

After 1953 no other state in Europe fell under communist control so candidates could argue that opposition to communism was more successful after the death of Stalin than between 1917 and 1952. The policy of containment adopted by Truman in 1947 proved to be more successful after 1953 and led eventually to the collapse of the USSR in 1991. The strong US support for anti-communist movements in Western Europe reflects this long-term determination to prevent the spread of communism, and this commitment has been detailed by Frances Stonor Saunders amongst others. The West was not prepared to intervene in the Soviet sphere of influence behind the iron curtain in Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968 when the Soviets invaded. The acceptance of Eastern Europe as a Soviet sphere of influence was acknowledged in the 1975 Helsinki Accords. This development of détente can be considered as an acceptance of the status quo and thus perhaps a failure to defeat communism or candidates could argue that it had limited goals and was thus successful in its own right.

This latter point has been made by a number of historians. For example Mason has argued: “Détente was a device to minimise tension and avoid dangerous crises. It was not intended to end the arms race or lead to the reform of the Soviet Union.” Equally, Todd has suggested: “Détente appealed to the USA as they felt it might help to resolve problems elsewhere - such as Vietnam.”

(f) 1979–1991

The era of détente came to an end when Reagan and Thatcher denounced the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan of 1979. Jimmy Carter regarded it as the “greatest threat to world peace since World War Two.” However, the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1989 and the USSR in 1991 was primarily due to the policies of Gorbachev who was not prepared to engage in an expensive arms race with NATO. Despite the fears of many, NATO and the Warsaw Pact were essentially defensive alliances and neither was planning a surprise attack on the other, which would almost certainly have escalated into mutual nuclear destruction. The West won the Cold War because the USSR withered away. As Phillips has argued: “The Cold War came to an end when the Soviet Union lost its will for empire.” In the long term the policy of containment was quite successful. Had it not been for the arms race, the USSR might have survived. Gorbachev believed that the Soviet Union could not continue to devote so much of its budget to the military. As the USSR collapsed when opposed by democratic regimes rather than when opposed by other regimes, most candidates will probably be in broad agreement with the quotation but each answer should be judged on its own merits by the quality of the arguments presented.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately.

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Option 5

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Total

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MARKS**