



Rewarding Learning

**ADVANCED
General Certificate of Education
2015**

History

Assessment Unit A2 1

[AH211]

WEDNESDAY 13 MAY, AFTERNOON

**MARK
SCHEME**

Level of response mark grid

This level of response grid has been developed as a general basis for marking candidates' work, according to the following assessment objectives:

- AO1a** recall, select and deploy historical knowledge accurately and communicate knowledge and understanding of history in a clear and effective manner;
- AO1b** present historical explanations, showing understanding of appropriate concepts and arrive at substantiated judgements;
- AO2** In relation to historical context:
- interpret, evaluate and use a range of source material;
 - explain and evaluate interpretations of historical events and topics studied.

The grid should be used in conjunction with the information on indicative content outlined for each assessment unit.

Level	Assessment Objective 1a	Assessment Objective 1b	Assessment Objective 2
	Answers at this level will:	Answers at this level will:	Answers at this level will:
1	recall, select and deploy some accurate factual knowledge and communicate limited understanding in narrative form. There will be evidence of an attempt to structure and present answers in a coherent manner.	display a basic understanding of the topic; some comments may be relevant, but general and there may be assertions and judgements which require supporting evidence.	display limited recognition of the possibility of debate surrounding an event or topic.
2	be quite accurate, contain some detail and show understanding through a mainly narrative approach. Communication may have occasional lapses of clarity and/or coherence.	display general understanding of the topic and its associated concepts and offer explanations which are mostly relevant, although there may be limited analysis and a tendency to digress. There will be some supporting evidence for assertions and judgements.	attempt to explain different approaches to and interpretations of the event or topic. Evaluation may be limited.
3	contain appropriate examples with illustrative and supportive factual evidence and show understanding and an ability to engage with the issues raised by the question in a clear and coherent manner.	display good breadth of understanding of the topic and its associated concepts. Analysis is generally informed and suitably illustrated to support explanations and judgements.	display an ability to present and evaluate different arguments for and against particular interpretations of an event or topic.
4	be accurate and well-informed and show ability to engage fully with the demands of the question. Knowledge and understanding will be expressed with clarity and precision.	display breadth and depth of understanding of the topic and its associated concepts. Explanations will be well-informed with arguments and judgements well substantiated, illustrated and informed by factual evidence.	display appropriate explanation, insightful interpretation and well-argued evaluation of particular interpretations of an event or topic.

Synoptic Assessment

Examiners should assess the candidate's ability to draw together knowledge and skills in order to demonstrate overall historical understanding. Candidates' answers should demonstrate breadth of historical knowledge and understanding by ranging comprehensively across the period of study as a whole. They should make links and comparisons which are properly developed and analysed and thus indicate understanding of the process of historical change. The knowledge and understanding of the subject should come from more than one perspective – political or cultural or economic – and there should be understanding demonstrated of the connections or inter-relationship between these perspectives.

Generic Levels of Response for Synoptic Assessment

The generic levels of response should be used in conjunction with the information on the indicative content outlined for each answer.

Level 1 ([0]–[5]) AO2(b), ([0]–[7]) AO1(b)

Answers at this level may recall some accurate knowledge and display understanding of mainly one part of the period and one perspective. The answer will be characterised throughout by limited accuracy and a lack of clarity. Answers may provide a descriptive narrative of events. There will be few links and comparisons made between different parts of the period. Answers will be mainly a series of unsubstantiated assertions with little analysis **AO1(b)**. There may be perhaps an awareness of contemporary **or** later interpretations but the answer may focus only on one interpretation **AO2(b)**. Answers at this level will be characterised throughout by unclear meaning due to illegibility, inaccurate spelling, punctuation and grammar; an inappropriate style of writing; and defects in organisation and lack of a specialist vocabulary.

Level 2 ([6]–[10]) AO2(b), ([8]–[15]) AO1(b)

Answers at this level may recall and deploy knowledge which draws from examples across the period. The answer will have frequent lapses in accuracy and at times lack clarity. The answer will provide some explanation though at times will lapse into narrative. Links and comparisons will be made but these will not be fully developed or analysed. Answers will contain some unsubstantiated assertions but also arguments which are appropriately developed and substantiated **AO1(b)**. There will be an awareness of contemporary **or** later interpretations about the subject but this will be limited and in need of further development **AO2(b)**. Answers at this level will have frequent lapses in meaning, inaccurate spelling, punctuation and grammar; at times the style of writing will be inappropriate; there will be occasional defects in organisation and little specialist vocabulary.

Level 3 ([11]–[15]) AO2(b), ([16]–[22]) AO1(b)

Answers at this level will recall and deploy knowledge accurately, drawing from all parts of the period with clarity and focus. Answers provide focused explanations and make links and comparisons which are developed and analysed, indicating an understanding of the process of historical change. Arguments are developed, substantiated, illustrated and reach a judgement **AO1(b)**. There is a satisfactory evaluation of either contemporary **or** later interpretations of the subject **or** a partial evaluation of both **AO2(b)**. Answers at this level will be characterised by clarity of meaning due to legibility, accurate spelling, punctuation and grammar; the style of writing is appropriate; there is good organisation and with some specialist vocabulary.

Level 4 ([16]–[20]) AO2(b), ([23]–[30]) AO1(b)

Answers at this level will demonstrate accurate recall of knowledge from across the period studied with clarity and precision. Answers will provide detailed and focused insightful explanations drawing on actions, events, issues or perspectives across the period, and there is an excellent understanding of the connections or interrelationships between these. A judgement is reached using arguments that are fully developed, illustrated and substantiated **AO1(b)**. There is a well informed and insightful evaluation of contemporary **and** later interpretations **AO2(b)**. Answers at this level will be consistently characterised throughout by clarity of meaning due to legibility, accurate spelling, punctuation and grammar; the style of writing is most appropriate; there is very good organisation and appropriate use of specialist vocabulary.

Option 1: Anglo-Spanish Relations 1509–1609

AVAILABLE
MARKS

Answer **one** question.

1 “Individuals rather than issues determined Anglo-Spanish relations in the period 1509–1609.” To what extent would you agree with this statement?

This question requires an assessment of the various issues which determined Anglo-Spanish relations in the period 1509–1609, as well as the impact of individuals. Answers might consider issues such as marriage, support for rebellion, religious beliefs, xenophobia, France, economic expansion and rivalry and styles of government. A variety of individuals should be considered including monarchs, their ministers and adventurers.

Top level responses will reflect on the relative importance of issues and the individuals involved. Answers will illustrate the complexity of the relationships between personality and issues and the difficulties of separating their importance.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

(a) Monarchs

Answers might consider how far relations were driven by the characters of various monarchs. When Henry VIII came to the throne he was determined to recapture the glories of his ancestor Henry V. This could be supported by the contemporary view of Henry VIII as a ‘Warrior Prince’. With Henry VIII targeting France, his natural ally was Spain and so relations improved. Henry VIII viewed himself as one of Europe’s leading monarchs and this dictated his relations with both France and Spain. Candidates might use contemporary comments from Ferdinand or Catherine of Aragon to highlight how Henry was manipulated by Spain.

Charles V, as ruler of Spain and the Holy Roman Empire, saw himself as the leader of Christendom. Despite Charles V’s family connection to Henry VIII, he still attempted to use Henry for his diplomatic gain over the French. Answers might consider Charles V’s feeling of superiority over Henry VIII as a factor in the decline of Anglo-Spanish relations. Charles V’s personal feelings over Henry VIII’s divorce of his aunt, Catherine of Aragon, seemed to override the diplomatic issues of the 1530s. Charles seemed to be driven by a need to protect his family reputation rather than represent his country’s issues with France. This could be supported by contemporary correspondence between Charles V and his ambassador in England and Henry VIII’s responses. The historical debate between traditionalists like Pollard and revisionists such as Haigh could further highlight the motivations for Anglo-Spanish relations in the 1530s and 1540s. In 1547 Edward VI became King but he had little influence as he was a minor and relations with Spain were influenced by his Lord Protectors in this period. Somerset’s continued interventions in Scotland which led to France declaring war on England in 1549. Northumberland made peace with France in 1550 with the Treaty of Boulogne.

The accession of Mary Tudor to the English throne in 1553 again points to personalities rather than issues. Mary was determined to marry Philip of Spain, despite other candidates favoured by her government and Parliament. By 1557 France and Spain were at war again and Philip II looked to England for support leading to the disastrous intervention of Mary I against France which led to the loss of Calais in 1558 and the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis in 1559.

Answers might focus on Mary's desire to revive Spanish connections in honour of her Spanish mother.

Philip II was, at best, lukewarm in his desire to marry Mary, yet he followed the wishes of his father. Answers might point to Philip's negativity in the marriage and his rapid move to Spain in 1556. Answers will show that Philip's personal desires overrode the needs of his father's foreign policy.

Although both Philip II and Elizabeth I sought to maintain good Anglo-Spanish relations and avoid war, answers may discuss whether their dominant personalities undid their policy desires. Philip's autocratic rule in the Netherlands caused revolt and this damaged Anglo-Spanish relations. Elizabeth's desire to prove herself, as a female in a man's world, may have created an aggressive anti-Spanish policy, so damaging relations. Elizabeth's comment on 'having one mistress and no master' could be used to highlight this position. Answers might consider suggestions that Elizabeth's dithering damaged Anglo-Spanish relations as it permitted strongly Protestant councillors to dictate policy. Candidates could use Davies idea of Philip II's foreign policy as being similar to Germany's *Weltpolitik* as a means to explain Anglo-Spanish relations. The Treaty of London of 1604 between the two new monarchs of England and Spain, James I and Philip III, ended almost 20 years of warfare between their countries after the Armada in 1588.

(b) Ministers/Councillors

Answers might consider how ministers and councillors affected Anglo-Spanish relations. Answers might consider some of the following:

- (i) The importance of Thomas Wolsey and his control of English foreign policy and possibly its manipulation to gain himself the Papacy. This could be supported by the historical debate between Elton and Scarisbrick;
- (ii) Thomas Cromwell's reforming religious beliefs and his attempts to establish links with Protestant Princes rather than the traditional Spanish alliance;
- (iii) William Cecil and Frances Walsingham, whose Protestant faith drove an interventionist foreign policy in Scotland, France and the Netherlands;
- (iv) Robert Dudley whose desire to marry Elizabeth provided an anti-Spanish influence on the Queen;
- (v) Drake, Hawkins and Raleigh, whose own personal economic and vehement anti-Spanish feelings damaged Anglo-Spanish relations. Drake's contemporary comments on his hatred of the Spanish might be used to support this position;
- (vi) Alva and Spanish nobles who sought personal advancement by exploiting the conflict in the Netherlands;
- (vii) Perez who conspired with enemies of Spain and who led a rebellion against Philip II.

(viii) After the death of Philip II in 1598 the Duke of Lerma dominated Spanish foreign policy and his desire for peace led to the Treaty of London (1604).

(c) Issues

Answers should consider a range of issues that influenced Anglo-Spanish relations throughout the century:

(i) Religion

The split with Rome could be seen as an issue which was based on religion and damaged Anglo-Spanish relations. Answers might suggest that declining relations in the second half of the sixteenth century were related to the religious differences between the two states. Philip II's self-image of 'the sword of Catholicism' could be used by candidates to give a contemporary emphasis on the impact of religion on Anglo-Spanish relations. Candidates might suggest that good relations existed at times of difference such as the 1540s and 1550s.

(ii) Marriage

Answers should identify the positive and negative effects of marriage on Anglo-Spanish relations throughout the century. The positive impact of Henry VIII's marriage to Catherine of Aragon in the 1510s and 1520s could be compared to its negative effects in the 1530s. Other marriages, such as Mary I and Philip II, could be compared to Elizabeth's possible marriage to Philip II or the Duke of Anjou.

(iii) Xenophobia

Answers might consider how xenophobia was an issue for each country.

(iv) Economic Rivalry

Answers should consider the positive impact of economic links in the Netherlands and compare this with later negative impact in the same country. England's challenge to Spain in the New World could be used to show the negative impact of economic issues on Anglo-Spanish relations.

(v) Styles of government

Answers might compare the autocratic style of Charles V, and especially Philip II, and argue that relations with England were damaged because of this. Philip II's rule in the Netherlands can be said to have caused poor relations with England in the 1570s and 1580s. The 'Black Legend' of Philip II, as seen by Dutch historians like Geyl, supports this position.

(vi) Support for rebellion

Elizabeth's support for Dutch rebels and Philip II's support for Catholic and Irish rebels might be seen as an issue that damaged Anglo-Spanish affairs. Answers might consider 'Religious Crusades' as an off-shoot of this point.

(vii) France

The power and influence of France might be considered as the issue which had the greatest influence on Anglo-Spanish relations. Answers might point to generally good relations while France was powerful and a decline in Anglo-Spanish relations due to the French Wars of Religion.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately.

[50]

50

2 “The Netherlands had a greater impact than France on Anglo-Spanish relations in the period 1509–1609.” How far would you accept this verdict?

AVAILABLE
MARKS

This question requires an assessment of the impact the Netherlands and France had on Anglo-Spanish relations in the period 1509–1609.

Top level responses will reflect on the changing nature of the impact of each nation across the period. Answers might suggest that the Netherlands had a greater impact on Anglo-Spanish relations during one part of the period but that overall its impact was eclipsed by France.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

(a) The Netherlands

With England’s main export being wool and Antwerp, in the Netherlands, being the centre of this trade, answers should focus on its economic importance. Answers should show that this trade had a major impact on Anglo-Spanish relations after Charles V united Spain and the Netherlands in 1516. It was in the interests of both nations to remain on good terms as both gained economically from the relationship. Despite this, a decline in relations during the 1530s led to the Netherlands being used as a bargaining chip. When Anglo-Spanish relations declined in the late 1520s and early 1530s, due to the divorce issue, both Henry VIII and Charles V used the Netherlands to exert pressure on the other. Trade embargoes, related to the Netherlands, were used by both monarchs to influence the other. Geographically the closeness of the Netherlands to the south coast of England made it a possible invasion centre against England. The fact that it was under Spanish control impacted on relations as it encouraged England to remain on good terms with Spain.

The growth of Protestantism in the Netherlands was harshly dealt with by Charles in the 1540s and 1550s. With Edward VI, a Protestant monarch, on the English throne, it could be suggested that religious persecution might have led to declining Anglo-Spanish relations, yet good relations suggest that the Netherlands had little impact in this period.

Answers might suggest that it was during the reigns of Philip II and Elizabeth I that the Netherlands had the greatest impact on Anglo-Spanish relations. The Dutch revolt of 1566 was to create tension between England and Spain. Answers may also discuss how mistakes made by Philip II helped to contribute to growing support in England for the Dutch Revolt after 1566 with his poor government and the new Spanish taxes which increased opposition in the Netherlands. The Dutch were also determined to protect their civil and religious liberties which were threatened by Catholic Spain under Philip. Candidates might use contemporary comments from Robert Dudley stating the need for England to support its co-religionists in the Netherlands. J L Motley’s description of the Dutch Revolt as one of the major events of the modern era emphasises the impact of the Netherlands on Anglo-Spanish relations. Elizabeth’s acquisition of money earmarked to pay Philip’s army in

Antwerp suggested to him that she was trying to undermine his position in the Netherlands and this had an adverse effect on Anglo-Spanish relations. The presence of a Spanish army in the Netherlands threatened England, while Elizabeth's expulsion of the 'Sea Beggars' led to Philip II losing control of the port of Flushing which limited his control of the Netherlands. Answers should point to the Treaty of Nonsuch where Elizabeth gave open support for the Dutch rebels for the first time and it was this which led to war between England and Spain. Responses might point to the Netherlands as having the greatest impact on Anglo-Spanish relations as it helped to create a war which lasted for eighteen years. Candidates might use the historical opinions of Dutch historians like P Geyl who saw Philip II's policy in the Netherlands as being part of his 'Black Legend'. The debate between Wernham and Wilson on the motivation for Elizabeth's Dutch policy could also be used to consider the impact of the Netherlands on Anglo-Spanish relations.

(b) France

Answers should consider the impact France had on Anglo-Spanish relations. As England's old enemy, France was of crucial importance to England. As an ally of Scotland, France was the greatest threat to the security of the Tudor monarchs. Henry VII had been driven by a desire to secure his Dynasty for his son and had fought one of the few English wars of this period with France to do so. The young King Henry VIII had been aware of this French threat and much of his early focus had been on France. He also hoped to build his reputation by military exploits and his claim to the French throne made it the obvious target. Henry VIII was to conduct three campaigns against France, spending over £2.5 million on his desire to be the French King. Henry's aims could only be achieved through alliance with France's main enemy Spain, and so Anglo-Spanish relations remained good through most of the period. Candidates might use Henry VIII's correspondence with the Emperor asking for action against France in 1525 as contemporary evidence of the importance of France in determining Anglo-Spanish relations. At some points Wolsey attempted to pursue a more pro-French policy, seeking to keep England at the centre of European democracy. Charles V's failure to deliver on promises drove England towards France and damaged Anglo-Spanish relations. Even after Charles V's support for his aunt, Catherine of Aragon, during the divorce issue of the 1530s, relations recovered. Henry's war with Scotland and his attempts to marry his son to Mary Stuart further increased the impact of France on Anglo-Spanish relations. Mary Stuart had strong French links as her mother, Mary of Guise, had strong links to the French monarchy. Answers should identify the importance of France during the reigns of Henry and Charles.

Charles V's rule of Spain, the Netherlands, Milan and the Holy Roman Empire led to increased conflict with France. The long-running Habsburg-Valois dynastic war led Charles to seek English help. The marriage of Philip Habsburg to Mary I in 1554 could be used to support this. Charles V's acceptance of the English Parliament's conditions of marriage is contemporary evidence of his need for English assistance due to war with France. The continuing alliance between England and Spain against France shows the impact it had on Anglo-Spanish relations.

Answers will focus on the increased French threat at the beginning of Elizabeth's reign due to questions over her legitimacy. The marriage of Mary Stuart to the French Dauphin and Henry II's proclamation of her as Queen

of England placed intense pressure on Elizabeth. Invasion from France and Scotland and peace between Spain and France seemed to leave England in a dangerous position. Spain's fear of a pro-French England led Philip to propose to Elizabeth and, despite her rejection, he continued to be supportive in the early 1560s. Candidates might use the contemporary comments of Philip II such as 'all now rests on who that woman marries' and 'better a heretic than a French woman on the English throne' to demonstrate the impact of France on Anglo-Spanish relations. Candidates should identify the importance of France in maintaining good Anglo-Spanish relations, despite Elizabeth's Protestant church settlement. The death of both Henry II and soon afterwards his son, Francis II, was to begin a transformation in the importance of France and so affect Anglo-Spanish relations. By 1561 Mary Stuart had returned to a mainly Protestant Scotland and so reduced the pressure on Elizabeth. The outbreak of the French Wars of Religion in 1562 was to send France into turmoil and remove it as a leading European nation. However, even in decline France had a major impact on Anglo-Spanish relations. Without the need to unite against France, Anglo-Spanish relations began a slow decline. Other factors now became paramount and conflict between the two nations increased. Despite its weakened position, France was still instrumental in creating war between England and Spain. Philip II's signing of the Treaty of Joinville with the French Catholic League in 1584 in an attempt to prevent Henry of Navarre becoming King of France led Elizabeth to fear a Catholic crusade against England. Answers should show how France's decline was a key element in the outbreak of war. Philip II's intervention in France in the 1590s and the subsequent Anglo-French alliance of 1596 further reinforced poor Anglo-Spanish relations. Candidates might use H Kamen's comment that Philip II acted defensively to show the impact that religious war in France had on Anglo-Spanish relations. Philip II's need to keep France Catholic and block Henry of Navarre's accession to the French throne had an important impact on Anglo-Spanish relations.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately.

[50]

50

Option 1

50

Total

50

**AVAILABLE
MARKS**

Option 2: Crown and Parliament in England 1603–1702

AVAILABLE
MARKS

Answer **one** question.

- 1 **“It was during the reign of James I (1603–1625) that the most significant changes to the role and status of Parliament occurred.” How far would you agree with this assessment of the relationship between Crown and Parliament in England in the period 1603–1702?**

This question requires an assessment of the extent to which the events of the reign of James I were the most significant in changing the role and status of Parliament.

Top level responses will reflect on the impact of the clashes between James I and his Parliament. Clashes over foreign policy, religion and, most notably, finance caused tension between the monarch and the elected Houses. Whig historians have tended to argue that the problems evident in the reign of Charles I took root during the reign of his father. Arguably, the causes of the Civil War can be traced back to the reign of James I. A comparison will be made with the importance of the reigns of other Stuart monarchs.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

(a) James I, 1603–1625

Although Parliament played an important role in providing supply for the King and passing bills, the main power in 1603 lay with the monarchy. Parliament remained an occasional event with limited status and influence, and entirely dependent on the Crown for its calling and dissolving.

At the outset of James I’s reign there were clashes over the election and clear distrust of the new Scottish King. The most serious disputes were over finance, particularly impositions and monopolies, although Parliament became increasingly concerned by James’s inconsistent religious policy and failure to lead the Protestant cause in Europe. Contemporary opinion of leading figures such as Weldon could be utilised to show the impact of James I’s actions and attitude. Parliament’s frustrations came to a head in its impeachment of Cranfield.

However, it would be inaccurate to see James I’s reign as a time of major change in the role and status of Parliament. The most radical attempt to alter the relationship between Crown and Parliament, through the Great Contract, ended in failure. Indeed, James I called Parliament more readily than his predecessors and it could be argued that, despite the tensions, Parliament enjoyed an effective working relationship with its monarch. Candidates may employ an observation from a historian such as Houston on the changing position of Parliament during James I’s reign.

(b) Charles I, 1625–1649

Arguably, the reign of Charles I saw the most significant change in the role and status of Parliament as, with his execution, the monarchy was replaced entirely. Despite this victory for the parliamentary forces, the republic was to be temporary and the monarchy would return in strength in 1660.

Of more long-term significance to the changing role and status of Parliament was the Constitutional Revolution of 1640–1642. By removing some of the King's financial prerogative powers and abolishing the courts Charles had used to enforce Personal Rule, Parliament was able to weaken the prerogative power of the monarch. The Triennial Act allowed for a regular sitting of Parliament and a clear change in status within the mechanisms of government. Despite these changes, Parliament failed to achieve many of its objectives and the term 'revolution' is misleading. Contemporary comment from Hampden may be employed, while the views of historians such as Sharp and Brice could be used to explain the impact of the Constitutional Revolution.

(c) Charles II, 1660–1685

The Restoration of Charles II recognised the failure of Parliament to find a workable settlement without a monarch. While the reforms of the 'Constitutional Revolution' remained in place, Charles was restored to a position of strength and the role and status of Parliament diminished. The actions of the Cavalier Parliament further strengthened the position of the monarchy by weakening the Triennial Act and passing a series of bills to protect the position of the King. The revisionist interpretation of the impact of the Restoration Settlement may be explained.

During this reign Parliament challenged the King's religious policy and was able to restrict Charles's hopes of indulgence. The major clash came during the Exclusion Crisis, where the weakness of Parliament's position was evident when Charles was able to dissolve it and rule alone for the rest of his reign. Contemporary opinion of leading figures such as Shaftesbury may be outlined. Good candidates may note that the emergence of political parties created a new style of politics that was to change the nature of parliamentary politics.

(d) James II, 1685–1688/1689

James II's pro-Catholic and, apparently, absolutist policies soon undermined the support he had enjoyed from his first loyal, Tory Parliament. His attempts to secure religious toleration and control the make-up of Parliament created the circumstances for the Glorious Revolution which helped to change significantly the role and status of Parliament. The contemporary opinion of James II may be employed to illustrate his aims and actions. Candidates may include a comment from a historian such as Starkey on the impact of the Glorious Revolution on the position of Parliament. The arrival of William and Mary in a joint monarchy created a new relationship with Parliament. The revised coronation oath, Bill of Rights, Mutiny Act, Toleration Act and the new financial arrangements all contributed to an increase in the role and status of Parliament. The Crown's dispensing power and abuse of legal proceedings was ended and the levying of taxes and calling of a standing army now required parliamentary consent.

Arguably, the Glorious Revolution transformed the role and status of Parliament more than any other event. It may be argued, however, that the Glorious Revolution merely fixed the abuses of the reign of James II and did not necessarily represent a radical change in the power structure.

(e) William III and Mary, 1689–1702

The most significant change in the role and status of Parliament came in the final decade of the century and was a result of the foreign policy of the King. The establishment of a Commission of Accounts and the Civil List allowed Parliament to influence the King's spending and the modified Triennial Act ensured its regular calling. Parliament had become an integral instrument of government. Its influence over the religion of the monarch and the foreign policy England would pursue was cemented by the Act of Settlement. Candidates may employ the contemporary opinion of leading political figures such as Bentinck and the opinions of a historian such as Smith could be used to explain the changing role and status of Parliament.

Although there now existed an increasingly effective working relationship between King and Parliament, good candidates may recognise that James I had also enjoyed an effective working relationship with his Parliament. Nevertheless, the events of the century, and particularly the final decade, had ensured a change in the role and status of Parliament. Despite the new partnership that existed between Crown and Parliament, the King retained the right to choose ministers, determine foreign policy and to call, dissolve and prorogue Parliament. Furthermore, the new financial arrangements arguably allowed the King access to greater expenditure, provided Parliament agreed, than ever before.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately.

[50]

2 “Clashes over foreign policy had the greatest impact on the relationship between Crown and Parliament in England in the period 1603–1702.” To what extent would you accept this verdict?

This question requires an assessment of the extent to which clashes over foreign policy caused the most significant changes to the relationship between King and Parliament in the period 1603–1702.

Top level responses will analyse the importance of other factors such as finance, religion or the liberties of the subject. It was during the Constitutional Revolution, the execution of Charles I, the Restoration Settlement, the Glorious Revolution and the Nine Years' War that the relationship between Crown and Parliament changed most.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

(a) The relationship between Crown and Parliament under James I, 1603–1625

During the reign of James I (1603–1625) there were a number of clashes between Crown and Parliament over foreign policy. James I's pursuit of a Spanish match for his son and his failure to play a decisive role in the Thirty Years' War in Europe caused tension with his Parliament. Arguably, there were more significant clashes over the King's religious policy, notably his leniency towards his Catholic subjects. Significant disputes between Crown and Parliament also centred on James I's economic policies. Despite these clashes, there was no significant change to the relationship between Crown and Parliament during the reign of James I. Contemporary comment from leading MPs such as Sir Edward Coke could be employed alongside the views of historians such as Carrier.

(b) The reign of Charles I and the 'Constitutional Revolution', 1640–1642

The first period of significant change to the relationship between Crown and Parliament came during the Constitutional Revolution of 1640–1642. In the early years of his reign, Charles I's flawed foreign ventures, under the disastrous leadership of the Duke of Buckingham, helped to create tension with his Parliament. Contemporary opinion from the Duke of Buckingham could be given. However, it was primarily Charles I's domestic policy which caused the breakdown in his relationship with Parliament and led to the period of Personal Rule. The significant changes which came after Charles I's recall of Parliament were not as a result of his inactive foreign policy but of his Laudian changes to the church and the controversial money raising policies he employed. Candidates could refer to the arguments of historians such as Wilson.

The substantial concessions made by the Crown during this period were not primarily due to the foreign policy of the monarch, although the control of the armed forces was one issue tackled by the Long Parliament. Parliament sought to gain control, or at least influence, over the financial position of the monarch and the extent of his political power. Many of the changes made during this 'revolution' were an attempt to prevent a recurrence of what Whigs termed 'the eleven year tyranny'. It is arguable that finance, religion and the issue of the liberties of Charles I's subjects were all more significant than foreign policy in determining the changes to the relationship between Crown and Parliament in this period.

(c) The Execution of Charles I, 1649

The execution of Charles I could be interpreted as the low point in the position of the monarchy in this period. The decision to execute the monarch and seize control of the country was not motivated by the foreign policy of Charles but by his actions before, during and after the Civil War. His refusal to reach agreement with Parliament, after defeat in two civil wars, resulted in his eventual execution. Arguably, it was the fact that Charles could not be trusted over religion which was most significant in causing this dramatic change in the relationship between Crown and Parliament. Furthermore, it was the army rather than Parliament which could be seen as the main instigator of the events which led to the execution of the King.

Candidates could employ the contemporary opinion of leading figures such as Cromwell to illustrate the reasons for, and impact of, the execution.

The interpretations of Whig, Marxist and revisionist historians may also be utilised.

(d) The Restoration Settlement and the reign of Charles II, 1660–1685

The Restoration saw the monarchy return to a position of strength and relative stability. The settlement may have confirmed the restrictions passed by the Long Parliament but it also paved the way for Charles II to strengthen the powers and prerogatives of the Crown. The willingness of the Cavalier Parliament to restore the position of the monarchy, and alongside it the Anglican Church, was motivated primarily by a desire for political stability rather than any economic, religious or foreign policy issue. Arguably, this early period of Charles II's reign was marked by co-operation rather than conflict, although there were criticisms of the failures in the Dutch War. Parliament and the Crown did clash during the Exclusion Crisis to the point where Charles II was compelled to pursue personal rule at the end of his reign. While the King's pro-French foreign policy, particularly through the Treaty of Dover, caused controversy, it was the religious affiliation of his brother and heir which provoked the crisis. The contemporary opinion of Charles II may be employed to illustrate the Crown's perspective.

(e) The Glorious Revolution and the Revolution Settlement, 1688/1689

Although it was James II's pro-Catholic actions which were most responsible for his downfall, there is no doubt that his links to Catholic, absolutist France caused a great deal of opposition in Parliament. James II's desire for toleration was misinterpreted as mirroring the approach of 'the most Christian king', Louis XIV. However, it was the promotion of the Catholic religion and James II's increasing unwillingness to work with Parliament which contributed most to his downfall. Arguably, it was the birth of a Catholic heir which most hastened his removal from the throne. James II's domestic affairs had contributed most to the Glorious Revolution but it is valid to consider the role of William of Orange and his desire to acquire the throne to further his European interests. In this respect, foreign affairs played a dramatic part in the transformation of the relationship between Crown and Parliament, even if it was not the policies of the King which caused this change. Candidates may employ an observation from a historian such as MacAulay to explain the reasons for change.

(f) The reign of William III and Mary, 1689–1702

William's pursuit of European war was to be instrumental in creating a working relationship with his Parliament during this period. The creation of the Commission of Accounts, Civil List and the passing of a revised Triennial Act all contributed to transforming the relationship between Crown and Parliament. Parliament's support for William's war efforts was conditioned by its desire to maintain a Protestant monarchy and increase the extent of its powers and prerogatives. Therefore, this change in relationship was influenced by religion, finance and the struggle for political power, as well as by the foreign policy of the monarch. Candidates may employ the contemporary opinion of Edward Russell to explain the importance of foreign policy in this period.

There is no doubt that the relationship between Crown and Parliament had changed during this period and that foreign policy had played an important role in these changes. By the end of the century Parliament had a more direct role in government, being able to influence the King's religious and

foreign policy and holding sway in the area of finance. It is arguable that the crucial period for change had been during the reign of William and Mary and that foreign policy had been the determining factor. However, throughout the Stuart period clashes over religion, finance and the ongoing conflict over the liberties of the subject had all, at varying times, played a significant role in shaping the relationship between Crown and Parliament.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately.

[50]

Option 2

Total

**AVAILABLE
MARKS**

50

50

50

Option 3: Liberalism and Nationalism in Europe 1815–1914

AVAILABLE
MARKS

Answer **one** question.

- 1 “**Liberalism was more successful in Germany than in other European countries between 1815 and 1914.**” How far would you accept this statement?

This question requires an assessment of the progress, or lack of it, made by liberalism in a number of different countries during the period 1815–1914. Germany will feature prominently in the answer, but liberal progress in, for example, France, Italy and the Habsburg Empire should also be considered in a properly focused answer. Economic and political dimensions should be discussed. Top level responses will contain material on individual rights, responsible governments and economic liberalism across the entire period, and reach a clearly argued conclusion, with supporting evidence from a variety of contemporary and later historical sources.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

(a) Germany

Liberalism, even after 1815, had many adherents in Germany, but those who created the German Confederation, associating liberalism with revolution, were anxious to curb its influence. Accordingly, Metternich succeeded in persuading the Diet to limit freedom of expression in the wake of liberal demonstrations at Wartburg, and later at Hambach. The Carlsbad Decrees and the Six Articles restricted academic and press freedom and strengthened the powers of the Confederation over individual states. In fact, the requirement that each of the 39 states should introduce a constitution remained unobserved except in the South West, where Baden adhered firmly to a liberal ethos. But, although German liberalism met with little political success before 1848, the *Zollverein*, a Prussian initiative, had by 1839 brought free trade to most of Germany, a success for the economic strand of liberalism. The free trade views of Friedrich List might be used to illustrate contemporary interpretation. During 1848 liberals did make remarkable progress for a short time. Across Germany rulers were forced into making liberal concessions, culminating in the Frankfurt Parliament, set up to unite Germany under a liberal constitution. In Prussia, meanwhile, Frederick William IV appointed a liberal ministry and announced that there would be a new constitution. But the Frankfurt Parliament dithered, its middle-class liberals frightened of radicalism, and the whole episode ended in defeat. Hamerow offers useful interpretation of the weakness of the Frankfurt Parliament. In Prussia an emboldened King waited for the opportune time to remove his liberal ministers and dismiss the assembly, then issued his own moderately liberal constitution, but the three-tier voting system ensured that electoral power resided with the wealthy. Between 1850 and 1858 Manteuffel, who despised liberals, governed without parliament, forging links between the Prussian Junkers and the working classes. Despite such setbacks, liberalism did not fade away. William I appointed some liberals to his government on his accession, and the Progressives, comprising radical liberals, became, in 1861, the largest party in the Prussian Parliament, organising effective opposition to

proposed army reforms. Their political success ended there, for Bismarck defied parliament and carried on collecting the necessary taxes. (Bismarck's 'iron and blood' speech, demonstrating the impotence of liberalism, might be quoted as interpretation.) The Liberals won 70% of the vote in 1863, but as Prussia was on the verge of victory over Austria an election reduced their numbers from 253 to 148. A breakaway group, the National Liberals, made the best of this setback and resolved to work with Bismarck. In the 1867 elections for the North German Confederation the National Liberals became the largest party, and succeeded in forcing Bismarck into a number of constitutional concessions. In the German Empire, set up in 1871, there was universal suffrage; the Reichstag could reject the budget but was unable to initiate legislation. Throughout the 1870s the National Liberals worked in government with Bismarck, but could not seize control over military spending, while, by supporting the anti-Catholic *Kulturkampf*, they betrayed their ideals of political freedom. Later in the decade their principled opposition to anti-socialist laws only lost them electoral support, which they then attempted to remedy by changing tack. In 1879 Bismarck dealt the liberals a double blow, reintroducing protection for Germany and spurning the National Liberals for new right-wing partners in government. Thereafter the liberals had little success. Although individual rights remained, the Reichstag was obliged to defer to government, a tendency which increased after 1900. Economically, the individualist philosophy of the liberals was on the retreat as the Social Democrats grew to become the largest German party, and welfare state reforms signalled the onset of collectivist policies.

(b) France

Answers may see France as a better example of liberal success. The 1814 Charter was a real constitution, setting up a bicameral assembly, but its guarantees regarding press freedom and religious toleration were ambiguous, and Charles X's apparent determination to rule in the style to which his ancestors were accustomed brought down the entire Bourbon restoration. Louis Philippe offered a somewhat more liberal constitution, and worked with governments which were more or less liberal. Early in the nineteenth century liberalism was a largely middle-class creed, and the Orleanist monarchy at first satisfied this group, but as wealth grew and more aspired to join the political class, the government's reluctance to extend the franchise reflected poorly on liberals, as did the failure to pass any meaningful social reform. Later interpreters of the 1830–1848 period include Cobban and Collins. In 1848 liberals and radicals combined to set up a republic which extended civil rights, but the granting of universal suffrage alarmed the middle classes, as did the growth of and subsequent reaction to the closure of the national Workshops, and most erstwhile liberals were happy to endorse the authoritarian Napoleon III as Emperor in 1852. (Cowie and Wolfson discuss the liberal dilemma when faced with demands for wider representation.) For a decade liberalism was on the back foot, although universal suffrage remained, but after 1860 Napoleon began to liberalise his regime, accepting the wishes of the electorate in his appointment of ministers and pushing a somewhat unwilling France towards free trade. In fact, the Emperor's phrase 'order first, liberty later' offers a pithy contemporary interpretation of this development. The establishment of the Third Republic did not interrupt the progress of liberalism, as Thiers preserved the Republic against dangers from Left and Right, while his successors similarly preserved the Republic's values against Boulanger, Dreyfus' accusers and the syndicalist strikers.

(c) Italy

In Italy Metternich maintained a tight grip on Lombardy and Venetia, and was in a position to crush liberal outbreaks elsewhere. In 1820 Austrian armies dealt successfully with risings in Piedmont and Naples: in 1831 they repeated the operation in central Italy. Liberalism struggled in a predominantly peasant country, but was strong enough in the urban environment to overcome tyrants or force them into compromises in 1848. Liberal hegemony was short, however, and the Habsburg recovery meant that the old regimes re-established themselves almost everywhere. The exception was Piedmont, where the continuance of the *Statuto* left the country as the model to which Italian liberals aspired. Under the Prime Minister, Cavour, a series of liberal reforms reduced the power of the Church and brought about free trade agreements. Like Thiers in France, the liberal Cavour proved to be determined, even ruthless, and when Italy was united in 1861 the liberal Piedmontese constitution was grafted on to the new country. However, the liberal Kingdom of Italy was not necessarily a success. Parliament became notorious for corruption and unstable governments, while liberal governments felt obliged to pass authoritarian measures and introduce crypto-socialist measures such as the nationalisation of railways to appease the left.

(d) The Habsburg Empire

Metternich saw liberalism as pernicious and utilised a system of surveillance to suppress it. His trenchant views on liberalism might be utilised as contemporary interpretation. In 1848 liberals succeeded in driving Metternich out and abolishing serfdom within the Empire, but although those two victories proved permanent, liberal fear of the mob echoed the Parisian Workshops scenario and the old regime was largely restored. In the 1850s the Bach era saw a complete return to authoritarian rule, but in 1860 a parliamentary system based on a very limited franchise was established. A period of liberal rule followed, but by the turn of the century was swamped by a wave of populism which opposed free trade and other liberal tenets. As 1914 approached the Emperor regained many of his powers, and liberalism went into decline.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately.

[50]

2 “Nationalist movements in Europe in the period 1815–1914 were by themselves not strong enough to overturn the existing political order. They only enjoyed success when they had outside assistance.” To what extent would you agree with this verdict?

This question requires an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of nationalism between 1815 and 1914, particularly in relation to its successes, which will be seen mainly as the establishment of new nation-states. It is likely that most emphasis will be on Italy and Germany, with consideration of the roles played by ‘outside assistance’, in other words other countries, in their creation. Top level responses will reflect not only on this, but will also note the part played by local nationalists in, for example, starting the process of self-determination by rebellion, resistance or even the stimulation of national self-awareness by cultural means. The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

AVAILABLE
MARKS

(a) The weakness of nationalist movements, 1815–1850

The status quo was established in 1815, when the Treaty of Vienna was signed, a major defeat for nationalism. Many Germans, Italians and Poles, who had briefly enjoyed unity and self-government, were left discontented by the re-establishment of the Habsburg, Prussian and Russian Empires, and it was among these peoples that nationalism emerged as a movement. The years 1815–1850 may be seen largely as illustrative of the proposition. The German Confederation was deliberately constructed to keep Germany divided and securely under Habsburg influence. Interest in nationalism was limited to intellectual and undergraduate circles, a weakness common to most European nationalist movements in the first half of the century. The Carlsbad Decrees (1821) and the Six Articles (1832) were both rushed through the Diet of the Confederation to curb nationalist growth and intellectual freedom. Contemporary interpretations might include the demands of the Hambach demonstrators, which provoked the Six Articles. Austrian influence lay behind the repressive legislation, illustrating both the essential weakness of German nationalism, and its inability to succeed on its own. Italian nationalism proved to be no stronger. Risings in various Italian states in 1820 and 1831 were suppressed by Austrian intervention, but the incompetence of the secret societies which sparked off the revolts, and the failure of the nationalists to rise above localism, both played their part in ensuring defeat. In the 1830s Mazzini offered a new style of nationalism, democratic, republican and appealing to a younger generation, but despite his ability to gather and inspire disciples, neither he nor they were practical men, and the attempts by Young Italy to overthrow the status quo were embarrassingly inept. Since the Troppau Protocol in 1820 had bound the Powers to combine where necessary to suppress liberal or national revolution, outside help for nationalism was absent. Answers might usefully quote from historians such as Herman on Metternich's influence on Troppau.

(b) Nationalist successes 1815–1848

The Protocol did not, however, receive the assent of Britain or France, and as a result these two states offered diplomatic help, or at least tacit consent, to the creation and continued existence of Belgium, a clear breach of the status quo. Better answers may note that the Belgian nationalists did successfully expel the Dutch without military aid from elsewhere. The case of Greece showed both the weakness and the strength of nationalism, with an anti-Ottoman rising continuing throughout the 1820s, but lacking sufficient muscle to establish an independent Greece. This was achieved through 'outside assistance' when Britain, France and Russia intervened to ensure the military defeat of the Turks by 1828. Answers which mention the *Zollverein* in the context of nationalist success might wish to consider whether this was a phenomenon emerging from German nationalism or from Prussian economic ambition. Better answers may see the growth of national consciousness engendered by cultural influences as a sign of nationalist strength, despite its failures in purely political terms. Thus, Fichte's thoughts on the German *Volk* and the Grimms' recycling of German folk myths helped to build a sense of nationhood which would later bear fruit. These, or the Czech Palacky or the Italian Alfieri, might be quoted as examples of contemporary interpretation.

(c) The events of 1848

1848 best represents the 'weakness of nationalism' argument. During the 'year of revolutions', nationalists had great opportunities to mould themselves into a nation, as in Germany, or find a king willing to lead them, as in Italy with Charles Albert, or force the imperial power to grant them self-government, as in Hungary. Yet in every case they either failed to capitalise on their opportunities or succumbed to superior military power. Weaknesses were apparent in a number of ways: they lacked political experience, they failed to build up armies and they did not succeed in winning over the masses to the concept of nationalism. It may also be argued that in the circumstances of 1848 the powers had enough problems, and were unwilling to intervene on behalf of nationalists elsewhere. Historians such as Peter Jones might be utilised for their interpretation of why nationalism failed in 1848.

(d) Italy after 1848

Italian unification is an example of the beneficial effects of 'outside assistance'. Before 1850 various attempts to produce an Italian nation-state had failed, arguably for lack of outside help (a useful contemporary interpretation is the Italian proverb '*L'Italia fara da se*'). Yet success would be achieved once Italian nationalists accepted the need for assistance. Napoleon III, always keen to challenge the Vienna system, offered help to drive the Austrians out of northern Italy. Despite the premature French withdrawal, the impetus was continued and the Kingdom of Italy formed in 1861. Foreign help was also useful in 1866, when Italy acquired Venetia, courtesy of its ally Prussia. Yet nationalist influence had increased, and the contribution of Garibaldi was crucial. Without the expedition of the Thousand, the new Italy would not have included the South. Against that, he might never have been able to reach the mainland from Sicily had it not been for the benevolent presence of the British navy. Although he was not necessarily a nationalist, Cavour's determination to expel foreign control from the peninsula and seek 'outside assistance' shows a new and more sophisticated diplomatic awareness on the part of Italian nationalism. Finally, the middle-class National Society held the fort for the nationalist cause when, in 1859, it looked as if Cavour's project might founder. For historical interpretation of the strength of Italian nationalism, Dennis Mack Smith could usefully be quoted.

(e) Germany after 1848

In Germany there was a flourishing nationalist movement, but it had failed in 1848, and unity came as a result of a power struggle between Prussia and Austria. Bismarck was perfectly capable of appealing to German nationalist feeling, as in the Schleswig-Holstein affair in 1864, and Luxemburg in 1866. But although he unified Germany, his first loyalty was always to Prussia and better answers may address this paradox, possibly asking whether Prussia counts as 'outside assistance'. There is scope for interpretation here, both contemporary, utilising Bismarck's own writings, and later, considering the verdict of, for example, A J P Taylor. 'Outside assistance' came in 1866 from Prussia's Italian allies, as well as from French neutrality, and was crucial to the defeat of Austria and the creation of the North German Confederation. It might be noted that in 1866 Prussia fought not only against Austria but against the vast majority of the North German states, so this might be considered as another defeat for nationalism.

(f) Other parts of Europe

Apart from a brief interlude in 1848–1849 Austria had retained control of its Magyar dominions, but the nationalist mood remained strong, if unproductive, until after the Seven Weeks' War, when a fatally wounded Austria thought it politic to offer the *Ausgleich* to Hungary, which thus benefited from 'outside assistance'. In the Balkans, nationalism remained fierce but largely impotent. Bulgarian independence in 1878 was a result of a Russian campaign against Turkey, while Albania's existence was largely due to Austrian determination, in the wake of the Balkan Wars, to block Serbian access to the sea. South Slav nationalism was constantly growing, yet suffered a crushing blow in 1908 when the Habsburg Empire annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. Other evidence which might be mentioned could include the failure of Polish and Czech nationalism to achieve anything substantial until the Great War, when 'outside assistance' broke the logjam.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately.

[50]

Option 3

Total

**AVAILABLE
MARKS**

50

50

50

Option 4: Unionism and Nationalism in Ireland 1800–1900

AVAILABLE
MARKS

Answer **one** question.

- 1 “Individuals determined the successes and failures of Irish nationalism.” How far would you accept this verdict on constitutional and revolutionary nationalism in Ireland in the period 1800–1900?**

This question requires an assessment of the role of individuals in the fortunes of both constitutional and revolutionary nationalism in this period.

Top level responses will examine the position clearly, explaining how each strand of nationalism was helped and/or hindered by individuals, both in Ireland and Britain. Answers will be expected to deal with the most obvious and well-profiled ‘individuals’, such as the leaders of constitutional groups, revolutionary movements or key members of the British government. In addition, candidates should refer to other factors such as the role of the Catholic Church and the significance of widespread support.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

- (a) The success or failure of constitutional nationalism was influenced by the actions of individuals in Ireland.**

Following the unsuccessful efforts of Henry Grattan to achieve Catholic Emancipation at Westminster, Daniel O’Connell created a new mass movement by setting up the Catholic Association in 1823. O’Connell contributed to the success of Catholic Emancipation through his charismatic leadership. He inspired the masses through his speeches; his rhetoric pushed an uncertain British government to acquiesce; he harnessed the support of the Catholic clergy and the middle class, and utilised the potent weapons of the freehold vote to mould the first real pressure group in Europe. O’Connell’s political judgement and pragmatism in the 1830s over the limited chances of achieving the repeal of the Union contributed to the Lichfield House Compact with the Whigs, which produced some limited reforms, such as tithes under the administration of Thomas Drummond. Contemporaries of O’Connell criticised him for the lack of significant reforms and Rees argues that by 1840 neither the Whig alliance nor the Union itself was working. Answers will also refer to the role of O’Connell in the failure of the repeal movement. According to Bew, O’Connell’s opposition to the ‘godless colleges’ in 1845 allowed him to be labelled as sectarian, as well as leading to clashes with figures such as Thomas Davis.

After a period of inertia and political vacuum in the 1850s and 1860s, a new type of constitutional nationalism emerged, the Home Rule movement led by Isaac Butt. This movement and the work of Parnell contributed to the progress made by constitutional nationalists in the second half of this period. Parnell possessed some personal charisma, and provided a dynamic type of leadership which Butt had lacked. He showed initiative by seizing on the land question as a means of ultimately harnessing widespread support for Home

Rule. He co-operated with the Land League, formed by Michael Davitt, which embraced former members of the Fenian movement in what became known as the New Departure in Irish politics. These actions contributed to land reforms in the form of the Land Act of 1881 and the Arrears Act of 1882. At Westminster, Parnell created a modern day political party, whose members were the first in Europe to receive a salary and be bound in a disciplined way by a pledge of unity. As Rees points out, Parnell had been able to unite all shades of nationalist opinion, as well as forcing British politicians to look at Ireland in a different light before his downfall. Despite the efforts of Parnell, the opposition of British politicians ensured that his attempts to deliver Home Rule failed in this period. However, Parnell was also weakened through his personal actions such as the Divorce scandal which attracted criticism from contemporaries within his own party and the Catholic Church in particular.

(b) The success or failure of the actions of constitutional nationalism was also determined by the actions of British politicians.

O'Connell's political fortunes were also helped by the actions of individuals in the Tory government. Wellington and Peel had to come to terms with their political discomfiture following the resignation of Lord Liverpool. As Rees points out, the Clare election of 1828 put Wellington under pressure to grant Catholic Emancipation in 1829 due to its popular support in Ireland and the fear of violence if it was rejected again. However, it could be argued that the political plight of the Whigs in the 1830s, and the willingness of Melbourne and Drummond to make the Compact work, was also decisive in helping O'Connell to accomplish some of his political aims. However, O'Connell had failed to achieve his objective of Repeal in the 1840s due to his personal dispute with Peel and his quarrels with the Young Ireland movement. Gladstone had shown his commitment to trying to solve the Irish problem through his land reforms and other measures. Parnell's efforts played a key role in pushing Gladstone towards the introduction of two Home Rule Bills in 1886 and 1893. The Home Rule issue split the Liberals and faced strong opposition from the Tories, especially in the Lords.

(c) The success or failure of constitutional nationalism was also dependent on the role of other factors.

The success or failure of constitutional nationalism was also dependent on other factors, such as the role of the Catholic Church and the significance of widespread support. The Catholic middle classes provided organisational skills and funding for the Catholic Association which helped them to achieve Emancipation in 1829. The Catholic Church helped by allowing the clergy to collect the penny rent and created widespread support from the peasantry, in particular, to obtain Catholic Emancipation. By the 1840s any faint hopes of achieving repeal of the Union were damaged by the effects of measures such as the increase in the Maynooth grant in 1845 and the Famine itself. Boyce argues that Catholic middle class support was crucial to the success of Emancipation but their lack of support contributed significantly to the failure of the campaign for repeal of the Union. In 1879 the Land League mobilised the widespread support of the peasantry and successfully linked the land issue to that of Home Rule as a strategy to solve the Irish problem. Moody argues that Davitt played a crucial role by encouraging Fenians to co-operate with constitutional nationalists to campaign for self-government for Ireland after the New Departure.

(d) The success or failures of revolutionary nationalists in this period was also influenced by the actions of individuals.

The first example of revolutionary nationalism in 1803 was a rebellion led by Robert Emmet which was badly planned and his force of 100 men failed to capture Dublin Castle. Foster does not dismiss Emmet as a revolutionary dreamer but regards him as a skilled political operator with significant support from some groups in Dublin. The miserable failure of the Young Ireland revolt in 1848 can also be partly attributed to its weak and divided leadership made of individuals such as William Smith O'Brien and John Mitchel. Rees argues that O'Brien was a reluctant and unlikely revolutionary leader. James Stephens, who was also involved in 1848, went on to form the Fenian movement. The poor leadership of Stephens and O'Kelly contributed significantly to the failure of the Fenian Rising in 1867. While individuals such as O'Brien and Stephens were partly responsible for the failures of revolutionary nationalism in nineteenth century Ireland, Rees argues that Emmet's famous epitaph speech turned his military failure into a political triumph through his legacy of inspiring other future revolutionary nationalists.

(e) The success or failure of revolutionary nationalists was also determined by other factors.

The fortunes of revolutionary nationalism were also determined by a number of factors apart from the role of individuals. As Bew points out, government agents and poor communications undermined Emmet's chances of success in 1803. There was little public support for the uprisings of 1803, 1848 or 1867 which were easily suppressed by the actions of the British government. The Young Ireland uprising went ahead in the aftermath of the Famine which had devastated Ireland. However, as Jackson points out, the legacy of the Young Ireland movement proved significant with the inspirational literature of Thomas Davis. Foster regards Davis as a true Irish patriot who recognised the importance of Irish History and its own distinct language. Strong opposition from the Catholic Church to the Fenian movement also weakened its support and chances of success. As Jackson points out, the execution of the Manchester Martyrs helped to create a consensus of support for Fenianism which it had lacked before 1867. After this failure revolutionary nationalism continued to enjoy no success up to 1900 but its ultimate legacy was the Easter Rising of 1916.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately.

[50]

2 "Their differences far outweighed their similarities." To what extent would you agree with this assessment of the supporters of the Union in the north and south of Ireland in the period 1800–1900?

This question requires candidates to examine to what extent there were significant differences as opposed to similarities between supporters of the Union in the north and south of Ireland in the period 1800–1900. Answers should compare and contrast the motives of the supporters of the Union in the north and south of Ireland, as well as the methods by which they attempted to achieve their objectives.

Good answers will discuss whether the economic, social and political motives of the supporters of the Union in the north and south of Ireland between 1800 and 1900 were predominantly different or similar. While both groups shared common

economic objectives, northern unionists had a greater focus on religious aims but showed less emphasis on the Empire than their southern counterparts. After the Home Rule crisis in 1886, there were clear differences in methods between the two groups of unionists, with northern unionists using threats and a more militant strategy than southern unionists, whose supporters used peaceful and constitutional methods against Home Rule.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for credible marks.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

(a) Religious motives for wanting to maintain the Union revealed differences between its supporters in the north and south of Ireland.

By 1850 Belfast and the area around it had become industrialised and the competition for jobs increased sectarian tensions and the fears of northern unionists over their future. After 1850 there were several examples of serious sectarian rioting in Belfast and Derry/Londonderry which increased religious fears amongst unionists in Ulster. Before the events of 1886, groups were also set up in Ulster to safeguard Protestant ownership of land and property in Ulster against the perceived Catholic threat. The Home Rule bills of 1886 and 1893 clearly demonstrated the extent to which religious fears motivated supporters of the Union in the north, a point highlighted by Buckland and Rees.

Whilst religious fears were also a concern for southern unionists, they placed less emphasis on them than supporters of the Union in the north. Buckland described the southern unionists as being a vulnerable 'scattered minority' in Leinster, Munster and Connaught, where they numbered only 250 000. Before 1850 religious fears over O'Connell had led to the formation of Brunswick Clubs in Cork. After 1850, the southern unionists' fears over the emergence of the Home Rule movement and the Land League increased their religious fears.

(b) The Empire was another area which showed differences in the motives of the supporters of the Union in the north and south of Ireland.

The concern of the Ulster unionists for the Empire appeared to be closely linked to their perception of the economic threat Home Rule posed to Ulster after 1886. For them the prosperity of industrial Ulster was linked to the economic benefits of trade with Britain and Empire. Thus, the concern of supporters of the Union in the north for the Empire was rooted in economic motives, rather than a genuine affection for the Empire itself. However, as McDowell points out, the southern unionists placed a strong emphasis on imperial ideals. In fact, Midleton and Dunraven had travelled across the Empire, holding administrative responsibilities. The literature produced by groups such as the Irish Loyal and Patriotic Union (ILPU) linked the prosperity of Ireland to the benefits of the Empire.

(c) Fears that Ireland’s economic prosperity would be damaged by Home Rule were prominent among supporters of the Union in both the north and south of Ireland.

Economic fears and concerns were present before 1850 but became more significant in the second half of the nineteenth century in both the north and south of Ireland. The Home Rule crisis increased these economic fears and key figures such as Thomas Sinclair claimed that Home Rule threatened the success and growth of industry in Ulster. In fact, historians such as Rees and Kee have pointed out that the economic arguments about Home Rule were seen as the most important motives amongst supporters of the Union in Ulster. Southern unionists shared these economic fears, as increased nationalist political activity over the land issue threatened their agricultural prosperity, as pointed out by McDowell. Changes to the electoral franchise in 1867 and 1884, as well as reforms in local government, removed the traditional economic and political dominance of southern unionists. Economic fears were reflected in the social structure of unionism, as some of the most prominent supporters of the Union in Ulster were wealthy businessmen, whilst outside Ulster its main supporters were wealthy landowners. As early as 1841 Henry Cooke had spoken out against O’Connell and the threat repeal posed to the prosperity of Ulster, which he attributed to the benefits of the Union.

(d) The methods employed by the supporters of the Union in the north and south of Ireland to achieve their objectives revealed more differences than similarities.

Ulster unionists were in the majority in Ulster which put them in a strong position to defend the Union and they were willing to threaten violent resistance to Home Rule. However, as southern unionists constituted only a small minority of the population outside Ulster, they relied on the goodwill of nationalist Ireland and support from the British government. They set up organisations in the south to protect the Union such as the Cork Defence Union in 1885 which stated that it was ‘to be non-sectarian and non-political’, whilst the ILPU was established in 1886. Southern unionists claimed that the Union was beneficial to everyone. Southern unionists were more prepared to use peaceful methods than Ulster unionists, whose rhetoric was more militant, particularly after 1886. Unlike the Ulster unionists, the supporters of the Union in the south had strong links at Westminster, especially in the House of Lords, where, in 1886, 116 out of the 144 peers with Irish interests owned land in the south and west. Both sets of supporters of the Union were linked together by a common aim to maintain and defend the Act of Union itself, despite their economic, political and social differences. Any attempt to meddle with the Union or to challenge its role, such as Home Rule, threatened the position of both sets of supporters of the Union in this period. However, after 1886 very few unionist MPs were elected outside Ulster, reflecting the demographic weakness of southern unionists compared with those in Ulster. Finally, as Buckland has argued, the differences between the two types of unionists became much more apparent after the events of 1886 and 1893, which highlighted greater differences in methods than similarities.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately.

[50]

Option 4

Total

**AVAILABLE
MARKS**

50

50

50

Option 5: Clash of Ideologies in Europe 1900–2000

AVAILABLE
MARKS

Answer **one** question.

1 “A desperate search for security.” To what extent would you agree with this assessment of Soviet foreign policy in Europe between 1917 and 1991?

This question requires an assessment of the extent to which the search for security was at the heart of Soviet foreign policy.

Top level responses will reflect on the significance of security as a motive for Soviet foreign policy and why this might have been the case. They would also consider how there were shifts within a given period and why this was the case. They will explore the multifaceted nature of foreign policy and reflect that it is rarely motivated by a single factor but is the product of competing forces, both external and internal.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

(a) 1917–1924

The significance of security considerations is obvious in the early years of Soviet foreign policy. Withdrawal from World War One and the brutally harsh Treaty of Brest-Litovsk highlight the priorities of the embryonic regime. The subsequent Civil War once again highlights how security and survival were the primary motivations of Soviet foreign policy at this juncture. Candidates could, however, also argue that the Soviet Union was aggressive from the outset, with Lenin’s creation of the Comintern. Equally, the Russo-Polish War was further evidence of this, something that was captured in the idea of creating ‘a red bridge into Europe’. However, candidates may point out that there was a dual strategy in operation, which varied according to leaders and circumstances throughout the period. Survival, and thus security, rather than any economic priorities or a desire to expand communism, was the main priority in this phase and by signing the Treaty of Rapallo with Weimar Germany in 1922, the USSR showed that it could be pragmatic and work with capitalist states if necessary for survival and security.

(b) 1924–1941

Stalin, believing that Trotsky’s hopes of international revolution were hopelessly naïve, continued the more inward-looking policies of the early 1920s. He concentrated upon the economic reconstruction of the USSR. The policy of ‘Socialism in One Country’ focused partly on industrialisation to increase its levels of rearmament as protection from potential attacks by capitalist states. In this sense security was the primary focus of foreign policy. There was nowhere to search for it as such – it was to be found at home. As Stalin commented: ‘One Soviet tractor is worth ten foreign communists’, thus highlighting his priorities.

By 1933, with the rise to power of Hitler, the USSR recognised the potential threat of Nazism. In 1934 the USSR joined the League of Nations to try

to co-operate with capitalist states such as the UK and France to achieve collective security. Self-preservation was the clear motive and one could say that a 'desperate search for security' was at the heart of Soviet decision making.

Soviet involvement with the Spanish Civil War was limited in character and may indeed be viewed as a piece of opportunism by Stalin, whether this was the gain of Spanish gold (economic) or the opportunity to wipe out Trotskyist opponents (ideological). However, candidates may note that, since Stalin did not want to jeopardise relations with France and Britain, his involvement in Spain was limited, thus reinforcing the argument that security was at the heart of Soviet foreign policy during this period.

After the Munich Conference in 1938 the USSR clearly realised that the West could not be relied upon and in 1939 it signed the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact with its ideological enemy, Nazi Germany. Although there were economic gains to be made from the pact, it could be more readily argued that it was essentially a measure to forestall a Nazi attack. Once again this was an attempt to maintain Soviet security. This particular episode offers candidates an opportunity to explore historiographical debates concerning the motives of Soviet foreign policy. There is ample scope to consider whether the Soviet Union was putting security first or whether, as Tucker and others would maintain, Stalin was seeking to bring about a major European conflagration from which the Soviet Union would subsequently benefit.

(c) 1941–1945

The Nazi invasion of the USSR in June 1941 forced it into a temporary alliance with capitalist states to defeat the forces of Fascism. However, at some point during the Second World War, Stalin decided that, after victory had been achieved, the USSR would never again have to depend on others for its own strategic security. What had been done for survival led Stalin to follow upon a course of action that was to ensure that security was to be at the heart of Soviet foreign policy.

(d) 1945–1953

In the immediate post-war period Soviet actions could be analysed through the prism of a search for security or a range of other factors. These possibilities are reflected in the range of historical viewpoints. The traditional interpretation of the origins of the Cold War suggests that the USSR occupied the states of Eastern Europe it liberated from Nazi Germany for ideological motives to spread communism. Revisionist interpretations suggest that Stalin broke the 1945 Yalta Agreement more for reasons of security and survival. The USSR only narrowly escaped defeat during the Second World War and by 1945 it was near economic ruin. Its security and economic needs led it to seek governments in nearby states which were not anti-Soviet and to ensure that no military threat ever emanated from German soil again. Stalin not only wanted to maintain a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe amongst the People's Democracies through the Cominform in 1947 and Comecon in 1949, but he was also determined to prevent a united capitalist Germany rising up again to threaten the USSR. A strong claim can be made that economic considerations were a strong driving force for Stalin at this point – be it in terms of reparations from Germany or the Soviet belief that it was necessary to blockade Berlin and undermine US

attempts to create an independent Federal Germany that would potentially impair the workings of their occupied zone.

(e) 1953–1964

The death of Stalin and the emergence of Khrushchev offers candidates the opportunity to consider whether the new leadership was to fundamentally alter the motives of Soviet foreign policy. Candidates could certainly explore the impact of the ‘secret speech’ and Khrushchev’s clear and evident desire to avoid conflict, reflected in his remarks about there being only two paths that the world’s foremost powers could take: ‘peaceful co-existence or the most destructive war in history’.

However, candidates could suggest that a multiplicity of factors were at work. The cost of the Cold War was certainly a concern for Khrushchev, as it would be for other subsequent leaders of the Soviet Union. Equally, there seemed to be a recognition of the status quo in Europe and expansionist desires seemed limited. Yet, security was to remain a considerable factor. The creation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955 demonstrated that the USSR was determined to maintain the Iron Curtain. The 1956 Hungarian uprising was crushed to prevent states in Eastern Europe from leaving the alliance. Equally, while the Berlin crisis of 1961 can be considered from different angles, it is plausible to argue that the economic threat to the viability of the East German regime was also centrally about fears of a reverse domino effect, where if one communist state was to collapse the rest would follow. These events could thus be presented as examples of Soviet determination to maintain its own security and a fear that any break in the Eastern Bloc would endanger that security. As Evans and Jenkins have suggested: ‘In many ways the foreign policy aims of Khrushchev differed little from those of Stalin’.

(f) 1964–1982

One could equally interpret events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the Brezhnev Doctrine as a desire to maintain that security which had been so elusive in the pre-war years. However, other motives also explain Soviet foreign policy in the Brezhnev era. Coexistence with the west through détente, such as the SALT agreement of 1972, was partly pursued due to the stagnation of the Soviet economy, which could not sustain high levels of spending, while the 1975 Helsinki Accords were signed by the Soviets for the economic and technological gains on offer and also to gain recognition from the West, thus enhancing Soviet security.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, which led to the end of détente and was justified by the Soviets on the ideological grounds of the 1968 Brezhnev Doctrine, could be presented as a determined effort to maintain Soviet security in view of the US-backed Islamist threat. However, it could equally be presented as a further example of Soviet aggression and the desire to impose communist governments against the democratic wishes of the Afghan people to have a theocratic state. Indeed, President Carter regarded it as the ‘greatest threat to world peace since World War Two’.

(g) 1982–1991

Soviet foreign policy was transformed after Gorbachev became the new leader in 1985, the reigns of Andropov and Chernenko having had little impact on events. Gorbachev was not prepared to shore up a Soviet-

dominated structure in Eastern Europe which was failing economically and threatened to bankrupt the USSR itself if it continued to try to match the USA as a military force. In a speech to the United Nations in 1988, Gorbachev had committed himself to ending the Cold War, had renounced the emphasis in the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution on trying to export communist doctrine abroad and the 1968 Brezhnev Doctrine, committing the USSR instead to disarmament in what was described as 'our common European home'. From 1986 to 1989 he withdrew troops from Afghanistan; in 1987 he reached agreement with President Reagan to destroy all stocks of intermediate nuclear weapons; and in 1989 did not intervene to prop up unpopular communist regimes in the former Warsaw Pact. Gorbachev was not interested in spreading communism or maintaining the balance of power in Europe. He wanted to reform communism within the USSR and in this regard one can see the emphasis being both economic and ideological; however, his policies resulted in the disintegration of the USSR in 1991. From this perspective it could be suggested that he believed that the means used to attain Soviet security had effectively undermined it and it was therefore necessary to change policies. However, such an analysis and series of policies led not to the survival of the Soviet Union but to its death, with Gorbachev as the chief 'gravedigger' (McCauley).

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately. [50]

2 To what extent were the opponents of communism in Europe in the period 1917–1991 motivated by security considerations?

Answers should discuss not only the degree to which security was the motivating force for the opponents of communism but also what other factors shaped the foreign policies of various states throughout the period. Candidates will be expected to distinguish between the motivations of different states and give due weight to the similarities and differences between them. Top level responses will be expected to sustain this level of analysis across the whole period.

The structure of the answer is immaterial; whether thematical or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for credible marks.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

(a) 1917–1933

Candidates may reasonably argue that initially there was a clear desire to destroy the Soviet Union and this may have been motivated by the belief that a communist state with international ambitions was a threat to security. This was evidenced through the involvement of France and Britain in the Civil War on the side of the Whites. Candidates could draw attention to Churchill's attitude at the time which reflected this aggressive approach. With the failure of the Whites and the success of the Bolsheviks in maintaining the revolution, candidates may wish to point out that there was a change in tactics by the opponents of communism, even if general hostility and suspicion towards the Soviet Union remained. Equally, candidates may wish to note the development of divisions among the non-communist states.

It is possible to contrast the roles of Britain and Germany at this point. On the one hand, there was the desire of Britain to isolate the Soviet Union but still trade with it, and in contrast the willingness of Germany to align itself with a fellow pariah state. With Britain relations were essentially hostile as evidenced in both the Curzon Ultimatum of 1923 and the Zinoviev letter of 1924. On the other hand, the series of treaties with Germany after the Locarno Treaty which sought to assuage Soviet concerns over its western borders, reflected a more positive relationship.

(b) 1933–1945

The rise of Hitler had a considerable effect on the relations between states in the pre-war period. There were some attempts to develop a policy of collective security against the Nazi threat, evidenced through treaties with France and Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union's entry into the League of Nations. Here candidates may argue that security was indeed a motivating factor in the development of relations with the Soviet Union, not in opposition to the communist state but in alliance with it. Candidates could draw on the arguments of the Soviet school which has maintained that the Soviet Union exhausted itself in its efforts to promote collective security and therefore, by definition, it was France and Britain that were at fault for the failure of collective security.

By contrast, Germany, once the primary ally of the nascent communist state, was now avowedly determined to destroy it. Hitler had made clear in *Mein Kampf* that he was expressly hostile to the Soviet Union and his policy was not based on security but rather ideological aggression.

However, candidates may emphasise that foreign policy was decidedly fluid. The Spanish Civil War and the Munich Agreement demonstrate that the opponents of communism could quickly dilute or reverse the policies they had previously espoused. Candidates could argue that security, at least as far as France and Britain were concerned, was contingent on national interest and, if this was best served by agreements with fascist states, the agreements would be signed. By contrast, Nazism was prepared to sign agreements with either democratic or communist states as military strategy required. As Ken Ward has aptly stated, 'ideological summersaults' abounded. Indeed, this period offers rich possibilities for candidates to analyse and utilise the various interpretations of events.

The war years offer the obvious point that the Nazis wanted to destroy the Soviet Union and very nearly succeeded in doing so, and security was clearly not a motivation. The alliance that existed between other capitalist states and the Soviet Union was born out of a common necessity, arguably security, and is neatly summed up in the phrase 'marriage of convenience'. Following the defeat of Nazism, candidates can explore the reasons behind the collapse of this temporary alliance.

(c) 1945–1979

Attention may be drawn to the unprecedented role of the United States in European affairs and the policies that it developed in the post-1945 period, most notably containment. Discussion of the war-time conferences may highlight the attempts made by the Allies to ensure that the Soviet Union respected democratic norms and how when they subsequently failed, the capitalist powers sought to limit the reach of communism. Alternatively,

candidates may decide to argue that the Western countries aggressively tried to limit Soviet influence. They may argue that the opponents of the Soviet Union were prepared to contain communism in Eastern Europe but destroy it in Western and Southern Europe.

At the heart of this discussion candidates can assess to what degree security was the primary motivating factor and, in so doing, engage with the major schools of thought regarding the post-war period. Drawing on the Orthodox school, candidates may seek to emphasise that it was fear of Soviet expansionism that led to the post-war policies adopted by the United States and its allies. By contrast, candidates may seek to argue that the US was motivated by 'dollar imperialism' and aggressively sought to undermine the Soviet Union to open up more markets.

From this juncture a range of events can be considered in light of the proposition at the heart of the question. The Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, the Berlin Airlift and the creation of NATO could all be considered examples of a determination to contain communism based on security considerations. However, it could be suggested that the United States was playing a 'long game' and using a build up of military forces to push the Soviet Union into 'military overstretch', thus ensuring its destruction. This would suggest that policy was not motivated by security but aggressive expansionism.

What appears to be most notable about relations in Europe in the following decades is the degree to which the opponents of the Soviet Union found themselves reacting to events in Eastern Europe. This is evident with regard to Hungary in 1956, the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 and it would appear any action beyond strong diplomatic language would have led to a military confrontation that had the potential for global destruction. As such, security could be regarded as a motivating factor for non-intervention by the West in these cases.

However, a more careful consideration may draw attention to the stop-start nature of the relations between the opponents of communism and the Soviet Union. The Geneva Conference of 1955, Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union in 1959, Khrushchev's return visit to the USA in the same year and the failure of the Paris Conference of 1960 all hint at a more complex picture. Stability was produced by military power but diplomatically a series of measures suggested an accommodation had been or was being reached that was in the interests of both superpowers.

The post-Cuban Missile Crisis years were to see a further solidifying of these trends in the form of détente, despite events in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The military agreements of the mid-1960s, the early 1970s and the Helsinki Final Act all suggest that the opponents of communism had no major desire to see the destruction of the Soviet Union and these developments emerged from both security needs to produce that stability between the superpowers, especially in Europe, but also from the costly effects of military adventurism in other non-European contexts. Indeed this is an argument that historians such as Mason have made.

(d) 1979–1991

However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was to witness the end of détente. The emergence of a new regime in the USA under Ronald Reagan coincided with a much more aggressive diplomatic and military approach to the Soviet Union. Containment was still very much a policy aim but the increase in military spending and the characterisation of the Soviet Union as the ‘evil empire’ gives some indication that policy methods and perhaps objectives had altered. The placing of Pershing and Cruise missiles in Western Europe led to an intense renewal of the arms race and candidates may speculate on what the purpose of this was. While the opponents of the Soviet Union may have characterised this policy as security based, other alternatives can be explored, such as the desire to force the Soviet Union to overspend and overstretch itself. In fact, Brzezinski admitted this himself when he declared that he regretted nothing about the covert involvement in Afghanistan and how it was ‘a conflict that brought about the demoralisation and finally the break-up of the Soviet empire’ ten years later.

It is possible to argue that the opponents of communism aimed to undermine the Soviet Union and its satellites overtly through military spending and attempting to bankrupt the Soviet Union. The opponents of communism pursued the same policy covertly through both propaganda and support for dissident movements both within the Soviet Union and across its satellite states. In this regard it is hard to argue that security was the primary motivating force of the opponents of communism; rather it was motivated by an ideological hostility to communism. Of course, it is possible to argue the opposite, namely that the very existence of the Soviet Union was an existential threat to the West in view of its ideologically aggressive DNA, to quote George Kennan.

The end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of communist regimes across Central and Eastern Europe, and subsequently of the Soviet Union itself, presents candidates with the opportunity to assess how significant the opponents of communism were in bringing about the demise of communism. For all the decades of opposition, and the many forms it took, it was perhaps its internal contradictions that brought the system down. However, candidates may argue that it was in fact a joint policy of containment and non-violent methods designed to destroy the Soviet Union that ultimately did bring about the defeat of communism and thus guarantee the security of the opponents of communism.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately.

[50]

50

Option 5

50

Total

50

**AVAILABLE
MARKS**