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#### UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE INTERNATIONAL EXAMINATIONS

GCE Advanced Subsidiary Level and GCE Advanced Level

# MARK SCHEME for the May/June 2012 question paper for the guidance of teachers

### 9697 HISTORY

9697/31

Paper 3, maximum raw mark 100

This mark scheme is published as an aid to teachers and candidates, to indicate the requirements of the examination. It shows the basis on which Examiners were instructed to award marks. It does not indicate the details of the discussions that took place at an Examiners' meeting before marking began, which would have considered the acceptability of alternative answers.

Mark schemes must be read in conjunction with the question papers and the report on the examination.

• Cambridge will not enter into discussions or correspondence in connection with these mark schemes.

Cambridge is publishing the mark schemes for the May/June 2012 question papers for most IGCSE, GCE Advanced Level and Advanced Subsidiary Level syllabuses and some Ordinary Level syllabuses.

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#### **GENERIC MARK BANDS FOR ESSAY QUESTIONS**

Examiners will assess which Level of Response best reflects most of the answer. An answer was be required to demonstrate all of the descriptions in a particular Level to qualify for a Mark Band.

Band	Marks	Levels of Response
1	21–25	The approach will be consistently analytical or explanatory rather than descriptive or narrative. Essays will be fully relevant. The argument will be structured coherently and supported by appropriate factual material and ideas. The writing will be accurate. At the lower end of the band, there may be some weaker sections but the overall quality will show that the candidate is in control of the argument. The best answers must be awarded 25 marks.
2	18–20	Essays will be focused clearly on the demands of the question but there will be some unevenness. The approach will be mostly analytical or explanatory rather than descriptive or narrative. The answer will be mostly relevant. Most of the argument will be structured coherently and supported by largely accurate factual material. The impression will be that a good solid answer has been provided.
3	16–17	Essays will reflect a clear understanding of the question and a fair attempt to provide an argument and factual knowledge to answer it. The approach will contain analysis or explanation but there may be some heavily descriptive or narrative passages. The answer will be largely relevant. Essays will achieve a genuine argument but may lack balance and depth in factual knowledge. Most of the answer will be structured satisfactorily but some parts may lack full coherence.
4	14–15	Essays will indicate attempts to argue relevantly although often implicitly. The approach will depend more on some heavily descriptive or narrative passages than on analysis or explanation, which may be limited to introductions and conclusions. Factual material, sometimes very full, will be used to impart information or describe events rather than to address directly the requirements of the question. The structure of the argument could be organised more effectively.
5	11–13	Essays will offer some appropriate elements but there will be little attempt generally to link factual material to the requirements of the question. The approach will lack analysis and the quality of the description or narrative, although sufficiently accurate and relevant to the topic if not the particular question, will not be linked effectively to the argument. The structure will show weaknesses and the treatment of topics within the answer will be unbalanced.
6	8–10	Essays will not be properly focused on the requirements of the question. There may be many unsupported assertions and commentaries that lack sufficient factual support. The argument may be of limited relevance to the topic and there may be confusion about the implications of the question.
7	0–7	Essays will be characterised by significant irrelevance or arguments that do not begin to make significant points. The answers may be largely fragmentary and incoherent.

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#### **SECTION A**

Source-based question: THE UNITED NATIONS AND STALIN'S SOVIET UNION; How is Sources A – E support the view that Stalin's Soviet Union was never truly committed the United Nations?

#### L1 WRITES ABOUT THE HYPOTHESIS, NO VALID USE OF SOURCES

[1–5]

These answers will write about the UN and Stalin's Soviet Union and might use the sources. However, candidates will not use the sources as information/evidence to test the given hypothesis. If sources are used, it will be to support an essay-style answer to the question.

L2 USES INFORMATION TAKEN FROM THE SOURCES TO CHALLENGE **OR** SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS [6–8]

These answers use the sources as information rather than as evidence, i.e. sources are used at face value only with no evaluation/interpretation in context.

L3 USES INFORMATION TAKEN FROM SOURCES TO CHALLENGE **AND** SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS [9–13]

These answers know that testing the hypothesis involves both attempting to confirm and to disprove it. However, sources are still used only at face value.

L4 BY INTERPRETING/EVALUATING SOURCES IN CONTEXT, FINDS EVIDENCE TO CHALLENGE **OR** SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS [14–16]

These answers are capable of using sources as evidence, i.e. demonstrating their utility in testing the hypothesis, by interpreting them in their historical context, i.e. not simply accepting them at their face value.

L5 BY INTERPRETING/EVALUATING SOURCES IN CONTEXT, FINDS EVIDENCE TO CHALLENGE **AND** SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS [17–21]

These answers know that testing the hypothesis involves attempting both to confirm and disconfirm the hypothesis, and are capable of using sources as evidence to do this (i.e. both confirmation and disconfirmation are done at this level).

- L6 AS L5, PLUS **EITHER** (a) EXPLAINS WHY EVIDENCE TO CHALLENGE/SUPPORT IS BETTER/PREFERRED, **OR** (b) RECONCILES/EXPLAINS PROBLEMS IN THE EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT NEITHER CHALLENGE NOR SUPPORT IS TO BE PREFERRED [22–25]
  - For (a) the argument must be, that the evidence for agreeing/disagreeing is better/preferred. This must involve a comparative judgement, i.e. not just why some evidence is better, but also why other evidence is worse.
  - For (b) include all L5 answers which use the evidence to **modify** the hypothesis (rather than simply seeking to support/contradict) in order to improve it.

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#### Please note:

Y supports the hypothesis
N against the hypothesis

**Neutral** neither supports nor opposes hypothesis

#### **CONTEXT:**

The concept of a United Nations had emerged in the Atlantic Charter (an agreement between Roosevelt and Churchill) in 1941, with the initial intention of maintaining a united front against Germany and then helping to maintain peace in the future. Stalin, with an obvious interest in defeating Germany, confirmed the Soviet Union's determination to maintain the alliance, both during the war and in the post-war world. Behind the rhetoric of such agreements, however, lay the self-interest of all three leaders and their countries. Roosevelt, fearful that the USA would go back to its pre-war isolationist policies and the damaging economic effects which this might have, was keen to ensure that the USA would continue to play a leading role in post-war world affairs. Churchill was quick to talk about freedom for all peace-loving peoples, but made it clear that this did not in any way mean that India would be released from British imperial control. Stalin saw such agreements as granting the Soviet Union an opportunity to enhance its international standing and provide it with greater security in the future. The United Nations was born out of the self-interest of the victorious powers, and it is, perhaps, not surprising that this same self-interest was to hamper its development and progress during its early years.

#### **SOURCE A:**

<u>Context:</u> Speech by Stalin to members of the Moscow Soviet in 1944. At the time, the Soviet Union was in alliance with Britain and the USA, and these nations were winning the war against Germany. The war had been devastating for the USSR in every sense, and Stalin was well aware that he needed American support in order to ensure the final defeat of Germany and to aid financial/economic recovery. Stalin's major concern was the avoidance of another such war.

<u>Content (Face Value)</u>: Stalin states that the only way in which war can be avoided in the future is by the creation of some form of world organisation with sufficient power/authority to ensure compliance by potentially aggressive states. (N – Stalin sees it as vital for the wartime alliance of the Great Powers to continue as some form of international organisation, such as the UN was to become, in order to ensure peace in the future.)

Content (Beyond Face Value): Stalin shows support for a post-war 'world organisation' as the only way of ensuring peace in the future. He believes that this organisation should have more power/authority than the League of Nations. He states that this world organisation could only be successful if the Great Powers continue to act together. By describing this as an 'essential condition', Stalin shows strong support for the concept of a United Nations as originally envisaged by Churchill and Roosevelt in the Atlantic Charter of 1941. In this speech, Stalin is addressing a group of party workers in Moscow at a time when World War II is being won but is not yet over. The people of the Soviet Union had suffered terribly as a result of the war. The people of Moscow would be pleased to know that Stalin was looking at all methods to ensure that such attacks would be avoided in the future. (N.) [X-Ref with E, which shows that Stalin was committed to the notion of a post-war international organisation]. However, it should be noted that Stalin is talking in general terms about this world organisation since his speech was made before the 1945 conference in San Francisco where details were discussed. While this source shows Stalin to be committed to the concept of a United Nations, it can tell us nothing about his commitment to the organisation itself. Indeed, there is no doubt that all of the Great Powers, not least the Soviet Union, were to ensure that their own national interests were protected before committing themselves to the United Nations. (NEUTRAL. The speech was made before the United Nations was established.)

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#### **SOURCE B:**

<u>Context:</u> Written by an American academic investigating the Soviet Union's involvement in the Nations. Written in 1964, 19 years after the inauguration of the UN, 11 years after the death of and at the height of the Cold War.

<u>Content (Face Value):</u> The USSR has claimed to be a strong supporter of the United Nations, as shown by the quote from the Soviet Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. (N – a senior Soviet official demonstrates clear support for the UN in 1947.) However, the source dismisses such claims as pure expediency, and states that, in reality, the Soviet Union has not shown commitment to the UN. (Y – the source claims that it would be impossible for the USSR to have a genuine commitment towards the UN because of the inherent ideological contradiction between communism and the principles of the UN Charter.)

Content (Beyond Face Value): The source states that the USSR's claim to be a staunch supporter of the UN is false and not supported by its actions (Y). However, the source was written by an American in 1964, at the height of the Cold War when the US feared a communist plot to gain world domination. It provides no examples or hard evidence to support its argument that the USSR has not supported the ethos of the UN. Instead, it talks in vague and emotive terms about the Soviet Union's 'communist ideology', claiming that this has prevented it from conforming to the principles of the UN Charter. It could be argued that the source too readily dismisses the statement by the Soviet Union's Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, which implies that the USSR is heavily committed to the UN. (N – the strong anti-communist bias undermines the argument being put forward in this source.) [X Ref with A, which shows Stalin committed to the notion of a post-war international organisation and E, which uses recently available evidence to suggest that Stalin was committed to the concept of the UN.]

#### **SOURCE C:**

**Context:** A more modern, post-Cold War analysis by a British academic.

<u>Content (Face Value):</u> The source argues that the Soviet Union had no interest in the aims and ethos of the United Nations, but merely exploited it to further its own ends. (Y – the USSR used the UN to enhance its own international prestige and carry out expansionist policies by diplomacy rather than war.)

Content (Beyond Face Value): The source argues that the Soviet Union had no interest in the aims and ethos of the United Nations, but used the UN as a diplomatic tool to ensure its own security while carrying out imperialistic and expansionist policies (Y). However, the source provides no hard evidence or examples to substantiate this claim. Although written by a British academic in the post-Cold War period and therefore lacking the bias present in Source B, there is still heavy criticism of the Soviet Union's leadership and 'its miserable achievements'. The allegation that the Soviet Union exploited the UN for its own ends could equally be made of the USA. (Y, but this is the unsubstantiated and unbalanced opinion of one Western academic. Or N, in the sense that Stalin was committed to the UN because it gave the USSR certain advantages.) [X-Ref with D and E, which show that Stalin was prepared to work within the UN albeit on his own terms.]

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#### **SOURCE D:**

Context: A post-Cold War analysis by a Russian academic delivered to a mainly American au

Content (Face Value): The source argues that the Soviet Union was initially not enthusiastic above the UN, fearing that the Western powers would use it to unite in opposition. (Y) However, the USSR quickly came to realise that the UN could be used to combat 'anti-Soviet' measures, while at the same time enhancing the Soviet Union's prestige as a great power. The Soviet Union ensured that as much of the UN's authority as possible was devolved to the Security Council, where the power of veto would mean that measures deemed to be anti-Soviet could not be passed (N). While supporting the UN's peacekeeping role, the Soviet Union was less committed to its other functions (e.g. economic, cultural and humanitarian), which were seen as a threat because of the absence of the right of veto (Y – USSR not fully committed to the whole range of UN activities).

Content (Beyond Face Value): The source implies that the Soviet Union was committed to the UN only in so far as it served her own interests. The Soviet Union was not enthusiastic about the UN's activities beyond peacekeeping, and made heavy use of its right of veto in the Security Council (Y). However, the self-interest argument could just as easily be applied to the other great powers, as implied by the statement that the USSR became concerned that 'the USA and the UK could force veto after veto...'. Indeed, the history of the UN shows that nations consistently put their own interests before those of the world body. The statement that the Security Council 'had evolved into an arena of confrontation and ideology' does not imply that the Soviet Union alone was responsible; rather, it implies fault on all sides (Y, but the Soviet Union's lack of genuine commitment should be seen in the context of each nation using the UN to further its own interests). [X-Ref with C and E, which show that Stalin was committed to the UN albeit on his own terms.]

#### SOURCE E:

<u>Context:</u> Modern article by a British historian with access to recently released evidence from Russian archives.

<u>Content (Face Value):</u> The source states that recently available evidence shows that Stalin was committed to the idea of the United Nations, providing that national interests could be protected (**N** – **Stalin was an enthusiastic supporter of the idea**).

Content (Beyond Face Value): The source argues that Stalin was an enthusiastic supporter of the UN because, by providing a safeguard against a revival of the German threat, it was in the Soviet Union's best interests to be so. [X-Ref with Source A.] Stalin ensured that, in the discussions regarding how the UN was to be structured, the Soviet Union's best interests were protected. This does not mean that he was not committed to the United Nations, and the leaders of the other great powers did the same in the best interests of their own nations (N).

#### CONCLUSION:

On balance, the sources would suggest that Stalin's Soviet Union was not truly committed to the ethos of the United Nations, but was prepared to take part because it was expedient to do so. The Soviet Union was not unique in this; all of the big powers put their own national interests before those of the international organisation.

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#### **SECTION B**

2 'The Cold War developed in Europe between 1945 and 1949 because the USA and USSR had different political ideologies.' How far do you agree?

In support of the hypothesis, it could be argued that the clash of political ideologies had been evident since the Russian Revolution of 1917. The necessities of WWII forced the USA and the USSR to work together to defeat a common enemy, but the power vacuum remaining in 1945 made superpower rivalry inevitable. 'Traditional' historians argue that the USSR's expansionist policies in Eastern Europe (e.g. breaking of Potsdam promises, Berlin Blockade) reflected the communist notion of world-wide revolution, something which the USA, as the defender of freedom and democracy, had to resist. Truman's anti-communist measures (Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan etc.) were part of the USA's ideological resistance to the spread of communism.

In challenging the hypothesis, it could be argued that the Cold War developed not because of differing ideologies, but because of the different national interests of the superpowers. 'Revisionist' historians argue that the USSR was not expansionist, but merely seeking security by establishing a 'buffer zone' in Eastern Europe. Truman, they argue, wanted to secure American economic interests by exploiting the European market, therefore the Marshall Plan can be seen as a form of 'dollar imperialism'. Similarly, keeping markets open to the USA could be seen as the reason why Truman dropped atomic bombs on Japan in order to prevent the USSR gaining a foothold in the East. 'Post-revisionist' historians argue that it was the failure of the two superpowers to understand each other and their respective policies (e.g. American reasons for wanting a strong Germany, Soviet reasons for wanting a weak Germany) that led to the Cold War.

3 To what extent was the Soviet Union responsible for the globalisation of the Cold War in the years from 1950 to 1975?

Arguments in support of the idea that the Soviet Union was responsible might include Stalin's overt statements regarding world communist revolution, Soviet support for the communist takeover in China and Soviet involvement in Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, Africa and the Middle East.

In challenging the view, it could be argued that the Cold War was globalised because of the USA's over-reaction to what it incorrectly perceived as a Soviet attempt to expand its influence. This supposed encouragement of world-wide communist revolution, led to containment, roll back and the domino theory. The USA's actions in Korea, Vietnam, Southeast Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East could be cited as evidence to substantiate this point.

Genuine balance could be achieved by arguing that the USA and the USSR shared equal responsibility for globalising the Cold War by becoming involved in what were essentially regional conflicts for their own strategic, diplomatic or prestige reasons.

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4 Explain who was more successful in achieving his goals in the Cuban missile 1962: Kennedy or Khrushchev.

Responses should demonstrate an understanding of why each of the leaders had beconinvolved in the crisis, thus enabling candidates to evaluate their gains/losses against their original aims and motives.

Castro – The Cuban Revolution and Castro's subsequent nationalistic policies clashed with the USA's economic interests in the island. Cuba was vulnerable to American economic and military actions. Castro's relationship with the USSR provided a solution to both problems. The key outcome for Castro was Kennedy's promise not to invade Cuba, effectively a recognition of the legality of his government.

Kennedy – In the years immediately following the crisis, Kennedy was heralded as a great leader who, through his policy of brinkmanship, forced the USSR to remove its missiles from Cuba. Recent historians have been more critical. Kennedy had given his blessing to various schemes which failed to remove Castro. Many historians now believe that such schemes helped to cause the crisis in the first place. Despite the outward show of bravado, evidence suggests that, like Khrushchev, Kennedy was willing to go to almost any lengths to extricate himself from the impasse. While the agreement to remove American missiles from Turkey was of little significance (they were scheduled to be removed anyway), Kennedy's promise to respect Cuba's independence in exchange for the removal of Soviet missiles was a significant gesture. Given that the USA's main aim was the removal of Castro's initially Nationalist and subsequently Marxist government, Kennedy actually achieved very little.

Khrushchev – Whereas Kennedy was initially lauded, Khrushchev was heavily criticised; China openly accused him of being too soft, while the Soviet Communist Party replaced him not long after the crisis. However, if Khrushchev's aim had been to protect a new and vulnerable communist state, it could be argued that he was successful (and forced the USA to abandon the Monroe Doctrine in Cuba). If his aim was to test out a new and inexperienced American president and force him to remove US missiles from bases close to the USSR, he was successful (albeit this part of the final agreement was kept secret). However, if his aim had been to place nuclear weapons in Cuba and maintain them there, he failed.

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#### 5 How important was the USA in the collapse of the USSR by 1991?

In showing the importance of the USA, it could be argued that the US built up enormous fine pressure on the Soviet Union throughout the arms race. The Soviet economy could not cope where ever-increasing commitment, especially when Reagan instituted his 'star wars' programme. US aid to Soviet enemies in Afghanistan added to the USSR's economic burdens. Improving American relations with China also impacted on the USSR, while Eastern European states of the Soviet Union became increasingly aware of the very different economic circumstances prevalent in the West.

However, in order to maintain balance, it could be argued that there were other reasons for the problems facing the USSR's economy. Nationalism (both in Eastern Europe and within the SU itself) was another key factor behind the collapse of the USSR by 1991. Political stagnation occurred under a number of Soviet leaders and, by the time Gorbachev came to power, the USSR was in a parlous state. Gorbachev's reforms of glasnost and perestroika were unable to redress the problems, and, arguably, made them worse. His decision to rescind the Brezhnev Doctrine added to the impact of nationalism.

### 6 'Attempts to control the nuclear arms race between the superpowers in the period from 1949 to 1980 were largely successful'. How far do you agree?

In support of the hypothesis, it could be argued that attempts to control the development of nuclear weapons did have some success during periods of détente. Test Ban treaties made it harder to develop and test weapons, and had the added effect of making it more difficult for non-nuclear states to develop nuclear capability. The SALT Treaties imposed limits on certain types of nuclear weapons and could be seen as a precursor to subsequent, more effective treaties (e.g. START).

In challenging the hypothesis, it could be argued that, despite various meetings and treaties, there was a constant build-up of nuclear arms by both the USA and the USSR, while other countries (e.g. UK, France, China) also gained nuclear capability. The USSR's development of the atomic bomb in 1949 led the USA to vastly increase its own expenditure on arms (massive retaliation). By 1953, both of the superpowers had developed hydrogen bombs. Even the move to Mutually Assured Destruction after 1962 failed to impose an effective restriction on the development of nuclear arms; hence the development of ICBM, SLBM, ABM and MIRV. The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 was limited in its scope and almost impossible to monitor effectively. The SALT Treaties were limited in scope and SALT II was never ratified due to the Soviet Union's involvement in Afghanistan.

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## 7 How far do you support the view that American dominance of the international had ended by the 1980s?

In support of the hypothesis it could be argued that the USA had clearly been the dominate economy between 1945-1970, as evidenced by Marshall Aid, assistance to Japan, the importance of the dollar and the key role played by the USA in GATT, the World Bank and the IMF. However, the American economy was adversely affected by a number of factors during the 1970s and 1980s e.g. high costs of defence and the Vietnam War, budget deficits from the late 1960s, falling value of the dollar and the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, effects of the oil crises, the recovery of West Germany and Japan, the development of the EEC and the rise of the Asian Tigers.

In challenging the hypothesis, it could be argued that the whole international economy suffered from recession in the 1970s and 1980s, but that this was largely a temporary phenomenon in a position of otherwise general growth. By 1991, with the US economy entering its tertiary stage, it was still in a dominant position, though not as dominant as in the period 1945–70.

### 4 'An attempt to challenge the dominance of the USA and the USSR.' How adequate is this as an explanation of the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement?

It could be argued that the NAM was established by developing countries that chose not to join either of the Cold War blocs. At the Bandung Conference of 1955, a significant milestone in the development of the NAM, the attending nations declared their desire not to become involved in the Cold War, and adopted a declaration fostering the promotion of world peace and cooperation following UN principles. NAM was later to describe itself as 'history's biggest peace movement'.

However, the aims of the Conference were far wider than this – to promote Afro-Asian economic and cultural cooperation, and to oppose colonialism and neo-colonialism. A 10-pont 'declaration on the promotion of world peace and cooperation', incorporating UN principles, was adopted unanimously. It was also agreed that developing countries should provide technical assistance to each other in order to reduce dependency on the leading industrial nations. Human rights arguments drew attention to racialism and cultural suppression. It was agreed that nations would work together in cooperation to overcome such colonial legacies. On its formal establishment at Belgrade in 1961, NAM's stated aims were considerably wider than basic Cold War issues – e.g. respect for fundamental human rights, respect for the sovereignty of independent states, racial equality, mutual cooperation, anti-colonialism etc. It could be argued that NAM was more of a mutual-support organisation and pressure group for developing countries (e.g. its opposition to all forms of colonialism and racism, such as apartheid). Indeed, many members of NAM maintained close links with one or other of the superpower 'blocs', undermining the notion that the organisation was merely about the Cold War.