



HISTORY (PRINCIPAL)

9769/71

Paper 5j Special Subject: China under Mao Zedong, 1949–1976

May/June 2016

2 hours

Additional Materials: Answer Booklet/Paper



READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

If you have been given an Answer Booklet, follow the instructions on the front cover of the Booklet.

Write your Centre number, candidate number and name on all the work you hand in.

Write in dark blue or black pen.

Do not use staples, paper clips, glue or correction fluid.

DO NOT WRITE IN ANY BARCODES.

Answer Question 1 in Section A.

Answer **one** question from Section B.

You are reminded of the need for analysis and critical evaluation in your answers to questions. You should also show, where appropriate, an awareness of links and comparisons between different countries and different periods.

At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together.

The number of marks is given in brackets [] at the end of each question or part question.

The syllabus is approved for use in England, Wales and Northern Ireland as a Cambridge International Level 3 Pre-U Certificate.

This document consists of **5** printed pages and **3** blank pages.

Section A**Nominated topic: The Communist takeover of 1949**

- 1 Study all the following documents and answer the questions which follow. In evaluating and commenting on the documents, it is essential to set them alongside, and make use of, your own contextual knowledge.

A *Mao Zedong explains his view of the importance of military power.*

Every Communist must grasp the truth, 'Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun'. Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party. Yet, having guns, we can create Party organisations, such as the powerful Party organisations which the Eighth Route Army has created in northern China. We can also create cadres, create schools, create culture, create mass movements. Everything in Yen-an has been created by having guns. All things grow out of the barrel of a gun. Yes, we are advocates of the overwhelming importance of revolutionary war; that is good, not bad, it is Marxist. It is only by the power of the gun that the working class and the labouring masses can defeat the armed bourgeoisie and landlords.

Mao Zedong, speech: *Problems of War and Strategy*, November 1938.

B A Communist poster shows links between the Red Army and the people.



Poster, 1944.

C *The US Secretary of State reflects on the success of the Chinese Communists.*

The reasons for the failures of the Chinese National Government ... do not stem from any inadequacy of American aid. Our military observers on the spot have reported that the Nationalist armies did not lose a single battle during the crucial year of 1948 through lack of arms or ammunition. The fact was that the decay which our observers had detected in Chungking, the Nationalist capital, early in the war had fatally sapped the powers of resistance of the Kuomintang. Its leaders had proved incapable of meeting the crisis confronting them, its troops had lost the will to fight, and its Government had lost popular support. The Communists, on the other hand, through ruthless discipline and fanatical zeal, attempted to sell themselves as guardians and liberators of the people. The Nationalist armies did not have to be defeated; they disintegrated. History has proved again and again that a regime without faith in itself and an army without morale cannot survive the test of battle.

Dean Acheson, statement, 5 August 1949.

D *A US diplomat who was stationed in China 1947–1948 recalls the situation by 1949.*

Everybody in the embassy had turned against Chiang; everybody had turned against the Nationalists. This would later be exploited by anti-Communists in the USA who said that the Embassy was all pro-Communist. That simply wasn't so. It was simply the contrast between the visible corruption of the Nationalists which was beyond description, and – what the few of those who had been up to Yen-an and had either seen it or had heard of it – of the incorruptibility of the Communists. These were seen as men who believed in something, or were dedicated to an ideal, and still not having gotten power, they were seen as a very attractive group. Nobody really ever believed 'Oh, they're just agrarian reformers; they're not real Communists'. Everybody in the Embassy knew they were Communist; they said so. Chou En-lai used to get very annoyed with people who said 'Oh, they're just agrarian reformers'. He said, 'We're nothing of the kind; we're Marxists; we believe it; we behave that way'.

J F Melby speaking in an interview, 1970.

E *A modern historian considers mass support for the Chinese Revolution.*

In the wake of spreading warfare from 1947 and the developing agrarian revolution from below, the Party was forced further left in its handling of land reform. In 1947, it drew up a new land reform law. Mao reaffirmed the necessity for land reform as the most fundamental requirement for winning country-wide victory. The law declared a sweeping abolition of the agrarian system of feudal exploitation. Village peasant associations were to manage the takeover of land and see its 'equal distribution among the entire rural population'. Though the Party sought to moderate land reform, peasant land seizures moved with a momentum of their own. Limits were only temporary and were imposed primarily to avoid disrupting military strategy. By 1948, about 100 million of the 168 million people in areas liberated by the Communists had received land. Communist military successes, of course, overshadowed the land reform. However, these successes were based on the mass movements and especially on the mobilisation of the peasantry through land reform which made the Chinese Revolution possible.

James Pinckney Harrison, *The Long March to Power: A History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921–72*, 1972.

- (a) How far does Document D corroborate Document C's view of the Chinese Communists? [10]
- (b) How convincing is the evidence provided by this set of documents for the view that purely military factors were the key to Communist success in 1949? In making your evaluation, you should refer to contextual knowledge as well as to all the documents in this set (A–E). [20]

Section B

Answer **one** of the following questions. Where appropriate, your essay should make use of any relevant documents you have studied as well as contextual knowledge.

- 2 'Too tainted by violence and oppression to be beneficial to China.' Discuss this view of Communist policies between 1949 and 1956. [30]
- 3 'Dictated more by ideology than by China's real economic needs.' Discuss this view of the Great Leap Forward. [30]
- 4 Why were border issues so important in Chinese foreign relations in the period 1949–1976? [30]

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