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**PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY**

**9774/02**

Paper 2 Topics and Key Texts in Philosophy and Theology 1

**May/June 2018**

MARK SCHEME

Maximum Mark: 50

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**Published**

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**Generic Marking Principles**

These general marking principles must be applied by all examiners when marking candidate answers. They should be applied alongside the specific content of the mark scheme or generic level descriptors for a question. Each question paper and mark scheme will also comply with these marking principles.

**GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 1:**

Marks must be awarded in line with:

- the specific content of the mark scheme or the generic level descriptors for the question
- the specific skills defined in the mark scheme or in the generic level descriptors for the question
- the standard of response required by a candidate as exemplified by the standardisation scripts.

**GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 2:**

Marks awarded are always **whole marks** (not half marks, or other fractions).

**GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 3:**

Marks must be awarded **positively**:

- marks are awarded for correct/valid answers, as defined in the mark scheme. However, credit is given for valid answers which go beyond the scope of the syllabus and mark scheme, referring to your Team Leader as appropriate
- marks are awarded when candidates clearly demonstrate what they know and can do
- marks are not deducted for errors
- marks are not deducted for omissions
- answers should only be judged on the quality of spelling, punctuation and grammar when these features are specifically assessed by the question as indicated by the mark scheme. The meaning, however, should be unambiguous.

**GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 4:**

Rules must be applied consistently e.g. in situations where candidates have not followed instructions or in the application of generic level descriptors.

**GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 5:**

Marks should be awarded using the full range of marks defined in the mark scheme for the question (however; the use of the full mark range may be limited according to the quality of the candidate responses seen).

**GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 6:**

Marks awarded are based solely on the requirements as defined in the mark scheme. Marks should not be awarded with grade thresholds or grade descriptors in mind.

Question	Answer	Marks
<b>Topic 1 Epistemology</b>		
<b>Section A</b>		
[Extract from <b>Bertrand Russell</b> : <i>The Problems of Philosophy</i> : 13]		
1(a)	<p><b>Explain the questions raised by Russell in his analysis of the nature of the real table.</b></p> <p>Russell begins with scientific descriptions, e.g. the view that all natural phenomena ought to be reduced to motions. Russell begins by considering the scientific analysis of light. Light, which seeing people experience and blind people do not, is not supposed by science to form any part of the world that is independent of us and our senses; and similar remarks hold true for our other sensations. The shape of a coin as judged by science is intrinsic, but its apparent space is private to the percipient – the coin will appear oval unless seen face-on. The space of science, although connected with the spaces we feel and see, is not identical with them, so the matter requires further investigation. Russell coined the term ‘sense-data’ to refer to the particular things we perceive during the act of sensation, sense-data being the mental images we receive from presumably real objects in the physical world. Russell’s example of the table shows that the same object can produce variable sense-data, although the exact relation between data and objects is not clear. Whereas scepticism would argue that sense-data tell us nothing about reality, Russell preferred the common sense view that even though sense-data give us varied kinds of perceptions from a single object such as a table, it is still true that different observers will agree that they are looking at the same table. Russell raised the question of whether there is any other method of discovering the intrinsic nature of physical objects, given that it cannot be discovered by means of the senses: in particular, whether what appears as matter is really something mental. This led also to distinguishing between ‘knowledge by acquaintance’ and ‘knowledge by description’.</p>	<b>10</b>

Question	Answer	Marks
1(b)	<p><b>Evaluate Russell’s underlying assumption that the physical world really does exist.</b></p> <p>This assumption is evident on reading <i>The Problems of Philosophy</i>, and fits with Russell’s position within the British empirical tradition. Candidates might look at his overall rejection of idealism and at his general view that the data gained from personal, immediate experience (‘knowledge by acquaintance’) is the starting point of all human knowledge. Some form of realist account of perception underpins most scientific approaches to the world, and the continued existence of material objects underpins the operation of science itself. As a critique of Russell’s assumption that the physical world exists, candidates might look at the problems associated with the concept of sense-data. Some might prefer an idealist account of material objects.</p> <p>Some philosophers question whether sense-data are the most primitive, direct element of experience. They argue that it requires too much conscious effort to be aware of the sense-data; therefore there must be something more basic that is experienced. Further problems might include: arguing from personal experience and sensation (private) to the external world (public); also, the problem of inference: is it valid to infer the existence of the physical world from sense-data?</p>	<b>15</b>

Question	Answer	Marks
<b>Section B</b>		
2	<p><b>‘There are no secure foundations for knowledge.’ Critically assess this claim.</b></p> <p>This could be taken to refer directly to foundationalism, or to any combination of epistemological theories. Foundationalist theories stem from a rejection of the infinite regress argument. For there to be any justified knowledge at all, some beliefs must be justified noninferentially. Foundationalists usually assert that foundational beliefs are infallible, although they differ as to what the infallible foundation comprises, which is likely to be the basis of any rejection of foundationalism. Descartes held that the foundation was built on belief (the <i>cogito</i>); others, more commonly, prefer the idea of justification by immediate experience (e.g. that ‘I see a red patch’). If I say that I seem to see a patch of red, it is difficult to see how I can be mistaken – I can be wrong if I think that what I see is a strawberry, but I cannot be wrong in my belief that this is what my own sense-data seem to show me.</p> <p>It is commonly held, however, that infallibilism is mistaken: Descartes’ is a psychological criterion, and any one mind can be mistaken. Moreover, even if Descartes is right, what else can I really know on the foundational basis that ‘I am thinking’? What I seem to see gives me no infallible foundation either, since although I do seem to see ‘x’, the possibility is unavoidable that ‘x’ might in fact be ‘y’, so I am wrong anyway. Some therefore prefer to have a fallibilist view of foundationalism, holding that fallible beliefs still give us good grounds for our beliefs; but that doesn’t get very far, since the fallible beliefs in question simply amount to that which is given to sense experience – e.g. sense-data; but I can be mistaken about sense-data. I can only claim that sense-data are foundational through evidence and probability, but evidence and probability are inferred by experience, so they can’t be foundational, because the foundation has to be noninferential. As a result, many philosophers prefer a coherentist or reliabilist approach to epistemology, but they have their own problems.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
<b>OR</b>		
3	<p data-bbox="304 315 1139 349"><b>Critically assess phenomenalism as a theory of perception.</b></p> <p data-bbox="304 383 1318 748">Phenomenalist theories hold that physical objects do not exist in themselves: we can experience nothing beyond the phenomena of our own perceptions. J S Mill, for example, spoke of objects as <i>permanent possibilities of experience</i>. Mill held that such permanent possibilities are sufficient for an object's existence. The regularity of experience in the world of possible sensations exists in other beings as well as in the individual, so there really is an external world. Mill's account can be criticised (for example) on the grounds that it does not explain why such permanent possibilities offer themselves – they just do, which seems rather inadequate by comparison with realist explanations that material objects exist, and are the cause of our sense experience.</p> <p data-bbox="304 786 1326 1223">Russell and Ayer give a different account, known as 'linguistic phenomenalism', which analyses what we really mean when we talk about physical objects. An empirical statement reduces to a set of statements referring exclusively to sense-data: e.g. sentences about 'tables' are to be translated into sentences which refer exclusively to actual or possible sensory experiences. This account relies on an undeniably complex set of 'subjunctive conditionals'/'counterfactual' descriptions about the sense-data of what would be observed. The variety of potential counterfactual descriptions of what we <i>might</i> perceive would seem to be infinite. For example (Dancy), how would I describe the subjunctive conditionals corresponding to the statement, 'there is a red rose in the dark'? Another major issue is that the mere description of counterfactuals seems to require the existence of an enduring and material observer, which goes against the phenomenalist reductionist agenda.</p> <p data-bbox="304 1256 1305 1487">Candidates might argue in defence of phenomenalism that it is a laudable attempt to explain the problem of the continued existence of material objects when they are not observed. If it is objected that its account is incomplete or unsatisfactory, then phenomenologists can argue that no other account of perception is complete or satisfactory. By contrast, the realist can claim that objects seem to persist and behave with regularity simply because the material world really does exist.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
<b>Topic 2 Philosophical and Theological Language</b>		
<b>Section A</b>		
[Extract from <b>A.J. Ayer: <i>Language, Truth and Logic</i>: 36]</b>		
4(a)	<p><b>Explain the distinction that Ayer makes between practical verifiability and verifiability in principle, and between strong and weak verification.</b></p> <p>Verifiability in Principle is Ayer’s modification of the requirement for practical verifiability, required by the fact that there are a number of significant propositions that are meaningful yet can be verified only in principle. Ayer gives the example of the claim that ‘there are mountains on the farther side of the moon’, which in Ayer’s day was not verifiable in practice through actual observation, but which would be verifiable in principle by improving existing rocket technology in order to observe the far side of the moon. Strong verifiability occurs when the truth of a proposition can be established conclusively in experience. In the weak sense, verification occurs if it is possible for experience to render it probable. As with the difference between practical verifiability and verifiability in principle, Ayer draws the ‘strong/weak’ distinction because strong verification requires too much in the face of the impossibility of absolute confirmation for empirical propositions. Some positivists indeed took the step of maintaining that propositions of this class that we call ‘propositions of law’ (such as ‘arsenic is poisonous’ and ‘all men are mortal’) are indeed nonsense, but are ‘special’ nonsense, which, as Ayer points out, is implausible. The distinctions drawn by Ayer maintain, he asserts, the essential thrust of the requirement for verifiability.</p>	<b>10</b>
4(b)	<p><b>Critically examine the extent to which religious language can be said to be true.</b></p> <p>Candidates may or may not take this to refer to the dispute between Ayer specifically and philosophers of religion in general. A more general discussion of truth claims about religious language would be valid. Ayer rejects the metaphysical thesis that philosophy affords us knowledge of a transcendent reality, primarily because metaphysicians ignore the rules governing the significant use of language. Following Ayer’s criteria for verification, it follows (he claims) that for a statement of fact to be genuine, there must be some possible observations that are relevant to the determination of its truth or falsehood. Metaphysics and religion are full of assertions that have no empirical justification of this kind, e.g. F H Bradley’s remark that ‘the Absolute enters into, but is itself incapable of, evolution and progress’. Such statements are not even verifiable weakly, and so are meaningless. Candidates might focus on Ayer’s rejection of metaphysics in ch.1, or extend the discussion to his general attack on the meaningfulness of religious statements. The attack from verificationism is generally refuted by claiming that religious statements are verifiable weakly; that they are verifiable in the normal cognitive sense; that they are meaningful non-cognitively, for example. Candidates are at liberty to explore any relevant lines of analysis.</p>	<b>15</b>

Question	Answer	Marks
<b>Section B</b>		
5	<p><b>Examine the implications of meta-ethics for normative ethics.</b></p> <p>Meta-ethics purports generally to investigate the meaning of ethical language – the meaning of ‘good, bad, right, wrong’ etc. Normative ethics asks the practical questions about how we should live. Meta-ethics thus informs the normative debate by considering for example whether ethical language is cognitive or non-cognitive. Cognitivists claim that ethical language is meaningful factually, either through a natural system or a non-natural one such as that of G E Moore. Non-cognitivists argue that ethical language is meaningful emotively or prescriptively, for example. Neo-naturalists endeavour to fill in the is/ought (or fact/value) gap by some criterion of application, for example, that ‘that which is good is that which improves the human condition’, although this may not get over the problems of precisely what improves the human condition and of whether or not we are naturally concerned to improve it. Normative theories apply meta-ethical ideas accordingly, so for example, emotivists and prescriptivists take the non-cognitive line, and utilitarians advocate a naturalist ethic, although it is difficult to see whether meta-ethics informs the normative debate or simply follows inbuilt prejudices about what is good.</p>	<b>25</b>



Question	Answer	Marks
<b>OR</b>		
6	<p><b>‘The beliefs that God is transcendent, immanent and perfect, are coherent.’ Evaluate this claim.</b></p> <p>Answers to this question might take many different routes, since the underlying question, if candidates choose to address it, asks whether or not language about God is coherent in any way. The belief that God is transcendent asserts that God is above/beyond the space-time universe. This would seem to be a coherent claim, since the obvious alternative would be to argue that God is immanent within space time, which begs the question of how such a being could have created the universe. Christian theology can ‘solve’ this by claiming that God’s nature can have both a transcendent aspect, as the spaceless, bodiless, timeless Creator; together with an immanent aspect, through which God might answer prayer, interact with humanity through religious experiences, and incarnate through the ‘person’ of Jesus. God’s perfection can be understood in the sense of perfect existence, perfect love, perfect morality, and so on; and the God who possesses all the ‘perfections’ underpins Descartes’ Ontological Argument, since God must possess the attribute of perfect existence, so cannot not-exist.</p> <p>Some might object that even if these ideas are coherent, we have no reason to suppose that they are true. For example, God’s alleged perfection clashes with human perceptions of the nature of evil and with alternative naturalist explanations of morality. The notion that God is the transcendent Creator clashes with scientific perceptions that a Creator is not needed, since (for example) that belief relies on an inappropriate understanding of the nature and existence of time. To see God as immanent gives rise to a number of dubious beliefs, for example, that God performs miracles by breaking the laws of nature. Credit any relevant lines of argument, although the focus should be on the ‘coherence’ of the beliefs referred to in the question.</p>	<b>25</b>

Question	Answer	Marks
<b>Topic 3 Philosophy of Religion</b>		
<b>Section A</b>		
[Extract from <b>John Polkinghorne</b> : <i>Science and Creation: The Search for Understanding</i> : 51]		
7(a)	<p><b>With reference to the passage above, explain Polkinghorne’s understanding of the character of God.</b></p> <p>Polkinghorne argues that God’s omnipotence entails the ability to do what he wills, but he can only will what is in accordance with his character, so he cannot, for example, will illogically that <math>2 + 2 = 5</math>. The laws of nature are a demonstration/reflection of God’s love for the world, in so far as he grants the world generous independence. God’s love is not exclusively ‘man-centred’, since the universe is a big place, and we presumably are one of a limitless number of species in it. God created the universe for one simple reason – love. When talking of the relationship between God and the world/the universe, panentheism is often cited as a useful model of how the universe is contained within God yet is separate from him, yet this does not give adequate expression of the difference between God and the world. God is not the kind of demi-urge figure seen in the writings of Brian Davies. Nor is the universe the kind of entity supposed by Alan Guth’s talk about it being a ‘free lunch’. The universe was created from nothing, and is wondrous on all levels, from the quantum world upwards. God is manifested in the world through the ‘cosmic Christ’. This is all ‘rational prattle’, but (presumably) useful rational prattle. There are many issues that candidates might pick out from this passage, either singly, or collectively, e.g. whether or not the character of God is adequately or reasonably explained by process theology/whether or not we can find a place for the temporal and contingent within God.</p>	<b>10</b>

Question	Answer	Marks
7(b)	<p><b>Evaluate Polkinghorne’s view of the relationship between Creation and Creator.</b></p> <p>Polkinghorne’s view of the relationship between Creation and Creator appeals to Christian scriptures, so presupposes a level of belief as opposed to simple reason. Reason might be founded, instead, on an appeal to probability arguments of the kind produced by Swinburne, which can function without the presumption of belief. Polkinghorne’s talk about the ‘involved God’ depends on his interpretation of biblical texts such as the prologue in John’s Gospel, which in turn is a highly polished piece of theological writing for which there is no empirical evidence whatever. Equally, God’s characteristics being centred around love is another scriptural interpretation which is hardly borne out by the character of the wrathful God of the Old Testament, or by the sheer extent of evil in this world.</p> <p>Polkinghorne makes a number of sweeping statements and claims which are little more than unsupported assertions, for example: that there is no world of Platonic ‘forms’; that there is no necessary order within which God must operate; that there is no ‘brute matter’ which can resist God’s will; and that the nature of law and matter is contingent on God’s will alone. These suggestions <i>might</i> be true, and Polkinghorne’s acceptance of them is not <i>unreasonable</i>, but they are based on reason as it exists within the structure of Christian belief, which may be entirely false. Candidates’ answers are thus likely to depend upon their definition of the relationship between faith and reason.</p>	15

Question	Answer	Marks
<b>Section B</b>		
8	<p><b>‘The moral argument proves the existence of God; the cosmological argument does not.’ Assess this claim.</b></p> <p>The claim that the moral argument proves the existence of God might be based on Kant’s version of the moral argument, although candidates might defend it using any version of that argument. A simple version might be that:  P1 If God does not exist, then objective moral values do not exist.  P2 Objective moral values exist.  C Therefore God exists.  This syllogism can be rejected by rejecting either P1 or P2, so examinations of the argument might revolve around the objectivity of moral values.</p> <p>The cosmological argument similarly might be discussed with reference to specific formulations, such as those of Aquinas or Swinburne, or else through generalised arguments which see a creative mind as the most likely explanation of what we see: it might be argued that the existence of a creative Mind has a certain inductive probability in explaining why anything bothers to exist in the first place.</p> <p>There are several possible permutations that might be given in order to answer the question, for example: that both amount to proofs; that one amounts to a proof; that neither amounts to a proof; that both arguments are inductive, so form a limited kind of proof at best; and so on. Judge simply by quality of argument.</p>	<b>25</b>

Question	Answer	Marks
<b>OR</b>		
9	<p><b>Critically examine the argument that religious experiences are real experiences of God.</b></p> <p>Candidates are likely to answer this question using a variety of different approaches. Some are likely to begin with some form of classification of religious experiences, including, for example, the notion that these can be categorized as cognitive and non-cognitive, the latter incorporating mystical experiences of the kind reported by most religions. There is a presumption that mystical experiences are genuine experiences of God on the basis, for example, of a supposed common phenomenological core, as in William James' writings; nevertheless other classifications do not agree with James' identification of the supposed core elements. Candidates might discuss the effects of drug experiences, experiments in neuro-science and the like, from the point of view that there are several explanations for religious experiences which derive them from brain function (both normal and abnormal) rather than from God. Taylor's argument that we should trust the testimony of the experts in religious experiences (e.g. those who have had one) is generally discounted on the grounds that some religious experiences induce their recipients to do some very irreligious things. Some might discuss the question of whether the finite can experience the infinite.</p>	<b>25</b>

Question	Answer	Marks
<b>Topic 4 New Testament: The Four Gospels</b>		
<b>Section A</b>		
[Extract from NRSV <b>Mark 13:1–8</b> ]		
10(a)	<p><b>With reference to the passage above, examine Jesus’ apocalyptic teaching.</b></p> <p>Candidates are expected to draw directly from the passage and work towards a clear definition of what apocalyptic is. Predictions concerning the events which will sign-post the end of time include: the destruction of the Temple; appearance of false messiahs; wars; rumours of wars; earthquakes; famines. Higher level responses may enter the debate about ‘now, but not yet’ in relation to the Kingdom and draw evidence from beyond the text. Some may extend their responses to include commentary on the fading influence of this kind of teaching in the early church and the emergence of realised eschatology in John. Some might refer to the view held by scholars such as Dunn, that Jesus transformed apocalyptic expectations by claiming that in him they had become expectations in process of fulfilment.</p>	<b>10</b>
10(b)	<p><b>‘Jesus did not make predictions about the future but taught people how to live their lives now.’ Critically examine this claim.</b></p> <p>Candidates have numerous ways of approaching this question. The future prediction which does have good support in the tradition is the foretelling of Jesus’ own death and resurrection. Some may note the role of teacher/prophet in Israel is one who reads the signs of the times, and not typically one who has a crystal ball: the fall of Jerusalem may be referred to. The problems faced by the early church of unrealised eschatological hopes may be referred to. Commentary on Jesus’ teachings about ‘how to live’ is a valid response. Some might refer to the approach by scholars such as Bultmann, who interpret history in individualistic terms and eschatological language in terms of individual existence and the crises of decision. Bultmann eliminates the Parousia as a future, decisive event at the end of history. Essays do not have to be balanced to be open to the full range of marks.</p>	<b>15</b>

Question	Answer	Marks
<b>Section B</b>		
11	<p><b>Examine Jesus' parables with reference to</b></p> <p><b>i) purpose</b></p> <p><b>ii) meaning.</b></p> <p>Candidates will select from a range of parables, and some may make comparison between parables and Johannine discourses. It is anticipated that 'purpose' will include reflections on the coming of the Kingdom, the nature of the Kingdom and Jesus' own identity in relation to the Kingdom. Some candidates may focus on the 'moral' edge of some of the parables but without reflection on the Kingdom; such responses will have self-imposed limitations.</p> <p>The meaning of the parables is complex and a higher-level response will show awareness of the layers of tradition exposed by biblical critics. Candidates are likely to spend some time analysing the text of Mark 4:11–12, where Jesus tells his disciples and other listeners that they have been given the secret of God's Kingdom, whereas for those 'outside', everything comes in parables, in order that they may look but not perceive, and listen but not understand, so that they will not turn again and be forgiven. This is difficult to understand. It appears to be contrasting the insights given to Jesus' followers by comparison with others who remain in ignorance. Since Jülicher's discussion, many have argued that the text of verses 11–12 is not authentic, but relates to later Christian belief that had been influenced by Paul's teaching on the hardening and rejection of Israel. The saying is based on Isaiah 6: 9ff, which describes what would be the <i>result</i> of Isaiah's ministry. Mark might mean that for those who are not Jesus' disciples, the purpose of the parables is to conceal the truth from them so that they cannot repent and reach the Kingdom. An analysis of Mark 4:11–12 is not required by the question, and some might legitimately restrict their answers to the meaning and purpose of specific parables.</p>	<b>25</b>

Question	Answer	Marks
<b>OR</b>		
12	<p><b>Examine why there is more than one Gospel.</b></p> <p>Candidates will need to be clear about what a Gospel is and may make the distinction between the Gospels and the gospel. Any reflections on the different contributions of the four evangelists if used in the service of the question are acceptable. Some, for example, may comment on differences in the information given in the texts, e.g. the lack of a birth narrative or resurrection narrative in Mark, whilst others may focus on the different theological faces of the four evangelists. Expect a wide range of responses with candidates at the higher end using the tools of biblical criticism and demonstrating sound knowledge of the texts.</p>	<b>25</b>