



Cambridge Pre-U

PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

9774/01

Paper 1 Introduction to Philosophy and Theology

May/June 2022

MARK SCHEME

Maximum Mark: 75

Published

This mark scheme is published as an aid to teachers and candidates, to indicate the requirements of the examination. It shows the basis on which Examiners were instructed to award marks. It does not indicate the details of the discussions that took place at an Examiners' meeting before marking began, which would have considered the acceptability of alternative answers.

Mark schemes should be read in conjunction with the question paper and the Principal Examiner Report for Teachers.

Cambridge International will not enter into discussions about these mark schemes.

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This syllabus is regulated for use in England, Wales and Northern Ireland as a Cambridge International Level 3 Pre-U Certificate.

This document consists of **10** printed pages.

Generic Marking Principles

These general marking principles must be applied by all examiners when marking candidate answers. They should be applied alongside the specific content of the mark scheme or generic level descriptors for a question. Each question paper and mark scheme will also comply with these marking principles.

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 1:

Marks must be awarded in line with:

- the specific content of the mark scheme or the generic level descriptors for the question
- the specific skills defined in the mark scheme or in the generic level descriptors for the question
- the standard of response required by a candidate as exemplified by the standardisation scripts.

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 2:

Marks awarded are always **whole marks** (not half marks, or other fractions).

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 3:

Marks must be awarded **positively**:

- marks are awarded for correct/valid answers, as defined in the mark scheme. However, credit is given for valid answers which go beyond the scope of the syllabus and mark scheme, referring to your Team Leader as appropriate
- marks are awarded when candidates clearly demonstrate what they know and can do
- marks are not deducted for errors
- marks are not deducted for omissions
- answers should only be judged on the quality of spelling, punctuation and grammar when these features are specifically assessed by the question as indicated by the mark scheme. The meaning, however, should be unambiguous.

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 4:

Rules must be applied consistently, e.g. in situations where candidates have not followed instructions or in the application of generic level descriptors.

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 5:

Marks should be awarded using the full range of marks defined in the mark scheme for the question (however; the use of the full mark range may be limited according to the quality of the candidate responses seen).

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 6:

Marks awarded are based solely on the requirements as defined in the mark scheme. Marks should not be awarded with grade thresholds or grade descriptors in mind.

Assessment objectives (AOs)

AO1	Demonstrate knowledge and understanding; identify, select and apply ideas and concepts through the use of examples and evidence.	40%
AO2	Provide a systematic critical analysis of the texts and theories, sustain a line of argument and justify a point of view. Different views should be referred to and evaluated where appropriate. Demonstrate a synoptic approach to the areas studied.	60%

AO1 and AO2 are both to be considered in assessing each essay.

The **Generic Marking Scheme** should be used to decide the mark. The essay should first be placed within a level which best describes its qualities, and then at a specific point within that level to determine a mark out of 25.

The **Question-Specific Notes** provide guidance for Examiners as to the area covered by the question. These question-specific notes are not exhaustive. Candidates may answer the question from a variety of angles with different emphases and using different supporting evidence and knowledge for which they receive credit according to the Generic Marking Scheme levels. However, candidates must clearly answer the question as set and not their own question. Examiners are reminded that the insights of specific religious traditions are, of course, relevant, and it is likely that candidates will draw on the views of Jewish, Christian or Islamic theologians, as well as those of philosophers who have written about the concept of God from a purely philosophical standpoint. There is nothing to prevent candidates referring to other religious traditions and these must, of course, be credited appropriately in examination responses.

Generic Marking Scheme

Level 5 21–25 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Broad knowledge and understanding of a wide range of philosophical/religious issues. • Insightful selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Excellent critical engagement and detailed evaluation of the wider implications of the question. • Complete or near complete accuracy at this level. • Argument is coherent, structured, developed and convincingly sustained. • Employs a wide range of differing points of view and supporting evidence. • Good evidence of wide reading on the topic beyond the set texts. • Shows good understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Confident and precise use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
Level 4 16–20 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knowledge is accurate and a good range of philosophical/religious issues are considered. • Systematic/good selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Good critical engagement and evaluation of the implications of the question. • Response is accurate: the question is answered specifically. • Argument has structure and development and is sustained. • Good use of differing points of view and supporting evidence. • Some evidence of reading on the topic beyond the set texts. • Shows competent understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Accurate use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
Level 3 12–15 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knowledge is generally accurate and a fair range of issues are considered. • Reasonable selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Some critical engagement and evaluation of the question. • Response is largely relevant to the question asked. • Argument has some structure and shows some development, but may not be sustained. • Considers more than one point of view and uses evidence to support argument. • May show some understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Reasonable attempt to use philosophical and theological vocabulary accurately.
Level 2 8–11 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some accuracy of knowledge. More than one issue is touched upon. • Attempts to select and apply ideas with partial success. • Attempts to evaluate though with partial success. • Response is partially relevant to the question asked but may be one-sided. • Some attempt at argument but without development and coherence. • Some attempt to use supporting evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is occasionally used correctly.
Level 1 1–7 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some key points made. Possibly repetitive or short. • Explores some isolated ideas related to the general topic. • Argument is limited or confused. • Response is limited or tenuously linked to the question. • Limited attempt to use evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is inaccurate or absent.
Level 0 0 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No relevant material to credit.

Question	Answer	Marks
1	<p>‘Plato’s understanding of the Good is unconvincing.’ How far do you agree?</p> <p>This question can be approached from many different angles. For a Platonist, truth about the world is approached only by reason, and reason answers the basic question, ‘What is the world really like?’ According to Plato, the physical universe is balanced by a metaphysical realm. The physical world is characterised by particular material objects that have extension in space and are subject to the processes of change and decay. The metaphysical universe is characterised by non-physical forms. Forms are universals by which particular things in the physical world can be identified. For example, individual sheep are sheep by virtue of participating in the ideal/universal form of a sheep. This logic extends to abstract entities, so there must be perfect forms of beauty, truth, justice, love, and above all, the Good. The Form of the Good is the over-arching form.</p> <p>Together with his concept of soul, Plato’s concept of the Good underpins his theology. The world is directed towards good by a being/demiurge who crafted the universe with a pattern of structure, cause and matter. The end-purpose of the universe is good, because its structure reflects the Form of the Good, the ultimate form of being. Some will illustrate this through Plato’s analogy of the sun. The sun illuminates the physical realm so that we see and understand our surroundings. The Good illuminates the intelligible realm, allowing us to understand and be knowledgeable. Just as the sun is what enables life to exist on earth, the Good gives existence to the forms and gives knowledge in the intelligible realm. Some might refer also to the similes of the divided line and the sun.</p> <p>Some will interpret Plato’s understanding of the Good primarily in terms of ‘the good life’. Plato’s Apology refers to Socrates’ death speech in which Socrates claimed that the unexamined life is not worth living. Plato undoubtedly felt the same, and explains this, for example, through the analogy of the Charioteer: a person’s reason needs to be in control of both <i>thumos</i> (natural pugnacity) and selfish/base desires. Each individual can then contribute to the stability and wellbeing of society as a whole by reflecting carefully on what they ought to do.</p> <p>Critical analysis of Plato’s understanding of the Good might be given through Aristotle’s critique of Plato, according to which Plato’s belief in perfect ideas/forms is misguided. To hold that ideas are perfect, transcendent entities is meaningless because all human activities appear to be based in normal empirical perception. Moreover, there cannot be absolute abstractions such as the perfect idea of beauty, or truth, or justice, or the Good, since these qualities are firmly dependent on human experience. The function of a human being consists rather in an activity of the rational soul in accordance with specific virtues: the Good of ethics is <i>eudaimonia</i> – complete wellbeing – which is achieved empirically through observation and practice in order to achieve that virtue. Excellence of character is compared to the skill of an archer who is able to hit a target. Just as the archer has to take into account a variety of factors, such as the wind, the distance of the target, and its shape, the virtuous/good human needs to arrive at the ethical mean by acting and reacting in appropriate ways.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
1	<p>Such a critique might be followed by a general defence of Plato's rationalist views, since the supremacy of empiricism over rationalism has by no means been demonstrated in subsequent philosophy.</p> <p>Accept all relevant approaches to the question, and mark solely in accordance with the generic Levels of Response.</p>	

Question	Answer	Marks
2	<p>‘It is obvious that moral absolutes exist.’ Evaluate this claim.</p> <p>Moral Absolutism is the view that there are absolute moral standards by which all actions can be judged. The rightness or wrongness of an action is intrinsic and exceptionless. For example, Kant’s Categorical Imperativism is an absolutist, deontological view, where moral rules allow no exceptions, for example, even where a lying promise would save someone’s life. For moral absolutists, the belief that acts are moral or immoral regardless of what individuals, societies or cultures think is an obvious one: morality is fundamental/built into the laws of the universe, irrespective of where the laws come from. Many hold that the author of fundamental moral laws is God, generally because God is held to be omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent, and thus obviously possesses the knowledge, power and desire to instantiate such laws, including absolutes such as justice and truth.</p> <p>However, such conclusions are hardly ‘obvious’. Physics appears to show that the universe functions through the operation of fundamental laws, so absolute moral laws might also be of this nature. On the other hand, we have no means of telling whether or not any set of laws is immutable, and those supposedly issued by God are no exception: Divine Command Theory is beset by many problems, not least those arising from the Euthyphro Dilemma.</p> <p>To many, Moral Relativism is the common sense view with which to defeat absolutism: morality cannot be absolute because there is no unquestioned source of authority, and there are no unquestioned moral rules/laws. Morality appears to be relative to time, place and culture. However, ‘All moral laws are relative’ looks suspiciously like an absolute claim, but the notion of an absolute claim justifying a relative statement seems incoherent to many.</p> <p>Some might turn to Moral Realism as offering a more acceptable approach than Moral Absolutism or Relativism. One possibility stems from Non-Naturalism, for example: that we have an awareness of moral truth through moral intuition; although this encounters difficulties where philosophers hold different moral intuitions. A more productive approach might be seen in Ethical Naturalism, which argues that moral properties are objective rather than absolute; there are objective moral properties that are reducible to non-ethical properties, such as love or happiness; hence Neo-Naturalists can argue that ‘the good’ reduces to ‘human wellbeing’, or to ‘the wellbeing of all concerned’, which leaves a lot of room for ethical discussion. In summary, to conclude that it is obvious that moral absolutes exist is a difficult undertaking.</p> <p>There are many routes that answers might take. Some might discuss Mackie’s Error Theory, which points to the obvious fact that people’s moral views are seemingly intractable. For example, two cultures might hold entirely different views about monogamy, not because one culture holds access to the moral facts about marital relationships whereas the other lacks that access, but simply because monogamy developed in one culture but not the other. Holding opposing moral views might be explained by anthropological and cultural studies, which could be more ‘obvious’ than the pros and cons of moral absolutism.</p> <p>Accept all relevant approaches to the question, and mark solely in accordance with the generic Levels of Response.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
3	<p>Assess the view that faith should always be based on reason.</p> <p>Some might preface their answers to this question by quoting the words of Tertullian: ‘What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?’ – i.e. ‘What has reason to do with faith?’ – followed by William Clifford’s opinion that ‘It is wrong, always, everywhere, and for everyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.’</p> <p>This primarily addresses the debate between rationalism and fideism. The argument can take many different forms, and any justified approach is acceptable. Rationality is concerned with the facts of an argument/what accords with reason or logic. Faith includes a belief in inspiration and revelation, and in their authority. The issue with authority and belief hinges on the question of what might constitute a ‘properly basic belief’, meaning that the belief does not depend on other beliefs, but on something outside the realm of belief. The view expressed in the question suggests that, for any belief to be properly basic, it must be compatible with reason, since something that is not reasonable cannot be a source of credible authority.</p> <p>Evidentialists hold that beliefs are properly basic only where there is reasonable evidence for them. Many would include the theistic arguments for the existence of God in this category, since it is a reasonable hypothesis that some features of the universe (such as its point of origin in the Big Bang and its appearance of design) point to God as its first-cause and designer. Strong foundationalists hold that beliefs are properly basic only if they are self-evident (for example: ‘This is a hand’) or incorrigible (true by virtue of being believed, such as: ‘I believe that I exist’ or ‘I feel pain’, because to assert these implies that my beliefs here are true). Those who argue that their beliefs must have the authority of a strong foundation will therefore take a strong rationalist stance (for example Plato/Aquinas). However, there are common objections to a foundationalist/rationalist stance, such as the failure of the logical and inductive arguments for the existence of God to provide a generally accepted ‘proof’. Also, the world’s religions appear to offer conflicting beliefs; and the verificationist/falsificationist challenges offer powerful arguments to suggest that religious assertions are meaningless.</p> <p>An alternative approach to arguments based on reason is that of fideism. Faith is the belief in the truth of something that does not require evidence and may not be provable by empirical/rational enquiry. Fideism holds that belief is self-authenticating, for example by the power of a religious experience; hence reformed epistemology roots faith in some kind of primary religious experience. Reference might be made, for example, to the work of scholars such as James, Otto, Wittgenstein and Plantinga.</p> <p>However, a common critique of fideism and reformed epistemology is that they attempt to justify some beliefs as being inherently rational/reasonable while rejecting others as trivial, but doing so presupposes that some form of <i>reasoned</i> judgement is being made. Some might take a voluntarist view of faith, accepting Pascal’s view that the rewards of faith are potentially so great as to justify a ‘will to believe’ (Pascal’s ‘Wager’). Self-interest might not be a noble basis for belief, but it is rational.</p> <p>Accept all relevant approaches to the question, and mark solely in accordance with the generic Levels of Response.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
4	<p>Critically examine the claim that neither Butler nor Freud offers a reasonable explanation of conscience.</p> <p>Butler (an English Bishop, theologian and philosopher) explained conscience as a reflective principle placed within us by God. Conscience is not the voice of God: it acts as a self-directing judge between prudence (egoism) and benevolence (altruism). As a God-given faculty, it must be followed, although its operation is secular and autonomous. When there is conflict between human desires and emotions on the one hand, and moral principles (particularly compassion) on the other, conscience is troubled, and works intuitively and autonomously so that the mind can regain its balance.</p> <p>Butler can be criticised for mixing psychology with theology: there is no obvious reason why conscience as Butler defines it should be a God-given faculty: God’s existence has to be assumed. Further, people do dreadful things in the name of conscience, but Butler does not appear to have considered that conscience can be distorted or evil. To see conscience as a faculty is also problematic, since it is not at all clear how psychology could ever be located or observed in the mind. Kant has similarly been criticised for inventing mental faculties in order to answer questions for which he had no real answer. Nevertheless, Butler’s arguments still might be judged as ‘reasonable’, since most would accept that humans do balance love of self with love of others, primarily because doing so preserves the self.</p> <p>Freud viewed conscience as a psychological phenomenon related to the unconscious mind. The super-ego is the restraining self: it controls impulses that are potentially damaging to society (and the self), such as the <i>eros</i> and <i>thanatos</i> instincts. The super-ego is the repository of parental and other authority figures, and like a parent it judges and threatens punishment. The feeling of threat is the conscience. To go against the super-ego evokes feelings of shame, guilt, anxiety and remorse, so an active conscience tends to be a guilty conscience.</p> <p>This account might be seen as unsatisfactory, since conscience would seem to be little more than the unconscious repository of parental authority. On the other hand, some might commend it on the grounds that it relegates the idea of God to being yet another authority figure generated in the unconscious, promoting guilt for those who break God’s rules. Freud may have been right about the conscience, although many reject it on the grounds that it would make any desire to do what is right nothing more than a reaction to guilt. His general ideas gain some support from child development studies, where it becomes clear that children learn conformity and benevolence (or the reverse) from their parents.</p> <p>Wider analysis might consider whether Butler or Freud gives a better explanation of the conscience; whether conscience is, alternatively, a God-related phenomenon as proposed by Augustine and Aquinas; or whether conscience is simply the name given to a person’s internal understanding of right behaviour, based on life experience, etc.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
4	<p>For the higher grades, there should be some consideration of what might or might not constitute a 'reasonable explanation' of conscience.</p> <p>Accept all relevant approaches to the question, and mark solely in accordance with the generic Levels of Response.</p>	