



Cambridge Pre-U

PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

9774/03

Paper 3 Topics and Key Texts in Philosophy and Theology 2

May/June 2023

MARK SCHEME

Maximum Mark: 50

Published

This mark scheme is published as an aid to teachers and candidates, to indicate the requirements of the examination. It shows the basis on which Examiners were instructed to award marks. It does not indicate the details of the discussions that took place at an Examiners' meeting before marking began, which would have considered the acceptability of alternative answers.

Mark schemes should be read in conjunction with the question paper and the Principal Examiner Report for Teachers.

Cambridge International will not enter into discussions about these mark schemes.

Cambridge International is publishing the mark schemes for the May/June 2023 series for most Cambridge IGCSE, Cambridge International A and AS Level and Cambridge Pre-U components, and some Cambridge O Level components.

Generic Marking Principles

These general marking principles must be applied by all examiners when marking candidate answers. They should be applied alongside the specific content of the mark scheme or generic level descriptors for a question. Each question paper and mark scheme will also comply with these marking principles.

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 1:

Marks must be awarded in line with:

- the specific content of the mark scheme or the generic level descriptors for the question
- the specific skills defined in the mark scheme or in the generic level descriptors for the question
- the standard of response required by a candidate as exemplified by the standardisation scripts.

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 2:

Marks awarded are always **whole marks** (not half marks, or other fractions).

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 3:

Marks must be awarded **positively**:

- marks are awarded for correct/valid answers, as defined in the mark scheme. However, credit is given for valid answers which go beyond the scope of the syllabus and mark scheme, referring to your Team Leader as appropriate
- marks are awarded when candidates clearly demonstrate what they know and can do
- marks are not deducted for errors
- marks are not deducted for omissions
- answers should only be judged on the quality of spelling, punctuation and grammar when these features are specifically assessed by the question as indicated by the mark scheme. The meaning, however, should be unambiguous.

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 4:

Rules must be applied consistently, e.g. in situations where candidates have not followed instructions or in the application of generic level descriptors.

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 5:

Marks should be awarded using the full range of marks defined in the mark scheme for the question (however; the use of the full mark range may be limited according to the quality of the candidate responses seen).

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 6:

Marks awarded are based solely on the requirements as defined in the mark scheme. Marks should not be awarded with grade thresholds or grade descriptors in mind.

Assessment objectives (AOs)

AO1	Demonstrate knowledge and understanding; identify, select and apply ideas and concepts through the use of examples and evidence.	40%
AO2	Provide a systematic critical analysis of the texts and theories, sustain a line of argument and justify a point of view. Different views should be referred to and evaluated where appropriate. Demonstrate a synoptic approach to the areas studied.	60%

In the textual questions AO1 and AO2 are assessed separately.

AO1 and AO2 are both to be considered in assessing each essay.

The **Generic Marking Scheme** should be used to decide the mark. The essay should first be placed within a level which best describes its qualities, and then at a specific point within that level to determine a mark out of 25.

The **Question-Specific Notes** provide guidance for Examiners as to the area covered by the question. These question-specific notes are not exhaustive. Candidates may answer the question from a variety of angles with different emphases and using different supporting evidence and knowledge for which they receive credit according to the Generic Marking Scheme levels. However, candidates must clearly answer the question as set and not their own question. Examiners are reminded that the insights of specific religious traditions are, of course, relevant, and it is likely that candidates will draw on the views of Jewish, Christian or Islamic theologians, as well as those of philosophers who have written about the concept of God from a purely philosophical standpoint. There is nothing to prevent candidates referring to other religious traditions and these must, of course, be credited appropriately in examination responses.

Table A: Generic Marking Scheme for 10 mark questions

Level 5 9–10 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Broad knowledge and understanding of a wide range of philosophical/religious issues. • Insightful selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Complete or near complete accuracy at this level. • Good evidence of wide reading on the topic beyond the set texts. • Confident and precise use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
Level 4 7–8 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knowledge is accurate and a good range of philosophical/religious issues are considered. • Systematic/good selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Response is accurate: the question is answered specifically. • Some evidence of reading on the topic beyond the set texts. • Accurate use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
Level 3 5–6 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knowledge is generally accurate and a fair range of issues are considered. • Reasonable selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Response is largely relevant to the question asked. • Reasonable attempt to use supporting evidence. • Reasonable attempt to use philosophical and theological vocabulary accurately.
Level 2 3–4 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some accuracy of knowledge. More than one issue is touched upon. • Attempts to select and apply ideas with partial success. • Response is partially relevant to the question asked but may be one-sided. • Some attempt to use supporting evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is occasionally used correctly.
Level 1 1–2 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some key points made. Possibly repetitive or short. • Explores some isolated ideas related to the general topic. • Response is limited or tenuously linked to the question. • Limited attempt to use evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is inaccurate or absent.
Level 0 0 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No relevant material to credit.

Table B: Generic Marking Scheme for 15 mark questions

<p>Level 5</p> <p>13–15 marks</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Insightful selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Excellent critical engagement and detailed evaluation of the wider implications of the question. • Complete or near complete accuracy at this level. • Argument is coherent, structured, developed and convincingly sustained. • Employs a wide range of differing points of view and supporting evidence. • Shows good understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Confident and precise use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
<p>Level 4</p> <p>10–12 marks</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Systematic/good selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Good critical engagement and evaluation of the implications of the question. • Response is accurate: the question is answered specifically. • Argument has structure and development and is sustained. • Good use of differing points of view and supporting evidence. • Shows competent understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Accurate use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
<p>Level 3</p> <p>7–9 marks</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reasonable selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Some critical engagement and evaluation of the question. • Response is largely relevant to the question asked. • Argument has some structure and shows some development, but may not be sustained. • Considers more than one point of view and uses evidence to support argument. • May show some understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Reasonable attempt to use philosophical and theological vocabulary accurately.
<p>Level 2</p> <p>4–6 marks</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Attempts to select and apply ideas with partial success. • Attempts to evaluate though with partial success. • Response is partially relevant to the question asked but may be one-sided. • Some attempt at argument but without development and coherence. • Some attempt to use supporting evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is occasionally used correctly.
<p>Level 1</p> <p>1–3 marks</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some key points made. Possibly repetitive or short. • Explores some isolated ideas related to the general topic. • Argument is limited or confused. • Response is limited or tenuously linked to the question. • Limited attempt to use evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is inaccurate or absent.
<p>Level 0</p> <p>0 marks</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No relevant material to credit.

Table C: Generic Marking Scheme for 25 mark questions

<p>Level 5</p> <p>21–25 marks</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Broad knowledge and understanding of a wide range of philosophical/religious issues. • Insightful selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Excellent critical engagement and detailed evaluation of the wider implications of the question. • Complete or near complete accuracy at this level. • Argument is coherent, structured, developed and convincingly sustained. • Employs a wide range of differing points of view and supporting evidence. • Good evidence of wide reading on the topic beyond the set texts. • Shows good understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Confident and precise use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
<p>Level 4</p> <p>16–20 marks</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knowledge is accurate and a good range of philosophical/religious issues are considered. • Systematic/good selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Good critical engagement and evaluation of the implications of the question. • Response is accurate: the question is answered specifically. • Argument has structure and development and is sustained. • Good use of differing points of view and supporting evidence. • Some evidence of reading on the topic beyond the set texts. • Shows competent understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Accurate use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
<p>Level 3</p> <p>12–15 marks</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knowledge is generally accurate and a fair range of issues are considered. • Reasonable selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Some critical engagement and evaluation of the question. • Response is largely relevant to the question asked. • Argument has some structure and shows some development, but may not be sustained. • Considers more than one point of view and uses evidence to support argument. • May show some understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Reasonable attempt to use philosophical and theological vocabulary accurately.
<p>Level 2</p> <p>8–11 marks</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some accuracy of knowledge. More than one issue is touched upon. • Attempts to select and apply ideas with partial success. • Attempts to evaluate though with partial success. • Response is partially relevant to the question asked but may be one-sided. • Some attempt at argument but without development and coherence. • Some attempt to use supporting evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is occasionally used correctly.
<p>Level 1</p> <p>1–7 marks</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some key points made. Possibly repetitive or short. • Explores some isolated ideas related to the general topic. • Argument is limited or confused. • Response is limited or tenuously linked to the question. • Limited attempt to use evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is inaccurate or absent.

Level 0 0 marks	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• No relevant material to credit.
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Question	Answer	Marks
Extract from John Searle: <i>Minds, Brains and Science</i>, Chapter 1 'The Mind-Body Problem'		
1(a)	<p>With reference to this passage, explain how Searle argues that 'naïve mentalism' and 'naïve physicalism' are consistent with each other.</p> <p>In essence, Searle's argument is built upon the premise that mental and physical states 'are not two different things, since mental phenomena just are features of the brain'. Naïve mentalism (the view that 'mental phenomena really exist') and physicalism (the view that 'all that exists in the world are physical particles with their properties and relations') are thus compatible doctrines. He reconciles the two positions by employing a common physical distinction between <i>micro</i> and <i>macro</i> properties. Micro-particles have features at the level of molecules and atoms, e.g. water is H₂O. Macro properties, on the other hand, are 'global' or 'surface' features of systems, e.g. the liquidity of water.</p> <p>The liquidity of water is explained by the nature of the interactions between H₂O molecules (i.e. 'liquid' is a state that H₂O molecules can be in). Similarly, mental phenomena (macro level) are caused by brain processes (micro level) and realised in a biological brain composed of neurons. Consequently, naïve mentalism and naïve physicalism are consistent with each other since mental states are features of the brain that have two levels of description: higher level mental descriptions (of, for example, conscious, intentional, and subjective states) and lower-level physical descriptions (of, for example, neural networks, synapses, and bio-chemical processes).</p>	10

Question	Answer	Marks
1(b)	<p>‘Searle’s biological naturalism solves the mind-body problem.’ Critically discuss this claim.</p> <p>Searle acknowledges that the ‘mind-body problem’ is the biggest philosophical problem we face: how to reconcile a view of ourselves as conscious, free, mindful, rational agents with a deterministic, scientific conception of matter. The approach he takes is what is referred to as ‘biological naturalism’. He claims that, partly, the problem persists because we continue to approach it with a 17th century vocabulary (a Cartesian ‘hangover’). How does non-extended mental stuff interact with extended physical stuff?</p> <p>Most solutions to the problem have involved the denial or downgrading of the status of mental entities. This is because it seems impossible to accommodate four key features of mind: consciousness, intentionality, subjectivity (qualia) and mental causation into a (very successful) scientific conception of the world. The issue, he contends, will only be resolved when we come to realise mental phenomena are both <i>caused by</i> whilst at the same time <i>features of</i> the brain (‘pains and other mental phenomena just are features of the brain’). If Searle is right, the mind-body problem is a <i>pseudo</i>-problem which will dissolve when we come to realise that mind and body interact, not as separate substances, but rather as dual features or properties of the same substance: the brain. The choice between naïve physicalism and naïve mentalism is thus disingenuous since ‘they are not only consistent with one another, they are both true’.</p> <p>A range of critical points are likely to be considered and candidates may well develop material from their part (a) response to do so. For one, is Searle right to say that the micro-structure of water <i>causes</i> its behaviour at the macro-level? It seems odd to say that one level of description <i>causes</i> another if they are one and the same thing. Also, some might query the analogy Searle draws between consciousness and water. Whilst it is true that we cannot point to H₂O and say ‘this is liquid’, we also cannot point to neurons and say ‘this is consciousness’. Liquidity is observable when there is an aggregate of molecules. Consciousness not so, since mental phenomena are subjective and thus not ‘present’ in the brain in the way neurons are.</p> <p>Some might use such points to consider the extent to which biological naturalism satisfactorily captures the phenomenological features of consciousness and/or whether Searle’s account collapses into property dualism, token identity theory or other forms of monism: are mental states ‘anomalous’? Some might consider wider themes and arguments from within the text to consider the issue of physical determination. Are Searle’s arguments surrounding the compatibility of mental causation with freedom of will (Chapter 6), for instance, convincing? Credit any reasonable line of enquiry.</p>	15

Question	Answer	Marks
2	<p>Critically assess the computational theory of mind.</p> <p>Some candidates will contextualise their response via a functionalist analysis of mind. In particular, Putnam’s ‘machine state functionalism’ which compares the process of thought or human intelligence (ideally concepts such as thought/intelligence should not be blurred with consciousness) to a finite state, digitised computer, computationally equivalent to Turing’s ‘Thinking Machines’. More generally, the issue concerns whether ‘thinking’ is better conceived of as a computational or biological phenomenon (some might consider mind brain identity theory here and the extent to which it is guilty of ‘carbon chauvinism’).</p> <p>The computational theory of mind, then, holds (as in Putnam’s version) that the human mind and/or brain is an information processing system/symbol manipulator, and that thinking is a form of computing. The empirical world provides input which the brain converts to output in the form of appropriate mental or physical states. Mental processing is algorithmic. Computational input comes in the form of symbols or representations of other objects. In Fodor’s version of CTM, representation is carried out in ‘mentalese’, a language of thought which is a biologically fixed code analogous to computer machine-code.</p> <p>Candidates might discuss several problems with the computational theory of mind. For example, however well it might deal with deduction, it does not cope with induction and abduction (given recent advances in AI and ‘general artificial intelligence’, some candidates may dispute this), both of which are crucial aspects of human reasoning. It falls foul of general criticisms of materialist theories, for example, that it cannot properly explain intentionality or the nature of conscious experiences such as qualia. Consciousness is not computational, and machines are not conscious anyway, so if minds are conscious and consciousness is not computational, then neither can minds be computational.</p> <p>Candidates are likely to refer to Searle, who insists that mental states are biological phenomena. There is more to mind than having formal or syntactical processes: a computer program can only be syntactical, so can never be a mind (expect reference to ‘as if’ intentionality here). Minds are semantical – they have more than a formal structure – they have a content. Candidates are likely to illustrate this through Searle’s thought-experiment of the Chinese Room, which is directed principally at computationalism and functionalism.</p> <p>They might also know the systems/robot/zombie replies to Searle. For the first of these, Searle argues that anyone who is willing to accept the ‘system reply’: that a mind can emerge from a system without saying what the system is or how it might give rise to a mind, is arguably under the grip of an ideology. Such a view (biological naturalism) might be construed as convincing since it avoids the pitfalls of dualism (some might query this), although any monist theory of mind does this. It is a naturalistic theory, and so it avoids importing insights from other disciplines (such as computational theory) into the philosophy of mind. The evolutionary advantages to beings possessing self-awareness are obvious, so the development of consciousness as a biological and not as a computational phenomenon seems clear.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
2	<p>Candidates can comment on any relevant aspect of the debate they like; for example, Fodor objects that Searle gives no account of why biochemistry is necessary for intentionality, arguing instead that the way in which an organism is connected to its environment is a more likely explanation of intentionality. Such problems suggest that Searle does not necessarily disprove the computational thesis that the brain carries out its functions mechanically.</p> <p>Credit any reasonable line of approach.</p>	

Question	Answer	Marks
3	<p>Critically examine the problem of other minds.</p> <p>The question has a long history, and an obvious starting point would be to approach it via an analysis of Cartesian epistemology. Descartes conceives of the mind as a spatially (though not temporally) un-extended entity; private (since I alone have access to it); accessed introspectively (unlike the public access we might have to [other] brains and/or bodily/behavioural states) and, at least from a first-person perspective, indubitable (I can doubt, for example, the cause of my pain, but not the pain itself – it is likely that many will refer to Descartes’ <i>cogito</i> here). Minds, thus conceived, are ‘ghostly’ substances that exist independently of the physical bodies they occupy.</p> <p>This view leads to the immediate threat of solipsism: that all I can know for sure is my own mind and its contents. Solipsism, it is widely held (some candidates may query this), is a position that needs conquering (Russell likened it to a psychological disease – ‘I’m a solipsist, why isn’t everyone else?’) rather than endorsing and a range of attempts have been made to do just this. With this in mind, it is likely candidates will discuss some of the following, or equivalent points:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mill’s ‘Argument from Analogy’: I have immediate and unmediated access to my own mental state (say, pain) and am aware of the environmental stimulus (for example, the stubbing of my toe) that occasions it and the behavioural manifestation (the subsequent expletive!) that itself so occasions. The latter of these are public. I therefore move analogously from my own case to the case of others and infer in them the same inner state that I myself possess. • Wittgenstein’s ‘Private Language Argument’: the concepts we use to identify and individuate our own inner mental episodes are public, not private. They apply equally to others as they do to us and there is thus no asymmetry between self and other ascription. • Strawson’s broadly ‘Kantian’ approach. The notion of personhood, he argues, is ‘logically primitive’. It is a basic feature of our conceptual framework. The concept, thus regarded, is a fundamental presupposition of our ascribing both ‘m’ (psychological) and ‘p’ (behavioural) predicates to ourselves and to others, although in others such ascriptions must be behavioural in character. • Other attempted rebuttals might be reductive in character so that if mental states are reducible to brain states, then the problem of other minds becomes the problem of other brains (thus bringing the issue into the empirical domain). <p>Discussions might also refer to behavioural dispositions and/or functional isomorphism (perhaps via the Turing test/Imitation Game and/or Searle’s Chinese Room thought experiment) and whether the ‘apparently’ irreducible features of consciousness (namely qualia and intentionality) can be so reduced without the charge of circularity. It would also be reasonable for candidates to take on an eliminative stance so that the problem might be seen to dissolve, or at least be linguistically eliminated, when we make appropriate alterations to our vocabulary. This latter view is problematic.</p> <p>Credit any reasonable line of enquiry.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
Extract from Jean-Paul Sartre: <i>Existentialism and Humanism</i>, pp29–30		
4(a)	<p>With reference to this passage, explain Sartre’s claim that moral responsibility ‘concerns mankind as a whole’.</p> <p>Candidates are likely to contextualise Sartre’s response in the above passage to evidence wider reading/understanding. This could be done via a consideration of Sartre’s atheism and his rejection of moral objectivity in general (the ‘spirit of seriousness’/ ‘conventional morality’, etc.). In the absence of God, then, and in the presence of absolute freedom (since ‘existence precedes essence’), the question of how we ought to live our lives and respect the lives of others becomes problematic.</p> <p>To resolve the issue, Sartre appeals to the notions of authenticity and ‘good faith’ to show that morality, far from being the product of divine or natural codification, is, instead, a human construct and demands that we take a certain ‘attitude’ towards the world. Whatever that attitude might be, it concerns not just ourselves but humankind in general: ‘Our responsibility is thus much greater than we had supposed, for it concerns mankind as a whole.’</p> <p>A recognition of this point is the starting point for an authentic existence. We are free, Sartre contends, to live in a state of ‘bad faith’ (<i>‘mauvaise foi’</i> ‘self-deception’), but this approximates to an evasion of the responsibility that freedom bestows upon us, the full extent of which (‘our responsibility is thus much greater than we had supposed’) leads to ‘anguish’ (the realisation that we are not just responsible for ourselves), ‘abandonment’ (we are ‘alone’ in the world) and ‘despair’ (that we might ‘choose in vain’). Good faith, on the other hand, demands that we place freedom and self-government at the heart of an existentialist ethic. Such freedom, we are told, transcends individual liberty (expect references to ‘intersubjectivity’) since without valuing the liberty of others, the very sanctity of freedom (including my own) breaks down.</p> <p>Sartre’s first account of an existentialist morality, then, appeals to the principle of universalisability; more simply, when we choose, we choose for humanity at large: ‘I am thus responsible for myself and for all men’. Freedom, then, underpins value and a value for one is a value for all. Sartre considers a range of examples to illuminate his position, including the Christian trade unionist worker who, having decided that ‘man’s kingdom is not upon this earth’, commits not himself ‘alone to that view’, but rather ‘all mankind’.</p>	10

Question	Answer	Marks
4(b)	<p>Critically examine how Sartre’s account of individual morality affects mankind as a whole.</p> <p>There is something clearly commendable about Sartre’s account. The emphasis placed on such values as autonomy and the potential for self-creation hold intuitive moral weight and there is clearly an intrinsic relation between freedom (should it exist), choice and responsibility which should not be discredited. Nonetheless, it has attracted criticisms both from and on a range of fronts, some of which are considered and responded to by Sartre himself (this was the aim of Existentialism and Humanism). For example, the charge that existentialism is a ‘pessimistic’ doctrine leading to ‘quietism and despair’; emphasises the ‘uglier’ side of life; ‘isolates the individual’ and leads to ‘amorality’ and ‘anarchy’ (etc.). The varying success of Sartre’s responses to these points might be considered, as might the issue of whether we are as free as Sartre contends.</p> <p>More specific criticisms might focus on the tension between Sartrean and deontological ethics. Whilst deriding any attempt at a ‘secular morality’ (here we would include pointedly directed comments towards Kant himself), his work does appear to bear more than a passing resemblance to Kantian deontology, most notably his appeal to the principle of universalisability.</p> <p>Issues surrounding this principle itself are also likely to be discussed: whether, for example, responsibility for self excludes responsibility for others (and/or vice versa)? Whether the notion of responsibility for others is intelligible (since we do not/could not ‘choose’ the choices others make for themselves)? It is also not at all clear that our individual choices (including ‘moral’ ones) are ones which we would have universalised (for example, vegetarianism) nor that universalisation itself is any guarantee of moral worth (a range of universalisable but non-moral or morally abhorrent ‘extreme’ examples from history, politics and religion are likely to be given here).</p> <p>Some might refer to some of Sartre’s own examples here and the extent to which they are convincing (for instance, the respective attitudes of <i>La Sanseverina</i> and Maggie Tulliver). Given the synoptic nature of the course, it is likely that candidates will draw on other material selected for study so that religious, normative, and meta-ethical critiques may be used to judge the relative success of Sartre’s account, all of which, if relevant, should be credited. Also, the extent to which his account can be seen to offer practical guidance within the field of applied ethics (again, his ‘student’ example is of particular significance here).</p>	15

Question	Answer	Marks
5	<p>‘Fletcher’s situation ethics and traditional Christian ethics are incompatible.’ Evaluate this view.</p> <p>It is likely that Fletcher’s situation ethics will be contextualised as an alternative to various moral absolutisms (including traditional Christian ethics) and relativisms or, more specifically, as a middle ground between ethical legalism, which would include deontology, divine command theory and moral law, etc., and antinomianism, which would include more existential and anarchistic approaches to ethics.</p> <p>That these positions are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive is called into question since there is a moral law (and so antinomianism is rejected) but only one such law so that various formulations of legalistic principles (thou shalt not lie, kill, etc.) can be disobeyed if they contravene the ‘supreme principle’ of morality. This principle is love. This middle-ground position Fletcher calls situationism and, as with earlier formulations of utilitarianism, it is teleological in character but based on the agapeic, rather than felicific calculus: ‘one ought always to act so as to bring about the most love for the most people’.</p> <p>Moral principles, in contrast with moral laws, the likes of which underpin traditional Christian ethics, can be constructed from the agapeic calculus, but, contrary to moral laws, these can never be universalised (we cannot ‘milk a universal from a universal’) since there will always be situations which demand their violation.</p> <p>Fletcher bases his views on four ‘working principles’. These are pragmatism: moral actions cannot be cashed out in the abstract; relativism: rightness or wrongness is relative to occasion; positivism: that morality is not grounded in reason, but the ‘positive’ choice of wanting to do good – ‘let us love one another because love is from God’, etc. (John 4:7–12), and personalism: ‘people before rules’ (it is likely candidates will refer to Jesus’ healing on the Sabbath here (Mark 3:1–6)).</p> <p>These principles are accompanied by the six ‘propositions’ of situation ethics. These are: 1. ‘Only one thing is intrinsically good; namely love: nothing else at all.’ 2. ‘The ruling norm of Christian decision is love: nothing else.’ 3. ‘Love and justice are the same, for justice is love distributed, nothing else.’ 4. ‘Love wills the neighbour’s good, whether we like him or not.’ 5. ‘Only the end justifies the means, nothing else.’ 6. ‘Love’s decisions are made situationally, not prescriptively.’</p> <p>The extent to which this is compatible with traditional Christian ethics is open to interpretation. Situation ethics puts people and their specific situation first. These take precedence over set rules and it is likely candidates will focus on this point to show that situation ethics is not compatible with traditional Christian ethics as situation ethics has no set laws. This is subject to the criticism of relativism where decisions are based purely on one’s ego and one’s own desires. Candidates could illustrate this point by referring to particular rules in Christianity and how they might be broken if one adopted a situation ethics approach to decision making.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
5	For example, situation ethics would allow a person to break one of the Ten Commandments if it was the most loving thing to do. This would seem to be wholly incompatible with traditional Christian ethics since Christian morality should be fixed and thus should not change as circumstances and cultures change.	

Question	Answer	Marks
6	<p>Assess the extent to which utilitarianism can help make decisions about environmental ethics.</p> <p>It is likely (although, as ever, not necessary) that candidates will begin by setting out what utilitarianism involves. For this reason, expect reference to more general accounts of consequentialist ethics that look to maximise utility (the greatest happiness for the greatest number) and its converse and the normative implications of such an approach. Some might discuss more specific formulations of the doctrine (for instance, act, rule, negative, positive, preference, and ideal, etc. utilitarianism and the distinction, should it exist, between higher and lower pleasures) which would be fine, but it is important that candidates do not lose sight of the question. Discussions that did not go beyond this or ones that chose to focus on alternative accounts of normativity would be characterised as having ‘isolated relevance’.</p> <p>To address the question, then, candidates need to critically apply utilitarianism to issues surrounding environmental ethics so that, whilst an internal critique of, for example, the views of Bentham, Mill, etc. <i>might</i> be relevant, what is more important is how a candidate critically applies these views to some of the prescriptive issues facing our ethical relationship with the wider natural environment. Such issues are legion and cannot be fully treated here. That said, expect reference to anthropocentrism; biodiversity; climate change; overpopulation and our duty to future generations; deforestation; pollution; ecology; extinction of species; space and ‘planetary boundaries’ (etc.), all of which, it might be argued, fall foul of the general principle of utility.</p> <p>With this in mind, candidates will need to show <i>how</i> said principle (or <i>principles</i> – some formulations, it could be argued, might be better adept here than others) might resolve some of the above issues. It would be reasonable to argue that alternative moral theories, perhaps Kantian deontology, natural moral law, or virtue ethics (i.e. duty or character rather than consequence) offer a better strategy for dealing with such matters, but this would need to be shown rather than assumed. Responses that merely listed alternative responses are unlikely to attract high marks.</p> <p>Credit any reasonable line of inquiry on the grounds of quality of argument and to the extent that it meets the demands of the question.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
7(a)	<p>With reference to this passage, examine the importance of miracles in the work of Elijah.</p> <p>Note: ‘Reference to the passage’ can be taken to mean exclusive reference to 1 Kings 17:17–24 or more widely to include relevant material about Elijah in 1 and 2 Kings. Full marks are available for either interpretation of the question.</p> <p>Reference might be made to some of the following:</p> <p>Candidates may briefly review other features of the life of Elijah before examining the importance of his miracles. He is best known for his challenge to the cult as well as to the king. He was politically involved. He claimed to speak the word of the Lord, and regularly challenged both the cult and the king.</p> <p>The miracle in this passage is the raising of the son of the widow of Zarephath (1 Kings 17:17–24), presumably from death, which is suggested by the translation here (the child’s soul came into him again), although some suggest that the son was merely in a coma, and that his having ‘no breath left in him’ means simply that his breathing was too shallow to be detected. This seems to miss the point of the story, however, which is that Yahweh has the power over life and death, just as he has power over the natural forces of the world. Elijah himself seems to have interpreted what happened as a God-given miracle, and the woman says that she knows he is a man of God, so that the word of his mouth is a true word from Yahweh (v.24).</p> <p>The importance of the miracle lies chiefly in Elijah’s ability to raise a child from (apparent) death. The same power is attributed to Elisha (2 Kings 4) which might suggest that the story is typological rather than factual. In either event, reversing death would for many be the ultimate miracle. Some might refer to the New Testament account of Jesus’ raising from death of the Widow of Nain’s only son (Luke 7:11–17), where the bystanders would have been well aware of the parallel in the Elijah narrative. In the Gospel account, the command to ‘rise’ comes directly from Jesus, and shows the status of Elijah in Judaism and early Christianity (as in the Gospel Transfiguration narratives, where Moses represents Law and Elijah represents Prophecy, e.g. Luke 9:28–36).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 Kings 17:8–16, where Elijah saves the widow of Zarephath and her son from starvation. <p>The miracle here is the multiplication of meal and oil for the widow, whereby Yahweh is shown to control the materials by which life is sustained. In this respect Elijah is sometimes called the ‘second Moses’, since the work of both prophets is associated with miracles. For example, Moses provides food and water for the Israelites during their journey in the wilderness (Exodus 15:22 – 16:36). In connection with the portrayal of Elijah as the second Moses, in Kings 2:6–8 Elijah divides the waters of the Jordan so that he and Elisha could cross, which echoes Moses’ parting of the Red Sea during the Exodus from Egypt.</p>	10

Question	Answer	Marks
7(a)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 Kings 18:1–46, the contest on Mount Carmel, where Elijah repairs the altar to Yahweh that had been thrown down, summons fire from heaven to consume a burnt offering to God, summons the return of the rain to end the drought, and then kills the prophets of Baal and Asherah. <p>Elijah is thus portrayed here as the prophet who used powerful miracles to restore Yahweh worship during a time when it had been subsumed by the worship of the Phoenician Baal / Asherah favoured by Ahab’s wife Jezebel. Elijah also uses miraculous fire to consume Ahab’s chariot and men (2 Kings 1:9–16).</p> <p>Comment might be made on the fact that Elijah was called to prophesy during a time when Baal worship had become more prevalent than worship of Yahweh, so Elijah was using drastic measures to demonstrate the superiority of Yahweh over Baal. For example, Baal was thought to control the rains, but in 1 Kings 17:1–7 Elijah tells King Ahab that there will be no dew or rain in the land until Yahweh decrees. Towards the conclusion of the contest on Mount Carmel, the rains arrive as a complete demonstration of Yahweh’s power.</p> <p>Some might evaluate the importance of these accounts as being little more than works of fiction appropriate to the world-view of the time. Others might view them as typological accounts where the emphasis is on their meaning for those who believe in the God of Elijah, and how they influence people to behave. Others might see them as literal accounts of observed phenomena showing something about God’s purposes.</p> <p>Accept all relevant approaches to the question, and mark solely in accordance with the generic Levels of Response.</p>	

Question	Answer	Marks
7(b)	<p>‘The miracles of Elijah are a literary creation rather than historical fact.’ How far do you agree?</p> <p>Candidates are at liberty to see this question as a development of 7(a).</p> <p>Topic 3 in the syllabus requires study of ecstatic visions and auditions experienced by prophets; also of ‘abnormal psychological phenomena’, including miracles. Old Testament prophets are said to prophesy in an ‘ecstatic’ state, characterised by an altered state of consciousness where awareness of the immediate environment is lost or altered. This can lead to a sense of being chosen for a task, as in Isaiah’s prophetic call in Isaiah 6, where the prophet hears a voice ask, ‘Whom shall I send?’ In such circumstances, the senses are said to function differently; so, for example, a prophet can feel being in the presence of a deity. Elijah encounters Yhwh on Mount Horeb: not in the wind, not in the earthquake, not in the fire, but ‘in a still, small voice’ used by the deity (ch.19), following which he is given a series of tasks. He also is put into a superior, abnormal physical state.</p> <p>Other ecstatic states are recorded, for example, when ‘the hand of the Lord was on Elijah so that he ran in front of Ahab’s chariot’ (1 Kings 18:46). During a contest with Ahab’s Baal prophets on Mount Carmel (1 Kings 18), Elijah and the prophets of Baal appear all to be in an ecstatic state. That of the Baal prophets is an uncontrolled frenzy; that of Elijah is one of controlled power, to the extent that he kills Ahab’s 450 Baal prophets (1 Kings 18:40). It is in this kind of state that Elijah performs a number of miracles, including those described above in Q7(a).</p> <p>Candidates are likely to develop a view on whether the miracle stories in 1 and 2 Kings are literary creations or perhaps an account of consistently observed paranormal psychological phenomena associated with Elijah. The issue is whether such phenomena represent or come from a specific external influence (i.e. God) or whether they are a literary creation from those observing the extraordinary things that prophets are believed to say and do.</p> <p>In support of the view that the miracles of Elijah are a literary creation rather than historical fact:</p> <p>(1) If miracles are defined as acts that break the laws of nature, then the ‘miracles’ of Elijah might well be a literary creation, for the simple reason that the world works through principles that are investigated and classified by science and by everyday experience. Generally speaking, we expect the laws of nature to remain unbroken: we do not expect miracles to happen in everyday experience. In the life of Elijah, miracles appear to be common, so they must be a literary creation by their author(s).</p> <p>(2) Not all of Elijah’s miracles are morally good. For example, Elijah’s ecstatic frenzy apparently led him to kill 450 prophets of Baal (1 Kings 18); but it seems unlikely that all (or any) of the Baal prophets deserved death for choosing to support the wrong God. This looks like a literary invention to support the narrative rather than a factual occurrence.</p>	15

Question	Answer	Marks
7(b)	<p>(3) In today's society, miracle stories still happen, but they are no closer to being accepted as miracles than are the 'miracles' of Elijah some three millennia ago. The Elijah miracles are literary constructs to encourage belief in Yahweh as God.</p> <p>(4) Similarly, the 'miracle' of God multiplying food miraculously so that the widow and her son can stay alive is a literary device to show that God provides meal, oil, water and whatever else people need in a crisis.</p> <p>(5) Equally, when God saves the widow's son from death / brings him back from the brink of death, this is best seen as a literary technique to show that Yahweh has power over death.</p> <p>(6) The same objection applies to Elijah's miraculous avoidance of death, where it appears that he ascends on a whirlwind to heaven without dying beforehand. It is a clever literary device, involving one inexplicable phenomenon (whirlwinds) with another (deathlessness).</p> <p>Against these views:</p> <p>(1) It cannot be shown, either then or now, that miracles do not happen. If they do, then by definition they cannot be defined by science. Moreover, if miracles were more frequent during the time of Elijah, then again, by definition, accounts of them would be more frequent. They are not literary creations.</p> <p>(2) There is no requirement for miracles to be morally good. God is not bound by rules. Moreover, Elijah's killing of 450 prophets anticipates 1 Kings 19:17–18, where Yahweh announces that the killing would extend to all bar 7000 who had not bowed the knee to Baal.</p> <p>(3) Whether or not miracles are accepted in today's society has no effect on their truth or untruth. Events in a person's life can persuade people that God exists or that miracles happen, but the reverse is equally true. In either eventuality, many people see the issue of miracles as a matter of fact and not as a matter of literary creation.</p> <p>(4) If God exists, then the idea that God can provide for any need does not need to be a literary device. The existence of God cannot be proved absolutely, but the arguments for God's existence are persuasive to many, as is the belief that God can provide for any need, whether through miracles or by any other method.</p> <p>(5) The idea that God brought the widow's son back from death can be a literary device, but it is equally possible that such an account is factual: a creator God would indeed have power over death.</p> <p>(6) It is possible that the account of Elijah's 'translation' to heaven without first dying is a literary device to explain phenomena such as whirlwinds and avoiding death itself. Nevertheless, it does not follow from one or more unlikely claims about miracles that all accounts of miracles are unlikely.</p> <p>The debate can follow many lines. For example, miracles can be defined in terms of emotion / wonder / awe and so on. These are things that people can get from the Bible, so they can be true on a personal level.</p>	

Question	Answer	Marks
7(b)	<p>Some might consider the legacy of miracle accounts in the Bible. With regard to those claimed to have been done by Elijah, the influence of these accounts on the development of prophecy appears to have gone far beyond the remit of literary device, since in later Judaism Elijah was seen as representing Prophecy itself just as Moses represented Law (in the narratives of Jesus' transfiguration – Matthew 17).</p> <p>Accept all relevant approaches to the question, and mark solely in accordance with the generic Levels of Response.</p>	

Question	Answer	Marks
8	<p>Critically examine the use of symbolic acts in the work of the prophets.</p> <p>The prophets frequently performed symbolic acts as supplement to prophetic speech. Some Old Testament prophets, including Abraham, Moses, Elijah and Jeremiah used symbolic acts to symbolise future events. Symbolic acts were a dramatisation, for example, when Jeremiah smashed a clay vessel (Jeremiah 19). On occasion, prophets included somebody else to help in making the prophecy, as was the case with Jeremiah and the potter. The prophet's actions are recorded either in the messenger formula or the revelation formula ('Thus says the Lord' / 'The Lord said to the prophet').</p> <p>Prophetic symbolic actions usually include a ritualistic gesture or a dramatised act. Isaiah wrote on a large tablet the name 'Maher-shalal-hash-baz' (the spoil speeds, the prey hastes) on a scroll, and then united with his prophetess-wife to bear a son (Isaiah 8:1–4). Jeremiah's yoke symbolised bondage (Jeremiah 27–28). Hosea and his wife Gomer represented God and unfaithful Israel (Hosea 1–3). The prophet's explanation of the symbolic action is often included alongside prophecy (e.g. Isaiah 20:1–6; Jeremiah 18:1–12). Symbolic actions by prophets sometimes needed witnesses, e.g. Jeremiah 19:10, 'Break the flask in the sight of the men who go with you'.</p> <p>The prophets therefore used symbolic acts as a way of delivering their message. Such acts could be dramatic reinforcements of the spoken word and could aid understanding in those who heard and saw them.</p> <p>For example, relations between Judah and Egypt were frequently strained. In 713 BCE there was a general revolt against Assyria, and Judah was urged to join the coalition. Isaiah argued against this, and prophesied an unhappy fate for both the Egyptians and the Ethiopians at the hands of Assyria. According to the text, he was told by God to walk naked and barefoot for three years as a sign of what would befall any nation (including Judah) who attempted to make war on Assyria. To walk naked and barefoot was the fate of prisoners, and symbolised their degradation, so the visual symbol of Isaiah walking in this way would have been a shocking humiliation, and would have pushed home the message to all those who saw it. Some argue that the prophet would have worn an undergarment, since true nakedness would have been deeply degrading, but the point is the same: the degradation of near-nakedness can serve as a symbol to point towards the greater degradation of wearing nothing at all by choice.</p> <p>The variety of symbolic acts is notable. For example, the prophet Ahijah tore a new garment into 12 pieces to symbolise a new division of the 12 tribes of the kingdom after the death of Solomon (1 Kings 11:29–31). Jeroboam was to become king of the 10 northern tribes. Tearing the robe is a dramatic representation of tearing apart the kingdom in this way. The act itself is a ritualistic gesture to illustrate God's intentions in an unforgettable way. Similarly, when King Joash was fearful of conquest by Syria, the prophet Elisha instructed him to open a window eastwards and shoot an arrow that would become 'The Lord's arrow of victory' over Syria, meaning that Syria would be defeated (2 Kings 13:14–19).</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
8	<p>Candidates are likely to refer to symbolic acts in the Book of Jeremiah, where the symbols are often dramatic and visual. For example, reference might be made to one or more of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jeremiah 13:1–11, the linen waistcloth hidden in the Euphrates, dug up after many days; used to symbolise the rotten state of Judah: ‘spoiled and good for nothing’ (v.7). • 16:1–9, where the prophet is forbidden by God to marry and have children, symbolising the imminent destruction of Judah and Jerusalem, where the dead bodies of parents and their children will rot on the ground as food for beasts and birds. • 18:1–12, the potter’s house, showing that God will do to Judah just as the potter does to the clay – mould and smash it. • 27:1 – 28:13, Jeremiah and the yoke bars, used as a symbol of submission to Nebuchadnezzar of Babylon; also the counter-symbol from the false prophet Hananiah and its result. • 32:1–15, Jeremiah’s purchase of a family field, used to symbolise hope, and an eventual return to some form of ordered life. <p>By their very nature and variety, therefore, symbolic acts aroused interest in the public. They also allowed those who witnessed them to take part in the prophecy as part of the <i>dramatis personae</i>. They could also be used to shock. For example, Hosea married a prostitute (Gomer), which would be unthinkable for a priest: so much so that debates still continue whether the account in Hosea 1–3 is literal or symbolic. Such acts would draw public attention in a way that words spoken alone could not.</p> <p>Accept all relevant approaches to the question, and mark solely in accordance with the generic Levels of Response.</p>	

Question	Answer	Marks
9	<p>Critically examine the influence of the call of Isaiah of Jerusalem on his work and message.</p> <p>Isaiah's call is recorded in Isaiah 6:1–13. The date is referenced in relation to the last year of King Uzziah's reign (742 BCE). Politically this was an important time in Judah's history, since Uzziah had reigned for 52 years, so Judah was faced with the task of maintaining continuity in a difficult and changing political climate, and this issue was to confront Isaiah.</p> <p>Despite Uzziah's long and relatively successful reign (e.g. he removed the Philistine threat), the king went one step too far and entered the Jerusalem Temple to burn incense on its altar. The chief priest Azariah confronted him with a deputation of 80 priests and charged him with usurping the priestly function. He was ejected from the Temple, and in 736 died of a leprous condition. Isaiah's call narrative shows this context during a time of rapidly increasing Assyrian power, and it appears that Judah had already had to make some concessions towards that power. This can be seen in the backdrop to Isaiah's call, which took place in the Temple, within the Temple cult itself.</p> <p>In other words, the influences on Isaiah's work and message came from his background as a prophet within the Jerusalem Temple cult. Within the context of his professional work he became aware of God's holiness and sovereignty. The language is much like that of the Enthronement Psalms (Psalms 93–100), where Yahweh is pictured as a universal king enthroned in royal splendour as a King above all gods (Psalm 95:3). The 'seraphim' would have been effigies modelled on Assyrian gods, part human and part animal, with six wings, so Uzziah had probably imported these into the Temple environment as an acknowledgement of Assyrian overlordship.</p> <p>Isaiah now understands that all such beings are bent to the will of the real king – Yahweh. The purification of Isaiah's lips by a burning coal (vv.6–7) is the prelude to his call, since by it he is purified and called to be God's messenger. Cleansed in this way, he will be able to do his work and give his message: specifically, he will be able to deal with people who would not otherwise be predisposed to heed his words. Verses 11–13 of the call spell out Isaiah's prophetic commission, which has to be carried out until the land has been invaded and made completely desolate.</p> <p>Candidates might focus on different parts of Isaiah's work and message. Their initial context was the Syro-Ephraimite War (736–732 BCE), in which Judah was being threatened by an alliance between Rezin, king of Syria and Pekah, king of Israel, who decided to break away from being tributary nations to Assyria. Ahaz of Judah refused to join their coalition, and Rezin and Pekah tried to depose Ahaz by invading Judah. Isaiah's reaction reflected his call experience, during which he had become convinced of the absolute power of Yahweh, in the face of which Isaiah advocated a policy of trust in God, who was using other nations, including Assyria, for his purpose. When Ahaz decided to ask the Assyrian king Tiglath-Pileser III for help, Isaiah's reaction was to pronounce a string of symbolic acts and judgements.</p>	25

Question	Answer	Marks
9	<p>For example (7:1–9), the sign of Shear-jashub ('a remnant shall return') was intended to assure Ahaz that if the situation deteriorated, a remnant would still return from captivity (although it may be that Isaiah intended this as a threat – that <i>only</i> a remnant would return). Similarly, Isaiah gave the sign of Immanuel (7:10–17) – 'God (is) with us' – God would support Judah so that the invasion would not happen. Ultimately, Ahaz was forced to pay tribute to Assyria with treasures from the Jerusalem Temple and to build idols of Assyrian gods. Hence Isaiah's call experience was explained by subsequent history: the people were judged to lack understanding and faith (6:10).</p> <p>Some may go on to discuss Isaiah's dealings with King Hezekiah, in which the threat is still that posed by Assyria. In 701 BCE, King Sennacherib attacked the fortified cities of Judah, and demanded heavy tribute from Hezekiah in return for sparing Jerusalem. Isaiah promised Hezekiah that God would defend the city for its own sake and that of King David. 2 Kings 19:35–37 records that the angel of the Lord killed 185 000 Assyrians in their camp. Sennacherib himself was subsequently killed by his sons. Isaiah's work and message here were consistent with his call experience, where the need for reliance on a powerful and holy God was made clear to him.</p> <p>Some evaluate Isaiah's message specifically in terms of his 'remnant theology', arguing that his call was critical to his understanding of the world. Since his call took place in the Jerusalem Temple, Isaiah's ecstatic state in the Temple developed into a Zionist theology in which the Temple is the 'place where God lives', and from which God will one day recall the remnant of exiled Jews from wherever they have been exiled to: hence Isaiah's focus on the 'sign of Shear-jashub' ('a remnant shall return'), who appears to have been his first-born son (Isaiah 7:3).</p> <p>Accept all relevant approaches to the question, and mark solely in accordance with the generic Levels of Response.</p>	