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ADVANCED GCE

HISTORY

2589

Historical Investigations 1799–1955

Candidates answer on the Answer Booklet

OCR Supplied Materials:
- 16 page Answer Booklet

Other Materials Required:
None

Monday 8 June 2009
Morning

Duration: 1 hour 30 minutes

OCE/12365

2589

INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

- Write your name clearly in capital letters, your Centre Number and Candidate Number in the spaces provided on the Answer Booklet.
- Use black ink. Pencil may be used for graphs and diagrams only.
- Read each question carefully and make sure that you know what you have to do before starting your answer.
- Do **not** write in the bar codes.

INFORMATION FOR CANDIDATES

- The number of marks is given in brackets **[ ]** at the end of each question or part question.
- The total number of marks for this paper is **90**.
- This paper contains questions on the following seven Options:
  - Napoleon I (pages 2–3)
  - Gladstone and Disraeli 1846–80 (pages 4–5)
  - Bismarck and the Unification of Germany 1858–71 (pages 6–7)
  - Roosevelt's America 1920–41 (pages 8–9)
  - Lenin and the Establishment of Bolshevik Power 1903–24 (pages 10–11)
  - Chamberlain and Anglo-German Relations 1918–39 (pages 12–13)
  - Stalin and the Development of the Cold War in Europe 1941–55 (pages 14–15)
- Answer on **one** Option only. In that Option, answer the Passages question, and **one** other question.
- You should write in continuous prose and are reminded of the need for clear and accurate writing, including structure of argument, grammar, punctuation and spelling.
- The time permitted allows for reading the Passages of the one Option you have studied.
- You are advised to spend equal time on the Passages question and the essay you select.
- In answering the Passages question, you are expected to use your knowledge of the topic to help you explain and evaluate the interpretations in the Passages, as well as to inform your answer.
- In answering an essay question, you are expected to refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations to help you develop your arguments.
- This document consists of **16** pages. Any blank pages are indicated.

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Napoleon I

If answering on this Option, candidates **MUST** answer **Question 1** and **ONE** other question.

1 Using these **four** Passages **and** your own knowledge, assess the view that the **main** reason for Napoleon's downfall was the defeat in Russia. **[45]**

A From: G. Rudé, *Revolutionary Europe 1783–1815*, published in 1964. This historian suggests that Napoleon's downfall can be traced to his invasion of Spain.

Some say Napoleon's downfall began in Spain, others Moscow, others again at Leipzig in 1813; or even in besieged and embattled France in the Spring of 1814. Napoleon himself confessed that it was 'the Spanish ulcer' that destroyed him. There was certainly no straight and undeviating line of destruction leading from the Battle of Baylen (in Spain) and the lines of Torres Vedras (in Portugal) to Waterloo. Nevertheless, the Peninsular War, beginning in 1808, became a running sore that drained the Grand Army, gave fresh hope and opportunity to his enemies in England, Austria and Russia, and generally stimulated that 'awakening of peoples' to which his ultimate fall and failure have most commonly been attributed.

B From: F. L. Ford, *Europe 1780–1830*, published in 1989. This historian argues that Napoleon's downfall was not inevitable and Napoleon's refusal to accept peace terms played a key role.

Napoleon's chief hope of survival after 1812 lay in the chronic jealousy and suspicion among the powers attacking him. Austria, in particular, had reason to stop short of a total victory likely to benefit its old rivals, Prussia and Russia, while releasing nationalistic passions among the various groups of the Austrian Emperor's subjects. In 1813 Austria still saw advantages in maintaining Bonaparte, linked as he was by marriage. Early in November, therefore, the Austrian foreign minister made an offer of peace which guaranteed France its natural frontiers, the Rhine, Alps and Pyrenees. This would have left Belgium, the German left bank of the Rhine and Nice-Savoy under French rule. These terms Napoleon bluntly refused. On 21 December the armies of the fourth Coalition crossed the Rhine into France. Local victories in February 1814 so exhilarated Napoleon that he again brushed aside peace offers. As a result Britain was able to secure an Allied agreement that they should fight on together to a clear decision.

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C From: M. Broers, *Europe under Napoleon 1799–1815*, published in 1996. This historian argues that Napoleon's defeat in Russia, though serious, was only the start of his downfall.

Of the 650,000 troops who began the invasion of Russia, only 93,000 returned. The majority of those troops lost were the best. The mainly French central force was destroyed: only 25,000 of an original force of 450,000 struggled back to Poland. Equally serious was the loss of good cavalry and artillery horses and never again would the French have an advantage in this sector. The Russian catastrophe should have been the end of Napoleonic domination, but it was only the beginning of the process and, for contemporaries, even a victory of these proportions did not signal a return of confidence. The campaign of 1812 had all but exhausted Russia both financially and militarily, and the Russians themselves were divided over whether to pursue Napoleon over their own borders. Metternich kept Austria neutral, still afraid to fight even a shattered Grand Army. He tried to arrange peace between Napoleon and Russia, which Napoleon saw as an incentive to fight on.

D From: G. Ellis, *The Napoleonic Empire*, published in 2003. This historian argues that in the end it was Russia that played the crucial role in the defeat of Napoleon.

If the military turning point in Napoleon's fortunes was the disastrous Russian campaign of 1812, it nevertheless took all the allies to bring him down in the campaigns of 1813–14. In that victory the contribution of Russia was probably the decisive factor, helped no doubt by Prussian mobilisation early in 1813. For if Britain provided most of the financial backing of the allied coalition, thanks to her heavy subsidies, Tsar Alexander I injected the resolute will to pursue and destroy Napoleon while he was in retreat. It was this determination, almost a sense of crusade, that eventually gave the Allies their superiority over the French. In spite of Napoleon's desperate and often brilliant efforts during the campaigns of 1813–14, he was forced to abdicate on 6 April 1814.

Answer **either**

2 Assess the view that Napoleon was the 'heir to the French Revolution'. **[45]**

or

3 Assess the view that Napoleon's military success in Europe up to 1809 is best explained by the weaknesses of his enemies. **[45]**

Candidates are reminded that they must refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations in developing the argument in their essay.

Gladstone and Disraeli 1846–80

If answering on this Option, candidates **MUST** answer **Question 4** and **ONE** other question.

4 Using these **four** Passages **and** your own knowledge, assess the view that Gladstone's policies in his Ministry of 1868–74 were not popular. **[45]**

A From: Richard Shannon, *The Crisis of Imperialism 1865–1915*, published in 1976. This historian believes that Gladstone's policies had become generally unpopular by 1871.

Largely through lack of interest, Gladstone allowed the government in 1871 to become committed to an impractical and unpopular Licensing Bill which gave huge offence to the brewers. Then general offence was given to the public by the government's conciliatory policy to the United States over the Alabama affair. Few people shared Gladstone's view that the fifteen million dollars paid in compensation was a valuable example to the nations for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. Robert Lowe, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, was unlucky; his sensible proposal for a tax on matches was frustrated by a strike by Bryant and May's matchgirls which gained public support.

B From: T. A. Jenkins, *The Liberal Ascendancy 1830–1886*, published in 1994. This historian argues that there was divided opinion about the reforms within the Liberal Party.

To many Liberals, including Gladstone himself, the Church of England was a socially valuable institution which deserved to be maintained as the Established Church of the nation. The aim of religious reform was to remove inconsistencies such as the abolition of the university tests. However, both Nonconformists and radicals were strongly committed to the Liberal cause and believed that religious liberty involved the dismantling of all the Established Churches and the ending of church domination in education. To the radicals and nonconformist groups these were measures designed to promote full equality. To other Liberals they looked like signs of an underlying class hatred and even a desire to take property from its lawful owners. In addition the temperance movement was disappointed by the mildness of the Licensing Act and a United Kingdom Alliance, dominated by the Nonconformists, was set up to campaign for reform. It condemned Gladstone's ministry and provided candidates to stand in by-elections against official Liberal candidates in 1873.

C From: Paul Adelman, *Great Britain and the Irish Question 1800–1922,* published in 1996. This historian argues that Gladstone's Irish reforms of 1869 and 1870 were successful.

The Land Act passed through both Houses of Parliament with little opposition. Gladstone's aim was to prove that the Westminster parliament was prepared to legislate to remedy what the mass of the Irish people saw as justified grievances. The Irish Land Act had a symbolic significance as a blow against the Protestant Ascendancy just as the Irish Church Act had removed once and for all the major religious grievance of Irish Roman Catholics. This legislation, together with the release of the Fenian political prisoners which Gladstone secured at the end of 1870, was followed by a new harmony between English Liberals and Irish Catholics. This seemed to Gladstone to justify his policies and he remained supremely optimistic about the future of Ireland. He proclaimed in a speech in 1871, 'There is nothing that Ireland has asked and which this country and this parliament has refused except for the simple grievance of university education'.

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D From: H.C.G. Matthew, *Gladstone,* published in 1997. This historian suggests Gladstone's government won some popularity for its financial achievements.

Tax payers were pleased when expenditure on defence fell dramatically through retrenchment and reorganization in both the army and navy in 1869–70. However, the army expansion, following the Franco-Prussian war and the expenses resulting from the abolition of the purchase of commissions, spoilt the effect to some extent. Gladstone hoped to make finance a unifying feature of his programme and even to think about the removal of income tax, which he disliked because of the ease with which it brought in revenue and thus, he believed, encouraged needless expenditure. There was a marked increase in national wealth and the yield of both direct and indirect taxation, leading to splendid surpluses in 1872 and 1873. Gladstone planned to relieve the burden on the property-owning classes without shifting it on to those who did not own property and so keep the loyalty of each group. But the popularity of the government declined in 1873 as it became linked with administrative scandals when irregularities in the use of the Post Office Savings Bank's funds were revealed.

Answer **either**

5 Assess the view that Disraeli's rise to power in 1868 resulted **mainly** from the passing of the Second Reform Act in 1867. **[45]**

or

6 To what extent was the defeat of the Conservatives in the 1880 election the result of Gladstone's Midlothian campaign? **[45]**

Candidates are reminded they must refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations in developing the argument in their essay.

Bismarck and the Unification of Germany 1858–71

If answering on this Option, candidates **MUST** answer **Question 7** and **ONE** other question.

7 Using these **four** Passages **and** your own knowledge, assess the view that by the time of the Luxembourg Crisis of 1867 Bismarck was considering war with France. **[45]**

A From: A.J.P. Taylor, *Bismarck, Man and Statesman,* published in 1967. This historian argues that Bismarck did not intend to provoke a crisis with France and was swept along by public hysteria.

After the defeat of Austria in 1866, Bismarck looked around for some means for satisfying Napoleon III's prestige without injuring German interests. He thought that he had found this in Luxembourg, thinking this was territory France could acquire without offending German nationalists. The inhabitants did not regard themselves as German and the king of Holland was prepared to sell it to pay his debts. What happened next has caused many writers to accuse Bismarck of setting a trap for France. This was not at all in keeping with his intentions in 1867 whatever might have been the case three years later. He cared nothing for Luxembourg itself and it had little value as a fortress. To his surprise, Bismarck was caught out for the first time by the national spirit that he had encouraged, a liberal demand that said Germany should not surrender ancient lands and a Prussian king and his generals calling for war with France.

B From: A. Stiles, *The Unification of Germany,* published in 2001. This historian suggests Bismarck knew that the Luxembourg Crisis would damage Franco-German relations despite his claims that he wished to avoid war.

Bismarck had encouraged national hysteria over Luxembourg. Why was this? It seems unlikely that he wished to start a war with France at this stage. He did not believe that the Prussian army was yet strong enough, and he knew that the North German Confederation was still fragile. His intention was perhaps to start a campaign of provocation to drive Napoleon III into a war in due course or perhaps he now realised that he was in a strong enough diplomatic position to stop France making any territorial gains. In a long interview given to a British journalist in 1867 Bismarck claimed that there is nothing in our attitude to annoy or alarm France and that he wished to avoid war. However, Bismarck knew well how to manipulate the Press with propaganda and he did not always believe what he said, or say what he believed.

C From: E. Feuchtwanger, *Bismarck*, published in 2002. This historian argues that Bismarck did not intend the crisis to provoke a war with France.

Once again, with the Luxembourg Crisis, Bismarck applied what had always been a basic political tactic, the use of a foreign crisis to achieve domestic objectives. Bismarck probably did think a war with France inevitable and may even have underestimated the influence of the peace party at the French court at this time, but neither Napoleon III nor he were for the moment ready to fight it. The constitution of the North German Confederation was not yet fully accepted, the south German States were by no means itching for a fight on the side of Prussia, nor was Bismarck keen to bring large numbers of potentially disaffected Catholics into the north German state prematurely. When the Luxembourg crisis was submitted to a conference of European powers in May 1867, Bismarck went out of his way to conciliate France by agreeing to the neutralisation of Luxembourg and the withdrawal of Prussian troops from the fortresses.

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D From: C. Clark, *Iron Kingdom: the rise and downfall of Prussia,* published in 2006. This historian suggests that Bismarck deliberately provoked the crisis.

In the spring of 1867, Bismarck exploited tensions in the set piece known as the Luxembourg Crisis. He first secretly encouraged Napoleon III to satisfy his wishes through the annexation of Luxembourg. Bismarck then leaked news of Napoleon's plans to the German press, knowing that these would prompt a wave of nationalist outrage. He then posed publicly as the German statesman bound by honour and conviction to execute the will of his people. The crisis was resolved by an international conference that guaranteed Luxembourg's status as an independent principality, but it could easily have led to a French declaration of war, as Bismarck himself was aware. Here again, Bismarck showed himself to be the master of manipulation, who could blend underhand dealings and public posturing, high diplomacy and popular politics, with great skill.

Answer **either**

8 'Prussia's strengths were merely the weaknesses of her neighbours.' To what extent do you agree with this view of Prussia in the period from 1858 to 1871? **[45]**

or

9 'A triumph of Prussian conservatism over German liberalism.' Assess this view of the German Empire in 1871. **[45]**

Candidates are reminded that they must refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations in developing the argument in their essay.

Roosevelt's America 1920–41

If answering on this Option, candidates **MUST** answer **Question 10** and **ONE** other question.

10 Using these **four** Passages **and** your own knowledge, assess the view that there was a major change in US foreign policy with the start of FDR's presidency. **[45]**

A From: Donald McCoy, *Coming of Age*, published in 1973. This historian argues that FDR's foreign policy in 1933 showed continuity with the policy of the 1920s.

Although the 1920s have traditionally been viewed as 'isolationist' this is to ignore many of the facts. What happened was partly a return to pre-war foreign relations, partly a reaction to the war and the Treaty of Versailles, and partly an adjustment to international affairs in the 1920s. American foreign relations in the 1920s represented a change from pre-war attitudes and the policies of Woodrow Wilson. Although Americans sought to avoid foreign alliances they also extended the branches of friendship and goodwill. However, the US aggressively sought further business expansion. In its quest for trade it extended loans to other countries. As part of its aim to be a trading nation the USA lessened its political interference in Latin America. When he took office in 1933 FDR did little to change foreign policy. However, the USA did improve relations with the USSR and Latin America, the latter through the Good Neighbour policy.

B From: George Tindall and David Shi, *America,* published in 1993. These historians argue that there was continuity in policy towards Latin America between Hoover and FDR.

President Hoover improved relations with Latin America from the late 1920s. He stopped US military intervention in that region. Before he left office, in 1933, he had already begun to withdraw American military forces from Nicaragua and Haiti. Franklin Roosevelt also embraced 'the policy of the Good Neighbour' and soon advanced it in practice. In December 1933 at the Pan-American Conference, the US supported a resolution which stated that, 'No State has the right to intervene in the international or external affairs of another.' Under FDR, US military forces completed their withdrawals from Nicaragua and Haiti. In 1934 FDR made a treaty with Cuba ending the US right to intervene in Cuban affairs.

C From: Peter Brett, *The USA and the World 1917–1945,* published in 1997. This historian believes that FDR went along with isolationist views within the USA but did improve relations with the USSR and Latin America.

During the first, and most of the second administration of FDR, the American people wanted to distance themselves from international relations. American efforts to support the League of Nations in stopping Japanese aggression and the encouragement of world disarmament and economic co-operation had failed. FDR went along with this tide of isolationist sentiment. However, there is a case to suggest that FDR was as much an internationalist as he could have been in the circumstances of the day. Early in his administration he did recognise the USSR and promoted the Good Neighbour policy in Latin America. Also FDR's administration was internationalist in its trade policy.

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D From: Kathryn Cooper*, FDR,* published in 2004. This historian suggests that FDR was not an isolationist in foreign policy.

When FDR became president in 1933, the mood of the USA was distinctly against foreign adventures. However, FDR remained convinced that the US had a role to play defending democracy and human rights, especially against the growing threat of fascism. Unlike most New Dealers, FDR was not an isolationist. Instead, he believed the best way to prevent war was to intervene in international affairs. When war did come, in 1939, he supported Britain with military and economic aid. However, despite his internationalist outlook FDR worked hard to ensure US neutrality throughout the 1930s. He supported the Neutrality Acts and refused to intervene in the Spanish Civil War. With regard to Latin America, FDR announced, early in 1933, that the USA would pursue a Good Neighbour Policy. This would end US intervention in the political affairs of Latin America. He put this into practice by removing troops from Nicaragua and Haiti. However, in Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic American-trained troops helped keep dictators like Somoza and Trujillo in power. To some, it seemed the US was prepared to be a 'Good Neighbour' as long as governments remained pro-American.

Answer **either**

11 Assess the view that the Wall Street Crash was not the **main** cause of the Depression. **[45]**

or

12 Assess the view that the New Deal did little to aid US industrial recovery in the period from 1933 to 1937. **[45]**

Candidates are reminded that they must refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations in developing the argument in their essay.

Lenin and the Establishment of Bolshevik Power 1903–24

If answering this Option, candidates **MUST** answer **Question 13** and **ONE** other question.

13 Using these **four** passages **and** your own knowledge, assess the view that the October 1917 Revolution was more a Bolshevik coup than a popular uprising. **[45]**

A From: R. Pipes, *The Russian Revolution, 1899–1919*, published in 1990. This historian argues that in October 1917 the Bolsheviks were only strong enough to claim a share of power.

On October 26, 1917, the Bolsheviks did not so much seize power over Russia as stake a claim to it. They only won limited temporary authority on that date. They won this authority from an illegal Congress of Soviets packed with their supporters. The authority they won was simply to form yet another temporary government. That government was to be accountable to the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Congress and retire in a month, upon the creation of the Constituent Assembly. It took them three years of civil war to establish real power. Despite their precarious position in 1917, they proceeded almost at once to lay the foundations of a type of regime previously unknown to history, a one-party dictatorship.

B From: S. Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution*, published in 1994. This historian argues that Lenin wanted a single-party state from the outset.

Some historians have suggested that the Bolsheviks' one-party rule emerged as a result of historical accident rather than intention. The Bolsheviks did not intend to take power for themselves alone. But the argument that Lenin did not intend to take power is questionable. Lenin overrode objections from other leading members of the party and in October 1917 wanted to stage an exclusively Bolshevik coup. In the provinces, certainly, the immediate result of the October Revolution was that the soviets took power. It is fair to say that they had no objection in principle to the soviets exercising power at a local level, as long as the soviets were reliably Bolshevik.

C From: M. McCauley, *Russia, 1917–41*, published in 1997. This historian argues that the October 1917 Revolution was supported by the majority of Russian citizens.

If the February Revolution was a haphazard affair, without any central direction, the October Revolution was quite different. It was carefully planned and executed. Lenin and Trotsky had the nerve to go for power knowing that they were taking a tremendous risk and there was no way they could guarantee success. The decision to take power and present it to the second Congress of Soviets was very astute. It was not presented as a Bolshevik seizure of power but as a popular revolution. Arguably, the majority of Russian citizens supported the revolution. It appeared to give power to the workers, land to the peasants, national self-determination to non-Russians and an end to the war. If a majority of people support a revolution it becomes democratic. Socialists expected a coalition government of all socialist parties. What the people did not expect was the Bolsheviks ruling on their own.

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D From: G. Darby, *The Russian Revolution*, published in 1998. This historian argues that Lenin's role in the events of October 1917 was crucial.

What Lenin brought to the Bolsevik movement was a programme distinct from other parties and an unstoppable drive to seize power. In the autumn of 1917 he saw a real opportunity and without him it is unlikely that the Bolsheviks would have taken power in October. It is still probable that the Provisional Government under Kerensky would have collapsed. It had no support and no power at all. However, what would have replaced it is anybody's guess, though a soviet government (i.e. a coalition of socialists) was the only real alternative. Kerensky's blunders over Kornilov, and finally on 24 October when he tried to suppress the Bolsheviks, ensured their victory. In many ways he initiated the insurrection by forcing the Bolsheviks to defend themselves. But while the October Revolution bore all the classic hallmarks of a *coup d'etat*, it was more than that – it was a response to the popular movement. The troops stood by and let the Bolsheviks take over – in the name of the soviets, in the name of the people.

Answer **either**

14 Assess the view that the use of terror was the **main** reason for the Bolshevik success in defeating their enemies between October 1917 and 1920. **[45]**

or

15 Assess the view that it was only the introduction of the New Economic Policy which kept the Bolshevik Party in power between 1921 and 1924. **[45]**

Candidates are reminded that they must refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations in developing the argument in their essay.

Chamberlain and Anglo-German Relations 1918–1939

If answering this Option, candidates **MUST** answer **Question 16** and **ONE** other question.

16 Using these **four** passages **and** your own knowledge, assess the view that Chamberlain was justified in pursuing the policy of appeasement at the Munich conference in 1938. **[45]**

A From A.J.P. Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War,* published in 1961. This historian argues that the motives of Chamberlain at Munich were idealistic, but the results of the Conference were not in Britain's best interests.

The Munich settlement was a triumph for British policy, not a triumph for Hitler. Nor was it a triumph for selfish or cynical British statesmen, indifferent to the fate of far-off peoples or calculating that Hitler might be launched into a war against Soviet Russia. It was a triumph for all that was best and most enlightened in British life: a triumph for those who had preached equal justice between peoples; a triumph for all those who had courageously denounced the harshness and short sightedness of Versailles. However, the settlement helped Hitler. He no longer expected to make gains just by parading grievances against Versailles; he expected to make them by playing on British and French fears. Thus he confirmed the suspicions of those who had attacked Munich as cowardly surrender. Munich became a symbol of shame.

B From Malcolm Thomson, *Churchill, His Life and Times*, published in 1965. This historian rejects the arguments of those who defended Munich.

Britain and France had come together to betray the Czechs. They postponed for eleven months a war there was no chance of avoiding at the price of sacrificing a sturdy democratic country that might have been their ally. They handed over modern arms and equipment and munitions factories that made the finest big guns in Europe. Defenders of Chamberlain have agreed with arguments which were made at the time that his actions were justified by circumstances. His arguments were that Germany was powerfully rearmed, while, on the other hand, the French military equipment was rapidly becoming obsolete and the British army was small. Time for British preparation had to be bought. Others, rightly, hold that these excuses are false. The eleven months delay only made Germany stronger; especially with the equipment she gained from the Czechs. Time was on the side of the Nazis. In Britain there was unease about the price in weakness and dishonour at which the brief peace had been bought. Munich was a shameful mistake.

C From D.G. Williamson, *War and Peace: International Relations 1914–45*, published in 1994. This historian presents a balanced view of the effects of Munich.

It is too simple to call Munich a triumph for Hitler. He had secured the Sudetenland, but arguably had been cheated out of his real aim, the destruction of Czechoslovakia, which was now protected by an international guarantee. Germany seemed in danger of being caught up in just the sort of internationalist agreement that Hitler had always hoped to avoid. However, even the most revisionist of historians would be hard put to call Munich a great victory for Chamberlain. Arguably he did buy more time for rearmament, but to the outside world Munich seemed to be a major defeat for Britain and France. The British ambassador in Tokyo reported that the Japanese reaction was that Britain was prepared to put up with almost any indignity rather than fight. The result was that Britain's prestige was at an all time low.

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D From Alan Clark, *The Tories*, published in 1998. This historian argues that there was no case for war in 1938.

The mass of people was hugely relieved about the Munich settlement. This was not so much because England had gained another year in which to prepare for war (this justification was much put about after the start of hostilities in 1939) but because a completely unnecessary and pointless conflict had been avoided. There had been no war plan. RAF bombers were not capable of penetrating German air space from their bases. The army was tiny and dangerously under-equipped. There had been practically no discussions at senior military level with the French. Equally significant was the attitude of the Dominions whose representatives in London had been urging Chamberlain to compromise. There seemed little likelihood of direct military assistance from them. Chamberlain commented privately before Munich that Englishmen should not kill Germans just because of decisions made about Eastern Europe at the end of the First World War.

Answer **either**

17 Assess the view that British policy towards Germany between 1918 and 1936 was dominated by economic considerations. **[45]**

or

18 To what extent did Britain's guarantee to Poland in March 1939 mark the end of appeasement? **[45]**

Candidates are reminded that they must refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations in developing the argument in their essay.

Stalin and the Development of the Cold War in Europe 1941–55

If answering this Option, candidates **MUST** answer **Question 19** and **ONE** other question.

19 Using these **four** Passages **and** your own knowledge, assess the view that the collapse of the Grand Alliance at the end of the Second World War was bound to happen. **[45]**

A From: Michael Lynch, *Stalin and Khrushchev: The USSR 1924–1964*, published in 1990. This historian argues that the Grand Alliance existed only because of the Second World War.

The coming together of the 'Big Three', the Soviet Union, the USA and Britain, became known as the 'Grand Alliance'. However, a more accurate description might be a 'marriage of convenience'. What bound them together was their desire to defeat their common enemy. They had little else in common. There were constant disputes between the Soviet Union and its two western partners. A major irritant was the question of the Second Front. Later on, as the war drew towards its end and the defeat of Germany became highly probable, the ideological differences between the Soviet Union and the other allies began to resurface. There was fear in the Soviet Union that Britain and the USA would attempt to enlist Germany in a war against Soviet communism. On the western side, there was anxiety that the Soviet advance into Eastern Europe heralded the start of a new period of communist expansion.

B From: David Williamson, *The Cold War in Europe*, published in 2002. This historian argues that differences between the allies meant their alliance was unlikely to last once the war was over.

It can be argued that the Cold War began from the very moment the communists triumphed in the Russian Revolutions of 1917. But if we accept that there was no Cold War proper during the 1920s and 1930s, it was Hitler who created the context for the Cold War when he invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941 and then, just after Pearl Harbour, declared war on the USA. The subsequent defeat of Germany by the Soviet Union and their western allies in 1945 at last brought the two superpowers – the Soviet Union and the USA – face to face. A few days before he committed suicide, Hitler predicted that 'the laws of history and geography' would make a conflict between these powers inevitable. Some historians see this as the key explanation for the Cold War. The causes of the Cold War can be likened to placing a 'scorpion and a tarantula together in a bottle'.

C From: Oliver Edwards, *The USA and the Cold War 1945–1963*, published in 2002. This historian argues that although there were differences in their post-war aims neither Roosevelt nor Stalin wanted their alliance to break down.

Roosevelt and Stalin shared some post-war objectives. Both agreed on limiting the power of Germany. Roosevelt thought that the Soviet Union might be a more important ally to the USA than Britain. Stalin genuinely wanted to remain on good terms with the USA. Yet in many respects their plans for the post-war world were radically different. Roosevelt's most cherished objective was the creation of the United Nations. Stalin's overriding concern was the security of the Soviet Union. His country had paid a high price for victory over Germany. From Stalin's point of view it was essential that the Eastern European states on the Soviet perimeter should have similar political and economic systems to the Soviet Union.

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D From: Mike Sewell, *The Cold War*, published in 2002. This historian argues that there were tensions between the wartime allies but a collapse of the alliance was far from inevitable.

With the onset of war in June 1941, Stalin sought an alliance with the West. It was an alliance of convenience, of desperation, not trust. Ideological mistrust remained strong. This was reinforced by Stalin's suspicion that the Anglo-American strategy was to fight Hitler to the last Russian. During the war, the Soviets discussed post-war aims with their Western allies. Deals were possible, especially with the British as is shown by the agreement on percentages of influence in the Balkans in November 1944. Differences among the allies were not always Western-Soviet antagonisms. Soviet perceptions of Anglo-American friction were encouraged by Roosevelt's actions at Tehran and Yalta on the issue of imperialism. Roosevelt remained confident that he could deal with Stalin on the basis of the mutual trust that had been built up during the war. The British and the Americans remained confident that they could do deals with Stalin.

Answer **either**

20 Assess the view that the USA's policies and actions in the period from 1945 to 1949 were motivated **mainly** by an American desire to protect Europe from communism. **[45]**

or

21 Assess the view that Stalin's policies in Eastern Europe were more defensive than aggressive in the period from 1944 to 1948. **[45]**

Candidates are reminded that they must refer to and evaluate relevant interpretations in developing the argument in their essay.

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